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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)3(2)(b) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Since the administrative court itself ruled that it is unable to hear Appellant's

constitutional challenge, is Appellant exempted from the exhaustion requirement under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-465-14 (1988)?
2.

Given the fact that the administrative tribunal ruled it had no authority to hear the

constitutional claims, that the constitutional challenge in federal court was dismissed and that the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) that
a person against whom the state was proceeding has a right to a neutral and detached judge in
the first instance, did the Third Judicial District Court err when it dismissed Appellant's
constitutional claims and left him without a forum?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is a correctness standard; i.e. whether trial court properly granted
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a question of law in which the reviewing court accepts
factual allegations in the Complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
Appellant Davis is asking this Court to interpret a state statute, Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-14 (1988). This Court does not defer to a trial court's interpretation of a statute, and thus
v

reviews it independently. Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) provides:
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly
prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only aflcr exhaii'sling
all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute
states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or a11
administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3)
(a) A party shall iile a petition for judicial review of
a final agency action within 30 days after the date that the
order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered to have been issiled iinder Subsection 63-46b13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet ihe form
requirements specified in this chapter.

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
Robert Davis is presently being prosecuted by the Appellees under Utah Code Ann. §58-

12-35.1 (1987) for alleged unprofessional conduct. The 155 count Petition seeks to revoke or
suspend Robert Davis' license to practice medicine in the state of Utah. Robert Davis' license
is a property right protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
However, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) and the statutory scheme under which
it operates is unconstitutional on its face. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) empowers the
Director with the authority to administer oaths, certify to official acts, issue subpoenas, compel
production of documents, and otherwise oversee and direct the investigation. In addition, the
statute vests in the Director the sole discretion in meting out the appropriate penalty for
violations of the act. The statute impermissibly vests in one person the authority to investigate,
prosecute and adjudicate alleged violations of the Utah Medical Practice Act.1
Robert Davis raised these claims in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah,
the administrative tribunal and the state district court. All have declined to hear Robert Davis1
constitutional challenges to Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987). The Federal District Court
held that principles of comity and exhaustion demanded that the claims be heard in state district
court first. The administrative court held that it had no jurisdiction to rule on constitutional
1

It is not the purpose of this appeal to brief the substantive constitutional issues which
Robert Davis attempted to litigate in state district court. For purposes of review, this Court
accepts factual allegations in the Complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. St. Benedict's, 811
P.2d at 194.

vu

issues. The state district court held that Robert Davis must first exhaust his remedy in the
administrative court. As a result, Robert Davis has been completely deprived of a neutral and
detached judge in the first instance as contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in Ward
v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Robert Davis has also been deprived of a forum
for his constitutional challenge to the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-1 et seq.9 the Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16 et
seq.y and the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et seq.
Robert Davis has thrice attempted to challenge the validity of the Utah Medical Practice
Act before he is subjected its unconstitutional operation. The order appealed from here required
Robert Davis to exhaust administrative remedies despite an explicit ruling by the Administrative
Law Judge that there was no such remedy exists. It is the purpose of this appeal to seek judicial
review of the state district court's ruling.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i) (1988), prior decisions of Utah's appellate
courts and the United States Supreme Court's recent decision of McCarthy v. Madigan,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992) the district court's ruling was incorrect.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below
Robert Davis filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in state district

court. R.000002-000011; see Addendum "A." The Complaint alleged deprivations of property
and liberty without due process of law in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. Robert Davis

viii

asked for a determination that the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et
seq.y was unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
Instead of filing an Answer, the Appellees ("the Division") filed a Motion to Dismiss
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(a). The Division argued that: (1) Robert Davis' claims were barred
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.; (2) Robert Davis
failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the subsequent recusal of the Director of the
Division, David Robinson, rendered the Complaint moot.2

R.000024-000101. Both sides

briefed the issues and oral argument was heard on February 28, 1992.3
C.

Disposition at the Trial Court
The state district court issued a Memorandum Decision on March 4, 1992. R.000136-

000139; see Addendum "B." The court held that Robert Davis' Mas applied" challenge to the
licensing statutes was rendered moot by David Robinson's recusal.
The court defined the issue as "whether [Robert Davis] can, during the pendency of the
administrative proceeding, bring an action for declaratory . . . relief against the agency . . .
claiming the statute under which they are proceeding is unconstitutional." R.000137. The court
cited Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980) for the principle o\
exhaustion and ruled that Robert Davis "should pursue his remedies in the administrative

2

During the pendency of this case, the Director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, David Robinson, recused himself. This occurred only after numerous
challenges and motions to remove Robinson from Dr. Davis' case for bias and prejudgment.
3

No transcript was made of the February 28, 1992 hearing. Therefore, the record in this
case is limited to the pleadings.
IX

proceeding and if it becomes necessary to address the constitutional issue then it can be done so
in the appropriate manner." R.000138.
The Court left no indication of what would necessitate a consideration of the
constitutional claims and did not elaborate on what procedure may be appropriate.4

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On December 7, 1989, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("the
Division") filed a Petition against Appellant Robert C. Davis ("Davis"). R.000035-000099; see
Addendum "C." The Petition seeks to revoke or suspend Davis' license to practice medicine
in Utah. The Petition was filed under the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l etseq., the Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16
et seq., and the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et seq.
A.

Davis' Challenge In Federal Court Was Dismissed On the Basis of Comity.
On December 7, 1989, Davis filed a constitutional challenge to the licensing statutes in

federal district court. See Addendum "D.M In that complaint, Davis alleged that: (1) the
Division issued illegal subpoenas in violation of the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution; (2) his due process rights had been violated as a result of bias and interest on the
part of the Division; (3) that the licensing statutes were facially unconstitutional; (4) procedural
due process violations due to the filing of the Petition; and (5) disclosure of confidential
information by the Division to the media and other third parties.

4

The Court did not rule on the Division's Governmental Immunity Act argument.
x

On or about November 6, 1990, the Division moved the Federal District Court to dismiss
Davis' complaint or alternatively for summary judgment. The basis for the Division's motion
was that Davis had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and otherwise failed to show
that the action was appropriate under one of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. Judge
Greene dismissed this challenge on the ground that Davis should have been proceeding in state
court. See Addendum "E." Judge Greene ruled that "in comity as well as the doctrine of
exhaustion you ought to be proceeding in state court." See Addendum "F." The Tenth Circuit
upheld this ruling on appeal. See Addendum "G."
B.

Davis' Challenge In Administrative Court Was Dismissed For a Lack of Jurisdiction.

On August 2, 1991, Davis filed a Motion To Dismiss Based on the Unconstitutionality
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) in the administrative court. See Addendum "H." Davis
argued that Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) violates the due process rights of physicians
by concentrating investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory power are vested in one person,
the Director of the Division, David Robinson. The due process clauses require that there be a
separation between the adjudicator, prosecutor and investigator.5
In addition, David Robinson, the Director of the Division and the sole finder of fact, is
biased against Appellant. None of the statutes potentially applicable to disciplinary actions
against physicians provide procedures for the disqualification of a biased hearing officer or
decision maker. Additionally, the statutory scheme fails to provide for the selection of an
5

See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1974); In re Disciplinary Action ofMcCune, 111
P.2d 701 (Utah 1986).
xi

alternative finder of fact.

As a result, Robinson's voluntary recusal has resulted in this power

being exercised by a statutorily undetermined party.
On October 29, 1991, at an administrative law hearing, Administrative Law Judge
Eklund heard oral argument on the motion and ruled that the administrative tribunal did not have
the authority to adjudicate the constitutional issue presented in Davis' Motion. See Addendum
"I." Judge Eklund, the administrative law judge in this matter, stated:
I acknowledge the fact, as set forth in the Clayton v. Bennett case, which is
cited by the Division . . . that Justice Crocket recognizes that declaratory relief
and injunctive relief pursuant thereto is a correct method for challenging the
constitutionality of a statute. I think what I am suggesting from what I just
indicated is I would deny any stay here and leave to you the opportunity to file
that request for a declaratory relief in the district courts and accompany it with
a request for injunctive relief and let the court address the issue whether they
think these proceedings ought to be stayed.
See Addendum "I." Judge Eklund suggested that Davis file his constitutional challenge in state
court, a forum with jurisdiction rule on constitutional issues.
I don't believe I have the authority and would not presume to exercise any
jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme here is unconstitutional on its face.
It is clear, from the cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the
courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you to raise the issue here,
for purposes of preserving it if necessary, for judicial review or independent
action before any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on that aspect
of your motion . . . Because / don't have the authority to address it.
See Addendum "J." (Emphasis added). Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge expressly
precluded an administrative remedy for Davis' constitutional claims.

6

298 P.2d 531 (Utah 1956).

xu

C.

Davis' Challenge In State District Court Was Dismissed On the Ground of
Exhaustion.
Upon receiving Judge Eklund's Order Davis filed a Complaint for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah on
November 22, 1991.

R.000002-000011; see Addendum "A."

The Complaint alleged

deprivations of property and liberty without due process of law in violation of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
State Constitution. Davis asked for a determination that the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et seq., was unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
After Davis instituted the state district court Complaint, David Robinson recused himself
from the licensing proceeding against Davis. R.0001000; see Addendum "K." Davis admitted
that this recusal substantively mooted his First Claim for Relief. That claim had alleged a due
process violation based upon David Robinson's personal and long-running bias against Davis.
R.000007.
However, Davis' Second Claim for Relief, the facial constitutionality claim, was still
relevant because: (1) the statutory scheme does not contain any disqualification procedure for
the Director; and (2) the Utah Medical Practice Act, on its face, unconstitutionally vests
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative power in one person.

R.00007-00008; 000105-

000106. The recusal, in effect, left Davis open to prosecution and adjudication by a statutorily
undetermined party.

Xlll

Davis' Third Claim for Relief was also unaffected by the recusal of David Robinson from
the proceeding. The Third Claim for Relief alleged due process violations under the Utah and
federal constitutions. This claim stemmed from action taken by the Board of Occupational and
Professional Licensing which concerned Davis and adjudicated his rights. The Board took this
action without giving Davis notice or an opportunity to respond to the allegations. R.000009;
see also R.000005-000006.
On December 16, 1991, the Division filed a Motion to Dismiss. R.000024-000101. The
Division argued that: (1) Davis' claims were barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.; (2) Davis failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(3) the subsequent recusal of the Director of the Division, David Robinson, rendered the
Complaint moot.
Subsequently, Judge Noel entered an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See
"Disposition at the Trial Court," p. "x," supra. It is from this Order that Appellant appeals.
After Davis filed his Notice of Appeal, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
against Davis.

On October 8, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge stayed Davis' license

revocation hearing until after the resolution of a federal criminal charges. See Addendum "L.Notwithstanding, these issues are still relevant and very important to Davis because he will
eventually be prosecuted under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987). See Addendum "L." A
license revocation hearing will commence on or about mid-May, 1993. See Addendum "L."

xiv

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) statutorily exempts parties from exhausting the
administrative process where those processes are inadequate or where a party will suffer
irreparable harm. Robert Davis attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the physicians'
licensing statutes under which he is about to be prosecuted. The administrative court ruled that
it was without jurisdiction and authority to hear these issues. Therefore, his administrative
remedy was inadequate. As such, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) provided Robert Davis
with a specific exemption from the exhaustion requirement.

Alternatively, Robert Davis is

exempted from the exhaustion requirement because he will suffer irreparable harm to his
professional reputation and livelihood if he is forced to undergo prosecution by an
unconstitutional statutory scheme.
Since Robert Davis unsuccessfully attempted to raise the constitutional issues in federal
and administrative court, it was error for the state district court to dismiss Robert Davis'
Complaint. This left Robert Davis completely without a forum to litigate his constitutional
challenge. The state district court had original jurisdiction to hear Robert Davis' Complaint
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953).

The state district court incorrectly declined

jurisdiction specifically conferred by statute when it dismissed Robert Davis' Complaint.

xv

ARGUMENT
I.

DAVIS IS EXEMPTED FROM THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14 (1988).
Generally, a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review

or judicial relief. McCarthy v. Madigan,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 1086 (1992) attached

as Addendum "M;" McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249, 251 (10th Cir. 1976); State Tax
Comm'n v. Ivenon, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). Exhaustion allows an agency to: (1)
exercise its discretionary power; or (2) apply its special expertise before judicial review is had.
McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1086. Exhaustion also allows for the creation of an administrative
record for subsequent judicial consideration. Id. at 1086-87.
However, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1988) statutorily exempts parties from the
exhaustion requirement in certain situations. That statute states that:
A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies
available, except that:

(b)

the court may relieve a party seeking judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies if:
(i)

the administrative remedies are
inadequate; or

(ii)

exhaustion of remedies would result
in irreparable harm disproportionate
to the public benefit derived from
requiring exhaustion.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1988) (emphasis added). In this case, Davis' administrative
remedies were wholly inadequate. Furthermore, the balance of equities suggests that Davis be
exempted from the exhaustion requirement.
A.

Administrative Remedies Are Inadequate to Adjudicate Davis' Constitutional
Challenge to the Medical Practice Act.

The Utah legislature has specifically provided that a party is excused from the exhaustion
requirement if the administrative remedy is inadequate. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i)
(1988).

Recently, the United States Supreme Court discussed those situations in which

administrative remedies are inadequate. McCarthy v. Madigan,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1081

(1992).
These situations are: (1) where there is an unreasonable time frame for administrative
action; (2) the agency is not empowered to grant effective relief; and (3) the administrative
body is biased or has predetermined the issues. Id. at 1087-1088. In Davis' case, the first two
situations are present. The third situation was substantially alleviated with the recusal of the
Director of the Division, David Robinson. R.000105; 000136.
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has identified a fourth situation in which
exhaustion is not required. When exhaustion would serve no useful purpose, a party need not
complete the administrative process. Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen, 194 Utah Adv. Rep.
28 (Utah Ct. App. August 20, 1992). In light of this analysis, the state district court's Order
was erroneous.
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1.

The State Court's Refusal to Hear Davis' Constitutional Challenges
Before he is Prosecuted is Prejudicial.

In McCarthy, the United States Supreme Court noted that "requiring resort to the
administrative remedy may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action."
McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1987. When undue prejudice results, exhaustion is not required. Id.
In this case, Davis has been wholly deprived of a forum for his constitutional challenges. As
it now stands, Davis may not have a substantive adjudication on the constitutionality of the
licensing statutes until after he has been subjected to their operation. The Division has zealously
advocated this result in the past:
In the present case, Utah law provides an adequate and meaningful remedy for
administrative and judicial review of plaintiffs claims. The Utah Administrative
Procedures Act . . . provides that a party has a right to judicial review of any
final agency action . . .
Since the issues raised by plaintiff in this case will by fully adjudicated either in
the administrative proceeding or on appeal from that proceeding to the Utah
Court of Appeals, a declaratory judgment by this Court is inappropriate . . .
R.000032-000033 [citations omitted]. This is clearly prejudicial.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on this exact issue. In Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the petitioner was denied a trial before a disinterested and
impartial judicial officer. See Addendum "N.H The Village argued that since the petitioner
could be later be tried de novo in another impartial court, any due process violations could be
"cured."

The Supreme Court rejected this argument stating that "the State's trial court

procedure [may not] be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually
offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached
3

judge in the first instance." Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 575-77 (1973); Wolkenstein v. Reville, 539 F.Supp. 87, 94-5, n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)
("an impartial initial adjudication is an irreducible minimum"); Matter of Ross, 656 P. 2d 832,
839 (Nev. 1983).
Requiring exhaustion of all administrative procedures before allowing a constitutional
challenge is prejudicial to Davis. Davis will "suffer irreparable harm if [he is] unable to secure
immediate judicial consideration of his claim." McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1087. Davis' license
to practice medicine is a property right protected by the Constitution, it is Davis' livelihood and
it is his lifelong profession.

He should be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the

licensing statutes before he is divested of these important interests. Because of the resulting
prejudice to Davis, exhaustion should not be required.
2.

The Administrative Law Judge Lacked Jurisdiction to Rule on the
Constitutional Issues, Rendering the Administrative Remedy
Inadequate.

Before filing his declaratory judgment action in state district court, Davis raised the exact
same constitutional claims before the administrative court. The Administrative Law Judge told
Davis that the constitutional challenge was a matter for the district court. He ruled that the
administrative tribunal did not have the jurisdiction or the authority to rule on the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987). During a hearing held October 29,
1991, Judge Eklund ruled that:
I don't believe I have the authority and would not presume to exercise any
jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme here is unconstitutional on its face.
It is clear, from the cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the
4

courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you to raise the issue here,
for purposes of preserving it if necessary, for judicial review or independent
action before any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on that aspect
of your motion . . . Because / don't have the authority to address it.

See Addendum "J." By bringing the declaratory judgment action in state district court, Davis
did what the administrative tribunal concluded was appropriate; namely, file a lawsuit in a court
of competent jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953).
An agency may "lack[] institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue
presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute." McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1088 (citing
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 497, n.5 (1977) (emphasis added); Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 76, (1976)); see also McGrath, 541 F.2d at 251. (exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine). Where this is the case, exhaustion will not be required.
Simply put, "exhaustion [is] not required where 'the remedy sought is one that the
administrative body is not empowered to provide/" Parkdale Care Center, 194 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 30 (quoting Pounds v. Denison, 766 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)); HattonWard, 828 P.2d at 1074. "The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not require one to
initiate and participate in proceedings where an administrative agency clearly lacks jurisdiction.H
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) [citations omitted].
It is well-established that administrative courts have no power to declare unconstitutional
the statutory and regulatory scheme it is authorized to administer. McGowan v. Marshall, 604
F.2d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 1979). This principle is well settled in federal circuits. Accord
McGowan, 604 F.2d at 892 (It would be "utterly fruitless" to petition constitutional claims to
5

the administrative body because they couldn't rule on them); Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v.
Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Adjudication of the constitutionality of
congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies"); Vargas v. United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 831 F.2d 906, 908
(9th Cir. 1987) ("[D]ue process claims generally are exempt from [the exhaustion doctrine]
because the [administrative body] does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues");
National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[Plaintiff]
was not required to exhaust administrative remedies since it challenged the ordinances as facially
invalid"); Farrokhi v. United States I.N.S., 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990) (Administrative
courts have no authority to adjudicate constitutional issues.); O.K.C. Corp. v. Williams, 461
F.Supp. 540, 546 (N.D.Tex. 1978) ("Complaints that an agency is violating . . . constitutional
rights . . . are excepted from th[e] general rule"). Further, a Utah case recognized that
"[administrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic
legislation." Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980).
The McCarthy case recently stated that "where the challenge is to the adequacy of the
agency procedure itself, such that 'the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy .
. . [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of [the plaintiffs] lawsuit" exhaustion
is not required. McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1088 (quoting Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63
(1979)). Such is the case here. The issues raised in the declaratory judgment action went
directly to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme. The statutory scheme is the source of
the Division's authority to proceed with its Petition.
6
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expertise; (c) facilitating judicial review through creation of a factual record by the agency; and
(d) avoiding repetitive adjudication or to avoid judicial involvement at all. In re Inspection of
Norfolk Dredging Co., 783 F.2d 1526, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1986); National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 940 n.6 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Association for Retarded
Citizens of Alabama v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1987).
None of the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine are served in this case.

An

administrative agency has no authority over or expertise in constitutional issues, so there is no
authority or autonomy to protect. Consequently, time and energy would actually be wasted in
pursuing an administrative remedy. A factual record below would be unhelpful in ruling on the
constitutionality of the statutory scheme: Davis' claims are questions of law.

If Davis is

required to exhaust the administrative process and prevail, his constitutional due process
challenge would be lost. See McGrath, 541 F.2d at 253. Furthermore, judicial involvement
should not be protected against, because the district court has original jurisdiction in this case.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953). Davis should not be required to incur the additional damage
which would result from the futile and pointless endurance of the administrative proceeding.
This is especially true in light of the fact that it is this very process which Davis was attempting
to bring into question in the state district court case.
Since none of the judicially established purposes of exhaustion are satisfied, exhaustion
is not required in this case. Absolutely nothing will be accomplished by requiring Davis to
endure prosecution before raising his constitutional claims.

8
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Administrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's interests in

immediate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in the efficiency or administrative
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applied to determine whether or not it is equitable to require a party to exhaust the administrative
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In Davis' case, the balance ot a n n u o wrongly suggests that Davis should be allowed to
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of law is required.
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^mplete and effectual denial of Davis' due process right to receive a hearing before a fair

and impartial tribunal.
1*

Davis* License to Practice Medicine is a Constitutionally Protected
Property Right.

A physician has a proper!j
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402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Beauchamp v. ,
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F.2d 1229, 1233 (7th Cir. 1988); Domino v. O'Neill 702 F.Supp. 949, 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Property "interests attain . . . constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been
initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or
significantly alter that protected status."

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976).

Therefore, a physician may not be deprived of a his license to practice medicine without due
process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1957).
Accordingly, Davis should be given the full protections of due process of law in the
license revocation proceeding against him.
It is not accidental that many of the specific provisions of the original constitution
and the Bill of Rights are procedural. The only way we know when the
government is behaving within its limits is when it goes through each step that we
require of it. Those are not silly technicalities, but they are the essence of
ordered liberty.
Ramirez v. Ahn, 686 F.Supp. 590, 591 (S.D.Tex. 1987) (Procedural irregularities resulted in
a denial of due process in a physician's license revocation proceeding.) "To perform its high
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
These fundamental principles apply to administrative proceedings with the same force as
they do to judicial proceedings.7 Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221
7

The Supreme Court tried to determine due process requirements in administrative
proceedings in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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are entitled to the protections of due process. Matter of Johnston,
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due process rights in this case are of the utmost importance and should be scrupulously
observed.
2.

Davis Stands to Suffer Irreparable Harm to His Professional
Reputation and Business.

Da1! is* licei ise to practice i nedicii ite is a lso I lis li 'elil i : od, 1 lis s oi iree • :>f in it :< :>i: i le a nd his
lifelong profession.

The Petition, seeks to completely divest Davis of these interests.

medical license is improperly

If his

and i u ICOI istiti iti : i La ill) i: e : ke i, It i i > ill si i f i i i inn lecliate,

irreparable, substantial damage. No series of subsequent appeals and/or reinstatements u, ill
remedy the loss Davis will s n i . . - '^e is even temixMvnly \m i.'Pic I i

p"'ii/t"i i!),!,< medinne.

Even if Dr Davis was eventually re-licensed, the injury to his professional reputation would be
impossible to restore.

Davis' interest in litigating the constitutionality ol i'lici 'lUluk" uiult'i
weighty.

Furthermore, the media coverage of the license revocation proceeding has already been
a

racjj0

news

programs have attended even procedural

[The] exact boundaries [of due process] ai e in idefinable, and its content vai ies
according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies
adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights
of individuals, it i* imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
traditionallv beer, associated with the ji idicial process "
Id. at 4-+^. Quasi-judicwi- proceedings must entail, "at the very least," a fair trial. Id. (quoting
Murchison, 349 U S . AX • \h; see Utica Packing Co, v. Block, 781 F.2d 7 1 , 78 (1986).
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hearings at the administrative court. Notwithstanding any subsequent determination that the
licensing statutes are unconstitutional, if Davis is fully prosecuted under an unconstitutional
statute he will already have sustained substantial adverse publicity and irreversible damage to
his reputation.
3.

The Public Interest is Outweighed by the Severity of the Consequences
to Davis.

The Division has repeatedly argued that its interest in protecting public health and safety
is more important than Davis' interests. While this interest is important, it is not controlling in
all situations and does not outweigh the meticulous observance of an accused is constitutional
rights to due process of law.
C.

Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office is Distinguishable from this Case and
Has No Applicability Here.

It is important for purposes of this appeal to distinguish the Johnson case from the issues
presently before the Court because the state district court relied on the Johnson decision when
requiring Davis to exhaust his administrative remedies. In its Order, the state district court
stated:
Both parties cite Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P. 2d 1234 (Utah
1980). That case however, did rule that plaintiff had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and dismissed the matter referring it back to the
administrative agency for further hearing. The Court said in that case:
Plaintiffs assertion of a constitutional issue does not alter the
necessity for compliance with the requirement of first adjudicating
their claim before the Retirement Board . . . As stated in Public
[sic] Utilities . . . 'If . . . an administrative proceeding might
leave no remnant of the constitutional question the administrative
remedy plainly should be pursued/

12

R.000137. The court's reliance on Johnson for requiring ext laustioi i 1 lei: e vn 'as pei plexii tg.
Johnson is factually and legally distinguishable from the instant case. First of all, ihe
Johnson plaintiffs were not awaiting prosecution. They were not facing an unconstitutional
deprivation

I proivrlv uiihout due process of law, as is Davis. Instead, the Johnson plaintiffs

were government employees who were attempting to recover monies in the state retirement fund.
j"« h mi""! 1 , 'ii'V'1"' 'I

I >• I "'"

11

prejudice and with leave to re-nU-

1'i'fiilli in' i i«i"" \\v\ larulory ir'bd was dismissed without
;«' *ii

^v

^mra^

* MVN nas been told that he ^ ; ^

suiier prosecutii'

ar

irreparable injury to his livelihood and reputation.
In Johnson, there was an ex,
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to district court, which was also explicitly provided foi", l\l ,i,l I.' 11'
mplicable to tl le Johnson plaintiffs.
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In Davis1" case, no rele\}ant administrative

procedure exists, express or implied. Significantly, the Administrative Law Ji idge in Davis' case
constitutional claims for a lack of authority and
jurisdiction.
in i mi | MI» ,! i ii MI .i in inn tlidlivi pKNidun1 iiiilnlonli, '>necified and available in Johnson,
but the agency had express jurisdiction and experti.se:.
plaintii

^ c Johnson court held that the
particular responsibility and

expertise. " "Id Hie Administrative Law Judge in Davis" case, not only had n o experti.se or
responsibility, but had

Further, in Johnson the court found that a reviewing court would benefit from the Board
of Review's interpretation of terms and procedures of retirement plan administration. Id. In
Davis' case, the state district court has original jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953). A full and completed prosecution of Davis would add
nothing to an adjudication of the facial validity of the statutes. The Board of Occupational and
Professional Licensing is not expert in constitutional law, but in medical licensing matters. The
Board has no authority to determine the "constitutionality of their organic legislation." Id.
The Johnson court ruled that the "mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not
obviate the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. In Johnson, there were claims
other than the constitutional issue. Id. In Davis' case, only constitutional issues have been
raised. Therefore, an entire administrative proceeding will not "obviate" the need of addressing
the constitutional challenges as it may have in the Johnson case.
In conclusion, the Johnson decision has little, if any, applicability to Davis' case. The
state district court was incorrect in relying on the Johnson exposition on exhaustion to preclude
Davis from litigating his constitutional challenge.
H.

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED
DAVIS' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AND LEFT HIM WITHOUT A FORUM
Exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement. Norfolk, 783 F.2d at 1528-29; Panola.

762 F.2d at 1556. Instead, it is a matter of discretion with the district court. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1988) ("the court may relieve a party. . ." from the exhaustion requirement);
Norfolk, 783 F.2d at 1529; Panola, 762 F.2d at 1556-57. In this case, the state district court
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dismissed on the grounds of comity and exhaustion. See Addendum "P." ("in comity as well
as the doctrine of exhaustion you ought to be proceeding in state court").
Si lbsequentlj , the Administrative Law Judge specifically ruled that he had no authonty
to adjudicate Davis* constitutional claims.
I don't believ e I have the authority and. would not presume to exercise any
jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme here is unconstitutional on. its face.
It is clear, from the cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the
courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you to raise the issue here,
for purposes of preserving it if necessary, for judicial review or independent
action before any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on that aspect
of your motion
.'Because / don 7 have the authority to address it.

I acknowledge the fact, as set forth in the Clayton v. Bennett* case, which, is
cited by the Division . , that Justice Crocket recognizes that declaratory relief
and injunctive relief pursuant thereto is a correct method for challenging the
constitutionality of a statute. I think what I am suggesting from what I just
indicated is I would deny any stay here and leave to you the opportunity to file
that request for a declaratory relief in the district courts and accompany it with
a request for injunctive relief and let the court address the issue whether they
think these proceedings ought to be stayed.
ic
co

Addendum

• ii.v.

i<oi • ;i - vderai and administrative courts ruled that state district

-. /i u

531 (Utah 1956).

ititi itic i la 1 :1a in: i is.

However, when the claims were presented to the state district court for review, the court
dismissed the case. The state district court first wanted Davis to exhaust the administrative
process. The state district court held that Davis must endure prosecution under the statutes
before he could challenge their constitutional integrity. The state district court never reached
the substantive challenge.
In his Motion in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Davis cited Ward v.
Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) for the proposition that trial court procedure may
not be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the litigant may eventually appeal due
process violations at the trial court level. R.000102-R.000112 at 000110. In the Order of
dismissal, the state district court summarily dismissed the applicability of the Ward case because
it does not "deal specifically with the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies."
R.000137.
However, as support for its exhaustion argument, the Division argued that "any
subsequent appellate review by the Utah Court of Appeals" could cure Davis' allegations of
constitutional deficiency. R.000033. The Division and the state district court failed to take into
account that Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) specifically provides for judicial review before
entry of a final order when the administrative remedy is inadequate. This has been considered
and approved in Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis Co. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Utah
1985) (Although statutes provided for judicial review of the final agency action, district court
has jurisdiction over any case brought to question the validity of an ordinance).
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collateral claims to be lost." McGrath, 541 F.2d at 249, 252. liy dismissing Davis' declaratory
judgment action, on the basis of exhaustion, the state district court
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^e

opportunity to have his constitutional argument heard before he was subjected \> *unconstitutional operation. Thence, the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable in this c^>c

is

is nilitlnl lii a forum for his coiis'titutional claims before he is prosecuted under the siatu:cs
which are the subject of his challenge. The stale district court abused, its discretion unc
I ' Il "', ,* mi 'i -"'I I1]1! 4fil* IN! ml I'MiRS) when it required Davis to complete the administrative process.

CONCLUSION
In sum, there is no administrative remedy to exhaust. The state district court's Order
wholly deprived Davis of a forum for his constitutional challenges to the facial validity of the
very statutes under which he is to be prosecuted. It was error for the state district court to
require exhaustion where no alternative adequate remedy exists.

Such an exemption is

specifically provided for by statute and should have been applied to Davis' case. In every other
adversary proceeding there is a procedure whereby a party may take an interlocutory appeal
when necessary. This is also true with administrative procedures, embodied in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-14 (1988).
Davis respectfully requests that this Court reverse the state district court's March 4, 1992
order and allow him to raise his constitutional challenge to the statutes before he is prosecuted
under them.
DATED this 7th day of December, 1992.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

DAVID E. ROBINSON,
in his individual capacity
as Director of the Division
of Occupational & Professional
Licensing of the Department of
Business Regulation, and the DIVISION
OF OCCUPATIONAL &. PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING at the Department of Business
Regulation, State of Utah, and
the UTAH MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD,
and PAUL VAN DAM, in his capacity as
Attorney General for the State of Utah,

COMPLAINT FOR
INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF
AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

civil NO. Cfioqn 744^1

L

Judge

Defendants.
Robert C. Davis, M.D., by and through counsel, Peter Stirba, hereby complains of David
E. Robinson, in his individual capacity as the Director of the Division of Occupational and

Professional Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, State of Utah (collectively
referred to hereafter as the "Division"), the Utah Medical Licensing Board (hereinafter the
"Board"), and Paul Van Dam, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Utah as
follows:
NATURE OF ACTION
This is an action for declaratory judgment, preliminary injunctive relief, and other
appropriate relief pursuant to Section 18-33-1 et. seq. of the Utah Judicial Code, and Rules 57
and 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for deprivation of property and liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Plaintiff is seeking a Declaratory
Judgment that Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied.
Plaintiff further seeks to enjoin the Division from bringing an administrative proceeding under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-l, et. seq. (Administrative Procedures Act), Utah Code Ann. § 581-16 (Occupational and Professional Licensing Act), and Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 (Medical
Practice Act). The Attorney General has been joined as a Defendant in this action pursuant to
Section 78-33-11, Utah Code Ann., in order to give him an opportunity to be heard.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah, and is presently

practicing medicine within the State.
2.

Plaintiff has a protected liberty and property interest in his medical license, which

permits him to practice medicine as his livelihood.
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3.

Plaintiffs right to practice medicine m the State of Utah, is protected by the due

process provisions of Utah and the United States Constitutions.
4.

For over the past four years, Defendant Robinson and the Division have been

engaged in a repetitious yet intense investigation of Plaintiff.
5.

The Division has filed an administrative Petition under the Utah Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-l, et. seq., the Occupational and Professional
Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16, et. seq., and the Utah Medical Protective Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 58-12-26, et. seq.t seeking to suspend or revoke Plaintiffs license to practice
medicine in the State of Utah.
6.

Defendant Robinson, as Director of the Division, is statutorily vested with the sole

authority to make the ultimate decision, following a finding by the Board that the charges have
been proved, regarding whether Plaintiffs license is revoked, suspended or what other action
should be taken under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1.
7.

Defendant Robinson also supervises discovery, the investigation of claims by the

Division, directs and participates in any hearings before the Division, and is closely involved
with each claim from its inception until he makes the ultimate decision regarding sanctions.
8.

The Plaintiff has been investigated on at least two previous occasions, at the

direction of Defendant David Robinson.
9.

Defendant Robinson has been personally and closely involved in the investigation

of the Plaintiff.
10.

Defendant Robinson has been privy to information concerning the Plaintiff which

is irrelevant to the Petition and will bias Defendant Robinson against the Plaintiff.
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11.

Defendant Robinson has also been involved in protracted prior investigations of

Plaintiff, as well as the litigation of several lawsuits filed by the Plaintiff against Defendant
Robinson for alleged wrongdoings by him in this and earlier investigations.
12.

Due to Defendant Robinson's past involvement with the Plaintiff, his direct

involvement in this current investigation and Petition, and his involvement with the claims made
against him by the Plaintiff, Defendant Robinson is biased against the Plaintiff.
13.

None of the statutes potentially applicable to disciplinary actions against physicians

(Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to 22 (1953), as amended);
Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-1 to 21
(1953), as amended); Utah Medical Practice Act § 58-12-26 (1953), as amended) provide
procedures for the disqualification of a biased hearing officer or decisionmaker.
14.

Plaintiffs business has suffered as a result of the State's pending agency action

and will continue to suffer general and special monetary damages if the State is permitted to
proceed with the planned hearings concerning Plaintiffs license.
15.

Revocation, suspension, or other disciplinary action against Plaintiffs license will

cause permanent and irreparable harm to Plaintiff.
16.

Therefore, Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to avoid the continuation of

this fundamentally unfair proceeding and the potential sanctions or revocation of Plaintiffs
license which may result unless Defendant Robinson and the Division are restrained and enjoined
from taking further action against Plaintiffs license, including bringing the Petition to a hearing.
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17.

Plaintiff has been required to employ the attorney appearing herein to prosecute

this action, and have agreed to pay him a reasonable fee for his service and to pay the costs
incurred.
18.

Concerning an earlier and separate transaction between Plaintiff and the Board,

Plaintiff met with the Board as the first step in complying with certain conditions of his
previously imposed probation. At this meeting, he was instructed to file a practice plan with
the Board.
19.

Following these instructions, the Plaintiff submitted a practice plan and revised

the practice plan for the Board's approval, and made every attempt to comply with the terms of
the probation.
20.

Regarding these efforts to comply with probation, Plaintiff sent a letter dated July

11, 1988 to the Board requesting information on the success of his efforts.
21.

The Board never responded to this letter, and never gave Plaintiff any information

on whether his practice plan and efforts to comply with probation had been approved.
22.

Without any opportunity for a fair hearing before the Board, and in fact without

even any notice to the Plaintiff, at a meeting on July 13, 1988, the Board determined that
Plaintiff had violated the probation.
23.

The Division then brought the aforementioned Petition before the Board, claiming

that Plaintiff had violated the terms and conditions of probation.
24.

The Board's bias is shown by the institution, existence, and results of the former

decision concerning the Plaintiff made by the Board in an unfair hearing in violation of due
process.
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(DUE PROCESS VIOLATION)
25.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs I through

24 above as set forth herein.
26.

The procedure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1, as applied in this situation,

is a violation of the provisions of the Utah and Federal Constitutions, due process and the
Fourteenth Amendment in that the decisionmaker is so intertwined in the claims investigation,
the discovery process, and the actual hearing and decisionmaking process, that he cannot
possibly act in his capacity as an unbiased final decisionmaker.
27.

As a result of the lack of an adequate procedure for the disqualification of a biased

hearing officer, the statutory provisions which purport to permit the Division to revoke or
suspend the license of a physician violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the
Utah and United States Constitutions.
28.

The Division must be enjoined from bringing its Petition before the Board to

revoke Plaintiffs license to practice medicine in the State of Utah for the reason that Defendant
Robinson's extensive participation and long-running bias against the Plaintiff creates a violation
of Plaintiffs due process rights and will result in irreparable injury to Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
SECOND CLArM FOR RELIEF
(STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL)
29.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 25

through 28 above as set forth herein.
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30.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 empowers the Director of the Division, Defendant

Robinson, with the authority to administer oaths, certify to official acts and records of the
Division, issue subpoenas, compel production of documents, and otherwise oversee and direct
the investigation.
31.

In addition, Section 58-12-35.1 vests the director, Defendant Robinson, with the

sole discretion to determine an appropriate penalty for those determined to be in violation of the
Act, including public or private reprimand; supervision or restriction of license; revocation of
license, requiring licenseholder to submit to care, counseling or treatment; requiring participation
of licenseholder in education program, or assigning licenseholder to the direction of another
physician.
32.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 vests in one person, the director, the authority to

investigate, issue subpoenas, adjudicate and determine a penalty in cases of alleged violation of
the Medical Practice Act.
33.

Plaintiff will be irreparably damaged by the operation of Section 58-12-35.1.

34.

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants for all general and special

damages Plaintiff has incurred or which Plaintiff will probably suffer as a result of the violations
alleged herein.
35.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(UNFAIR PROCEEDING)
36.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 29

through 35 above as set forth herein.
37.

The Board meeting held on July 13, 1988 violated the due process provisions of

Utah and Federal Constitutions in making a decision concerning the Plaintiff and his medical
license without affording him his constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to respond to
the allegations before the Board.
38.

The Board is therefore biased, as shown by this proceeding, its determination in

violation of Plaintiffs due process rights, as well as the ongoing depravation of his constitutional
rights to a fair and objective tribunal by being asked to deliberate on a matter that it has already
determined, and therefore should be enjoined from hearing the Petition which concerns the
Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For a judicial determination that Section 58-12-35.1 is unconstitutional both on

its face, and as applied violates Plaintiffs due process rights under Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
as under the facts of this case wherein Plaintiff will be denied a fundamentally fair proceeding.
2.

For an Order of this Court immediately enjoining the Division of Occupational

and Professional Licensing, as presently constituted with David Robinson as the Division
Director, from proceeding to a hearing on the Petition filed by the Division regarding Plaintiff.
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3.

For an Order of this Court immediately enjoining the Utah Medical Review Board

from hearing the Petition filed by the Division concerning Plaintiff.
4.

For general damages.

5.

For special damages.

6.

For reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff herein.

7.

For costs of this action incurred by the Plaintiff herein.

8.

For such other relief as to which Plaintiff may show himself entitled, or as the

Court deems proper under the circumstances.
DATED this

of November, 1991.
STIRBA?£ HATHAWAJ

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
The Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial in the above matter.
DATED this

day of November, 1991
STIR

Plaintiffs Address:
1519 West 9000 South
West Jordan, Utah 84088
jb\rb\pl\dav-rob .cmp
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. DAVID,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 910907449 CV

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al.,
Defendant.

:

This matter is now before the Court is defendants' Motion
to

Dismiss.

The

Court

has

reviewed

the memos

submitted

in

connection with said Motion, has heard oral argument, has taken
the matter under advisement and now rules as follows:
A substantial portion of this Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief has been rendered moot by defendant David
E.

Robinson's

further
What

proceedings

remains

statutes

recusal

is

under

in

of

himself

this

matter

from

involving

estentially

a

which

Division

the

participating

constitutional
of

the

in

any

plaintiff.

attack

on

Occupational

the
and

Professional Licensing and the Utah Medical Licensing Board is

?rQ12C>
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proceeding against plaintiff.
is

whether

the

plaintiff

MEMO DTZIJ: \

The narrow issue before the Court

can,

during

the

pendency

of

the

administrative proceeding, bring an action for declaratory and
injunctive
statute

relief

against

under which

they

the
are

agency

involved

proceeding

claiming

the

is unconstitutional.

Defendants claim that this issue can be decided by the Court of
Appeals

in

the

proper

manner

after

the

hearing,

and

that

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Plaintiff

relies

primarily

on

Ward

v.

Village

of

Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) and Utah Restaurant Association
v. Davis County Board of Health. 709 P2d 1159 (Utah, 1985).
should

be

noted,

specifically

with

however,
the

that

issue

of

neither

of

exhaustion

those
of

cases

It
doil

administrative

remedies.
Both

parties

cite

Johnson

Office, 621 P2d 1234 (Utah, 1980).

v.

Utah

State

Retire-o^t

That case however did rule

that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies *r. i
dismissed

the matter referring

agency for further hearing.

it back to the administrative

The Court said in that case:

"Plaintiff's assertion of a constitutional issue does
not alter the necessity for compliance with the
requirement of first adjudicating their claim before
the Retirement Board....As stated in Pulic Utilities...
"If...an administrative proceeding might leave no
remnant of the constitutional question the administrative
remedy plainly should be pursued.""
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MEMO DECT

The Court is of the opinion that plaintiff should pursi
his remedies in the administrative proceeding and if it becomes
necessary

to address the constitutional

issue then

it can ce

done so in the appropriate manner.
Accordingly defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent
with this ruling and submit it for signature in accordance the
the local rules of practice.
DATED this

^

day of March, 1992.
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DAVID V. ROBINSON

MEMO DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
(

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

day of March, 1992:

peter Stirba
Elizabeth J. Buchanan
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dan R. Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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the

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID, ROBERT C
PLAINTIFF,
VS
ROBINSON, DAVID E
UTAH MEDICAL LICENSI DEFENDANT.
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

CASE NUMBER 910907449 CV
DATE 02/28/92
JUDGE FRANK G NOEL
COURT REPORTER NOT PRESENT
COURT CLERK PAJ

SUM

P. ATTY. STIRBA, PETER
D. ATTY. LARSEN, DAN
ORDERS
BASED UPON ARGUMENT OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT.

Cliti

R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3 312
Attorney General
DAN R. LARSEN - 4865
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

DAVID E. ROBINSON, in his
individual capacity as
Director of the Division
of Occupational &
Professional Licensing of
the Department of Business
Regulation, and the
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL &
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING at
the Department of Business
Regulation, State of Utah,
and the UTAH MEDICAL
LICENSING BOARD, and R.
PAUL VAN DAM, in his
capacity as Attorney
General for the State of
Utah,

Civil No.

910907449CV

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants,

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing
before the Court on February 28, 1992, at 9:00 a.m.

Plaintiff

was represented by Peter Stirba; defendants were represented by
Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General.

Having heard and

considered the arguments of counsel, together with the

memorandums of law, and having filed a Memorandum Decision on
March 4, 1932, it: 13 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as
follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted for the

reasons stated in the Memorandum Decision.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice

DATED this

^

!^day of

(\{ ^ j A V

1992.

BY THE COURT

FRANK G. NOE^i ^ ' ,^v Y-/ /
District Court''Judge
/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, postage
prepaid, this _/.^?L

day of March, 1992, to the following:

Peter Stirba
Elizabeth J. Buchanan
Stirba Sc Hathaway
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
ADMINISTER AND PRESCRIBE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

PETITION
CASE NO. O P L - 8 9 - 73

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
These causes of action were investigated by the Utah Division of
Occupational & Professional Licensing (the Division) upon complaints that ROBERT
CHARLES DAVIS, a licensee of the Division, has engaged in acts and practices
which constitute violations of the Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann., § 5 8 - 1 2 - 1 .
et seq.
PARTIES
1.

The Division is a Division of the Department of Commerce of

the State of Utah, established by virtue of Section 1 3 - 1 - 2 , Utah Code Ann. (1953).
as amended.
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2.

ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS is a licensee of the Division.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

3.

1.

During all times pertinent to the allegations made herein,

DAVIS has been the owner and manager of Family Medical Center located at 1781
West 9000 South, West Jordan, UT 84088. Family Medical Center was and is a
business corporation and not licensed to practice medicine in the state of Utah.
2.

From on or about August 1987 to on or about May 17,

1988, DAVIS employed Dr. Owen G. Reese and from on or about June 7, 1988 to
on or about April 13, 1989 DAVIS employed Dr. Taira Fukushima as hourly parttime employees who had no ownership, control or authority in Family Medical
Center and who worked for wages under the supervision of DAVIS.
3.

On or about July 8. 1987, DAVIS? license to practice

medicine was placed on probation by the Division. This probationary period will
not expire until July 17, 1992. It was found in Division case OPL 86-105 that
DAVIS intentionally misled insurance companies and Medicare by misusing the
term "comprehensive". Conditions of Davis' probation include the following:

a.
Respondent shall appear before the Board for
interviews at the end of his 90 day suspension and every
six months thereafter for a period of one year, and
thereafter yearly until the end of his probation.

b.
Respondent shall present to the Board at his first
six month interview evidence that ten of his medical
records have been reviewed at random by a qualified
practitioner in his field, and that the practitioner has also
examined the billing record and states that the billing is
appropriate to the level of service provided. The name of
the person to be used in these reviews shall be provided
to the Board and approved by it m advance.

000026

c.
Respondent shall provide the Board with a practice
plan which includes acceptable methods of peer review.
Such methods might include membership on a hospital
staff, membership in the county and state medical
societies, a practice system that brings him into contact
with peers such as a group practice or a partnership, or
the frequent use of consultations with an agreement that
said consultations may be provided to the Board.

d.
Respondent shall arrange for back-up by a
physician that has no restrictions on his license with the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
DAVIS has failed to comply with all the conditions of his probation.
4.

On or about January 17, 1989, the Division served DAVIS with a

Subpoena Duces Tecum, together with properly signed liability releases executed
by the patients whose records were sought. DAVIS refused to produce the patient
records requested.
5.

On or about May 4, 1987, Tanya Anne Stauffer consulted with

ROBERT DAVIS at the Family Medical Center because she was having sinus
problems and bad headaches. DAVIS caused health insurance claim forms to be
submitted to Medicare for services rendered to Stauffer on May 4. 7, 9. 12, 22 and
26, 1987. For services on May 4, 1987, DAVIS billed code 70210.26 for "sinus x ray 2 view (reading proof)" in addition to code 70210 for "sinus x-ray 2 view
(taking tech.)" which constitutes double billing. Codes 70210 "sinus x-ray 2 view
(taking tech.)" and 70210.26 "sinus x-ray 2 view (reading proof)" were also billed
for services performed on May 7, 1987. For services on May 7, 1987, DAVIS also
billed code 85021 (complete blood count) and code 85009 (differential white blood
count) which exacted higher fees as they should be rebundled to an 85022 (CBC
with differential).
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6.

For services rendered to Stauffer on May 22, 1987 and again

on May 26, 1987, DAVIS billed code 85021 (complete blood count) and code 85009
(manual differential) resulting in higher fees because they can be rebundled to an
85022 (complete blood count with differential).
7.

On or about November 9, 1987, to on or about June 30, 1988

DAVIS caused billing claims to be submitted to Medicare for Stauffer, billing
numerous visits for allergic reaction and injections of allergen. Health insurance
claim forms submitted to Utah State Department of Health by DAVIS between
November 24. 1987 and July 13, 1988, represent services provided by DAVIS as
having been provided by Owen G. Reese or Taira Fukushima.
8.

DAVIS caused health insurance claim forms to be submitted to

the Utah State Department of Health representing Owen G. Reese as the provider
of services to Stauffer on May 19, 1988, May 23, 1988, May 26, 1988, May 3 1 ,
1988 and June 2, 1988. In fact, Owen G. Reese ceased to work for DAVIS May
18, 1989.
9.

On or about November 16, 1987, David L Wilcox visited the

Family Medical Center, due to what he thought was a bronchial attack. Wilcox was
treated and instructed to return in two or three days. When Wilcox returned he
was seen by DAVIS. Wilcox saw DAVIS several more times concerning his diet
and cholesterol. As a result of these visits DAVIS billed Wilcox's health insurance
carrier, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois, 90080 (established patient comprehensive service) for services rendered on November 23, 1987, December 1
1987, December 11, 1987, December 18, 1987, January 5, 1988 and January 12,
1988. The services provided by DAVIS on these dates do not reach the level of
"comprehensive service".
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10.

For services rendered to Wilcox on November 23, 1987, DAVIS

billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 86171 for "strep". Code 86171 is the
code for a complement fixation test and results in a higher fee. DAVIS billed code
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85009
(differential), and 84435 (T-4). Code 80053 (executive profile) includes codes
85021, 85009, and 84435.
11.

On or about December 1, 1987, DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue

Shield of Illinois codes 85009 (manual differential), 80059 (liver profile), 80073 (renal
profile), and 85021 (complete blood count) for services rendered to Wilcox. Billing
separately for these services with these codes exacts higher fees because they
should be rebundled to a single code.
12.

On or about January 15, 1988, Wilcox turned his left ankle and

injured his foot. He immediately went in to see DAVIS without an appointment.
DAVIS diagnosed him as having a sprained ankle and put on a half splint with ace
wrapping. For this service DAVIS billed code 90580 (emergency care comprehensive service). The service provided was not "emergency care" as
described in the code. DAVIS also billed codes 29505 (long leg splint) which
means a thigh to ankle or toes cast, and 99070A (splint and casting material) when
Wilcox only received a half leg splint with ace wrapping.
13.

On January 16, 1988, Wilcox was experiencing a great deal of

pain in his ankle. DAVIS1 office had closed, so Wilcox waited until on or about,
January 18. 1988, when he had an appointment. At that time, DAVIS took off the
splint, looked at his ankle, put the splint back on and re-wrapped it. DAVIS billed
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois for services rendered to Wilcox on January 18,
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1988. He billed code 90580 (emergency care - comprehensive service) althouqh
this was not an "emergency" visit and the services did not reach the
"comprehensive" level. DAVIS also billed code 73610 (ankle x-rays complete)
although x-rays were not taken. DAVIS billed codes 29740 (cast wedging) and
99070 (supplies and material) despite the fact that Wilcox was wearing a splint
rather than a cast. DAVIS subsequently billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois a
second time on January 29, 1988, for service rendered on January 18, 1989, for
code 29740 (cast wedging). On the January 22, 1989, claim form Davis diagnosed
"Fracture-Ankle/Medial Malleolus." On the January 29, 1988, claim form DAVIS
identified the diagnosis as "Fracture-Fibula". DAVIS then submitted a third bill for
these same services, minus the charge for case wedging, to Smith Administrators,
the insurance carrier for Wilcox's wife. This claim form, dated February 29, 1988.
represents Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, when he was not.
14.

On or about January 22, 1988, Wilcox returned to see DAVIS

for a follow up visit. DAVIS examined at his ankle and put on a walking cast. For
this service. DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive
service) as well as code 29345 (long leg cast) which is the application of a long leg
cast, thigh to toes. The services provided did not reach the level of
"comprehensive" services. Additionally, the service performed was putting on a
walking cast rather than a long leg cast.
15.

On or about January 29, 1988, DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue

Shield of Illinois code 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) for
services rendered to Wilcox on January 26, 1988, for "Fracture - Ankle/Medial
Malleolus". In addition, DAVIS caused another health insurance claim form to be
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submitted to Smith Administrators on February 29, 1988, for service rendered to
Wilcox on January 26, 1988, representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of
services.
16.

On or about February 4, 1988, DAVIS caused a claim form to

be submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois for services alleged to have been
provided to Wilcox on January 30, 1988. DAVIS billed codes 90070 (established
patient - extended service). Extended was not the level of service received by
Wilcox. On or about February 22, 1988, DAVIS caused a duplicate claim for the
alleged January 30, 1988, services to be submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Illinois.
17.

On or about February 3, 1988, Wilcox was dissatisfied with the

cast and wanted a second opinion. DAVIS instructed Wilcox to come in and he
would take the cast off and put him in a "Bledsoe Boot". For services rendered on
February 3, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive
service) and code 99070K (Bledsoe Boot/Fibula). The only service received by
Wilcox was the placement of a Bledsoe Boot. DAVIS also billed code 29740 (cast
wedging) which was not performed.
18.

On or about February 6, 1988, Wilcox returned to see DAVIS for

follow-up care. For services rendered to Wilcox on February 6, 1988, DAVIS billed
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive
service) which is not the level of service performed. DAVIS also billed codes
85021 (complete blood count), 80073 (renal profile), 84132 (potassium and
electrolytes), 80059 (liver profile) and 85009 (manual differential) which creates
higher fees because they should be billed as a single panel.

0CC041

19.

On or about February 13, 1988, Wilcox received an allergy

injection from DAVIS. Later, DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code
95T55 (professional services allergies) and code 90080 (established patient comprehensive service). A "comprehensive" level of service is not warranted for
an allergy injection.
20.

On or about March 23, 1988, Davis caused a billing to be

submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, for services rendered to David Wilcox on
March 5, 1988. Included in the billing are the following services: Code 90580
(Emergency Care-Corn), Code 86171 (Strep Screen), Code 85021 (CBC), Code
85007 (Differential). Code 83715 (lipoprotein), Code 90782 (Injection), Code 9J1850
Aristocort Injection), and Code 71020 (Chest X-Ray 2 views). A diagnosis of
pneumonia is given on this date. Wilcox never consulted DAVIS for pneumonia nor
was this diagnosis ever discussed with him.
21.

On or about December 16, 1987, Bonnie K. Wilcox (Bonnie)

injured her thumb. Her father, David Wilcox, took her to Family Medical Center
where she was seen by Dr. Owen G. Reese. DAVIS caused health insurance claim
forms to be submitted to David Wilcox's Blue Cross/Blue Shield Insurance for
medical services rendered to Bonnie. Included in billing for services rendered to
Bonnie on December 16, 1987, DAVIS billed code 90520 (emergency care - new
patient - comprehensive service). The patient was not seen in an emergency room
as this code implies. The time spent and services rendered during this visit do not
justify a "comprehensive" level of service.
22.

On or about December 19, 1987, Bonnie returned to Family

Medical Center for a re-check of her thumb and was seen by DAVIS. DAVIS billed
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Blue Cross/Blue Shield code 90080 (comprehensive - established patient). The
level of services performed was not "comprehensive". DAVIS also billed code
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85009
(differential manual), 81000 (urinalysis), and 84439 (T-4), although they are all
included in an "executive profile*. DAVIS also billed code 73130 (hand x-ray
complete). DAVIS billed code 99070-A (splint and casting materials). The injury
was not splinted or casted, but was merely taped and wrapped in an ace bandage
by DAVIS.
23.

On or about December 28, 1987, Bonnie returned for, what her

mother described as a follow-up visit regarding her thumb fracture and was billed
code 90080 (comprehensive - established patient). A "comprehensive" level of
service was not performed.

The billing form lists "hepatitis" as a diagnosis,

although this diagnosis was never discussed with the patient's family. DAVIS also
billed codes 82948 (blood sugar), 85021 (complete blood count). 85009 (differential
manual). 80073 (renal profile), and 80059 (liver profile) which results in higher fees
because they should be rebundled. DAVIS also billed code 73130 (hand x-ray
complete).
24.

For services rendered to Bonnie on January 13, 1988. DAVIS

again billed code 73130 (hand x-ray complete). In all, four complete hand x-rays
were taken within one month for the thumb injury. He also billed code 90080
(comprehensive - established patient) although a "comprehensive" level of service
was not rendered. DAVIS billed codes 80059 (liver profile), 85009 (differential
manual), 85021 (complete blood count), and 84132 (potassium and electrolytes)
exacting higher fees when they should have been rebundled.
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25.

On or about January 16, 1988, Bonnie again returned for a

follow-up concerning the healing of her broken thumb. DAVIS billed 90080
(comprehensive - established patient) which was not the level of service-provided.
DAVIS also billed codes 85009 (differential manual) and 85021 (complete blood
count) exacting higher fees because they can be rebundled.
26.

On or about January 28, 1988, Bonnie returned to have her

thumb re-checked. While there her mother asked DAVIS about a rash on Bonnie's
feet. DAVIS suggested that Bonnie stop taking sulpha pills he had prescribed the
previous week for a urinary infection. She did and the rash went away. DAVIS
caused a health insurance claim form in his own name, dated January 29, 1988, to
be submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield charging codes 86422 (allergy panel RAST), 36415 (blood draw) and 99070 (allergy desensitization) for the January 28,
1988, visit, although these tests were without her knowledge.
27.

DAVIS caused a health insurance claim form to be submitted to

Smith Administrators, dated January 29, 1988, in the name of Owen G. Reese
charging the same three codes for the same January 28, 1988, visit. DAVIS listed
the diagnosis as "allergic reaction". The mother, however, says she only went in to
get Bonnie's thumb examined.
28.

On or about January 30, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080

(comprehensive - established patient) after seeing Bonnie for another follow-up
visit relative to the progress of her thumb's healing. The "comprehensive" level of
service was not provided. DAVIS also billed 85021 (complete blood count) and
85009 (differential manual), exacting higher fees because they should be
rebundled.
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29.

On or about January 12, 1988, Glorame Rose Wilcox (Glorame)

went in to see DAVIS because she had an ear infection. DAVIS drew blood for a
pregnancy test, which she requested, and for allergy tests, which she did* not
request. She told DAVIS she had allergy testing done by another doctor, but
DAVIS said he would have to run them again. DAVIS looked into her ears and
gave her a prescription for self-administered drops. For this service DAVIS billed
Smith Administrators, Gloraine's insurance carrier, code 90020 (comprehensive new patient). The description of the visit by Gloraine does not support the
characterization of a "comprehensive" evaluation. DAVIS also billed code 80053
(executive profile) and in addition, codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85009 (differential
manual). 85021 (complete blood count), 84439 (T-4). Codes 81000. 85009. 85021
and 84439 are included in an executive profile (code 80053). Gloraine does not
recall receiving a urinalysis (code 81000) or an arthritis panel (code 80072),
although these billings are listed. The diagnoses of amenorrhea, and asthma,
shown on the billing form, do not correlate with the patient's statement that the
reason for the visit was an earache. These diagnoses were not discussed with the
patient.
30.

On or about January 15, 1988, Gloraine returned to see DAVIS.

He drew blood, pushed on her face, and took x-rays of her skull so he could see
how much it was infected. Additionally he gave her a prescription for Keflex to
combat her sinus infection and told her to stay home from work for three days.
DAVIS then billed Gloraine's husband's insurance company Blue Cross/Blue Shield,
code 90080 (comprehensive-est. patient). DAVIS also billed codes 85009
(differential manual), 85021 (complete blood count), and 80059 (liver profile) which
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exacts higher fees because they can all be combined into a common panel, CBC
and multichannel chemistry.
31.

On or about Monday, January 18, 1988, Gloraine accompanied

her husband to DAVIS' office while he received medical services. She had no
appointment and received no services, however, DAVIS billed her husbands
insurance company, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois, codes 90070 (established
patient - extended service), 85009 (differential manual) and 85021 (complete blood
count) for services ostensibly rendered to Gloraine.
32.

DAVIS billed Gloraine's insurance company, Smith

Administrators, for medical services rendered on February 1, 1988, although.
Gloraine did not receive medical services from DAVIS on this date. DAVIS billed
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). DAVIS also billed code
86171 "(strep screen)", code 85021 (complete blood count) and code 85009
(differential manual). DAVIS caused these billings to be submitted to Smith
Administrators identifying Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, although
Reese did not provide services for Gloraine.
33.

DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 90080

(established patient - comprehensive service) for medical services provided to
Gloraine on or about February 3, 1989. She did not visit DAVIS on this date.
DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85009 (manual
differential) on this date.
34.

DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 90060

(established patient - intermediate service) for medical services ostensibly
received by Gloraine on or about February 23. 1988. She did not receive any
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medical services on this date. Owen G. Reese is shown as the provider of
services and his signature has been written on the billing.
35.

On or about January 13, 1988, Carla Gay Jacobson thought

she had pneumonia and consulted DAVIS. Jacobson had health insurance through
Republic Self Insured (Republic), administered by John Hancock Insurance, which
was the company DAVIS billed for his services. For services rendered to
Jacobson on January 13, 1988, DAVIS billed code 80053 (executive profile) and in
addition billed separately code 84439 (T-4), 85009 (differential - manual), 85021
(complete blood count), and 81000 (urinalysis) which are included in an executive
profile (Code 80053). DAVIS billed code 90020 (comprehensive - new patient)
when the level of service provided was less than a "comprehensive" evaluation.
DAVIS also billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" which resulted in a higher fee than if
the proper code used.
36.

On or about January 16, 1988, Jacobson returned for a follow-

up visit. DAVIS later billed code 90080 (comprehensive - established patient)
which was not the level of service provided. DAVIS billed code 85009 (differential
manual) and code 85021 (complete blood count) exacting higher fees when both
should be rebundled.
37.

On January 30, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080

(comprehensive - established patient), although the return follow-up visit services
did not warrant this level of evaluation. DAVIS also billed code 85021 (complete
blood count) and code 85009 (differential manual) which results in higher fees
because they should be rebundled.
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38.

Diagnoses shown by DAVIS on the claim forms for Jacobson

include pneumonia, melena, angina, anemia, sinusitis, and ulcerative colitis. DAVIS
dicKnot discuss these diagnoses with Jacobson. The patient consulted another
physician on March 16, 1988, and was informed she had neither anemia or
ulcerative colitis.
39.

During 1987, Janice Lynn Cisneros experienced sharp pains in

her lower abdomen. On one occasion she visited the emergency room at a local
clinic. The doctor thought she might possibly have an ovarian cyst and advised
her to consult an obstetrician/gynecologist. Her mother called Family Medical
Center and asked if they had a gynecologist. She was told that they did and that
an appointment would be set up with one of them. On or about January 29. 1988
Janice saw DAVIS, explaining that she had seen a regular doctor who
recommended she consult a gynecologist. She conveyed to DAVIS her
assumption that he was a gynecology specialist and the necessity that she visit a
specialist. DAVIS did not tell her he was not a gynecologist.
40.

Cisneros had health insurance coverage through Gem State

Mutual of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, which was the company DAVIS billed for his
services. DAVIS also furnished copies of his records to Gem State for their
evaluation of his claims. On or about January 29, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State
code 90020.52 (new patient - comprehensive) for services rendered to Cisneros,
although it is clear from the records that this level of service was not rendered.
DAVIS also billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) and codes 81000 (urinalysis).
85021 (complete blood count) 85009 (differential manual) and 84439 (T-4). Codes
81000, 85021. 85009 and 84439 are all included in an executive profile (80053.52)
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Additionally, the patient records for Cisneros provided to Gem State by DAVIS do
not document an executive profile. Instead, they show a CBC with differential
(code 85022) and a dip stick urinalysis (code 81002). The billing resulted 7h higher
fees than what would have been paid had the actual services been billed.
41.

On or about February 2, 1988, Cisneros returned to see DAVIS

for follow-up care. DAVIS later billed code 90070.52 (established patient extended service). The exam described in the records provided to Gem State do
not reach the 90070 level of service. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood
count) and 85009 (differential manual) which exacts higher fees because they can
be rebundled. DAVIS also billed code 81000 (urinalysis) when a code 81002 (dip
stick urinalysis) is documented.
42.

On or about February 1, 1988, Kenneth Dean Wallace had a

cold and thought his two children had strep throats. He made an appointment with
Family Medical Center and took his wife and two children with him. Wallace had
health insurance coverage through James Benefits, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is
the company DAVIS billed for his services. DAVIS took throat cultures from all four
members of the family and billed code 86171 (strep screen) for each. This is
actually the code for a complement fixation test and exacts higher fees than if the
proper code had been billed.
43.

For services rendered to Wallace on February 1, 1988, DAVIS

billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) and m addition he billed codes 85021
(complete blood count), 85009 (differential manual), 84439 (t-4) and 81000
(urinalysis) which are all included in an executive profile (80053.52).
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44.

Wallace had made follow-up appointments with DAVIS for

himself and his children for February 3, 1988, but missed it because they were
feeling better. Davis's office then called and advised that it was important they
return for their follow-up visit. Wallace was informed a previous urinalysis had
shown sugar in Wallace's urine and additional tests were necessary to determine if
he had diabetes.
45.

On or about February 4, 1988. Wallace returned to see DAVIS.

Urine and blood were again drawn and tested. Wallace was told by DAVIS that he
had a urinary tract infection and was prescribed antibiotics, although Wallace says
he had not been suffering any symptoms of urinary tract infection. DAVIS billed
codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85009 (differential manual) which results
in higher fees because they can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with
differential).
46.

On or about February 9, 1988. Wallace returned to DAVIS'

office for a follow up visit. DAVIS billed code 80059 (liver profile) in addition to
codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (differential manual) resulting in
higher fees because these can be combined with an 80059 into a common panel
or can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS rendered
diagnoses of pyelonephritis, mononucleosis, and cystitis which does not correlate
with Wallace's stated symptoms of a cold with no pain or significant problems.
DAVIS did not discuss these diagnoses with Wallace.
47.

On the February 1, 1988, visit to DAVIS, a blood sample was

obtained from Debbie Wallace (Ms. Wallace) by use of a finger prick. DAVIS took a
throat culture from her, had one of his nurses take x-rays of her head t and gave
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her a shot of penicillin. For these services, DAVIS billed code 90517.52
(emergency care - extended service) which is not the level of service provided
DAVIS also billed 85021 ( complete blood count) and 85009 (manual differential)
which exacts higher fees as they can be rebundled.
48.

On or about February 9, 1988, Ms. Wallace accompanied her

husband to see DAVIS, after an employee of DAVIS' asked her to return to see if
she had caught her husband's urinary infection.

They drew blood from Ms.

Wallace, but DAVIS did not examine her. DAVIS said it wasnt necessary because
the type of infection Kenneth had was not transferrable. Even though DAVIS spent
very little time with Ms. Wallace, he billed code 90070.52 (established patient extended service).
49.

On or about February 22. 1988, to February 29, 1988. DAVIS

caused eight (8) health insurance claim forms to be submitted to Wallace's health
insurance carrier, James Benefits, Salt Lake City, Utah. These claim forms
represented medical services rendered to the Wallace family as having been
provided by Dr. Owen G. Reese, when they were provided by DAVIS.
50.

On or about February 8, 1988, Carol Ann Osier called the

Family Medical Center and asked if she could bring in her son, Justin Clay
Chesnut, who had symptoms of a common cold and the flu. DAVIS examined
Justin's ears, nose, throat, chest and breathing. He ordered chest x-rays and had
a nurse draw blood. DAVIS took a strep culture and told Osier the baby didn't
have strep or ear infection but that the x-ray indicated there was something in his
lungs. DAVIS had Justin given a penicillin shot and a prescription for an antibiotic.
For services rendered to Justin on February 8, 1988, DAVIS subsequently billed
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Osier's health insurance earner. Southland Life Insurance, Dallas, Texas, code
90520.52 (emergency care - comprehensive service). "Comprehensive" is not the
level of services provided to Justin. In addition DAVIS billed codes 85009
(differentia! manual) and 85021 (complete blood count) resulting in higher fees
because they can be rebundled to code 85022 (complete blood count with
differential). DAVIS also billed code 86171 for a "strep screen". Code 86171 is
the code for a complement fixation test and results in a higher fee than if the
proper code is used.
51.

On or about February 10. 1988. Osier took Justin back to see

DAVIS for a follow-up visit. Blood was drawn and another chest x-ray taken. The
visit took approximately 5 minutes. As a result of services rendered to Justin on
February 10, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90570.52 (emergency care - extended
service). The level of service provided was neither "emergency" nor "extended".
DAVIS also billed codes 85009 (differential manual) and 85021 (complete blood
count) resulting in inflated fees Because they can be rebundled to code 85022
(complete blood count with differential).
52.

On or about February 12. 1938. Osier returned to Family

Medical Center with Justin. Justin had improved but Osier was sick with the same
symptoms. Justin had an appointment, and Osier asked if DAVIS could see her as
well. Both Osier and Justin went into the examining room. DAVIS spent no more
than a few seconds with Justin and then examined Osier. He then billed for
services provided to both patients. For services rendered Justin on this visit.
DAVIS billed Osier's insurance company code 90080 (established patient comprehensive service). The level of service provided does not justify the
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"comprehensive" coding. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count)
and 85009 (differential manual) resulting in inflated fees because they can be
rebundled to code 85022 (complete blood count with differential).
53

On or about February 22, 1938, DAVIS caused health insurance

claim forms to be submitted to Osier's health insurance carrier, Southland Life
Insurance, Dallas, Texas, representing the provider of services to Justin on
February 8, 1988, February 10, 1988 and February 12, 1988 as Dr. Owen G.
Reese, who did not provide these services.
54. As stated in paragraph 52.. on or about February 12, 1988, while
at Family Medical Center with her son, Carol Ann Osier asked if DAVIS could see
her also. DAVIS examined her ears, nose, throat, and said he wanted to run a few
tests. They drew blood, requested a urine sample and took chest x-rays. DAVIS
returned and told her she had a urinary tract infection. For this visit, DAVIS
subsequently billed Osier's health insurance carrier code 90520 (emergency care new patient - comprehensive service). Neither "emergency" nor "comprehensive''
service was provided by DAVIS. DAVIS also billed code 81000 (urinalysis) although
the service provided was 81002 (urinalysis routine without microscope). Code
85009 (manual differential) was also billed by DAVIS for this visit when no
differential count was done. He also billed code 87088 (urine culture), although no
genitourinary symptoms were complained of. DAVIS billed codes 81000
(urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85009 (manual differential), and 84439
(T-4) in addition to code 80053 (executive profile). All of these tests are
represented in an executive profile. DAVIS billed code 71020 (chest x-ray - 2
views), although no chest x-ray report appears in the medical record.
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55. The health insurance claim forms submitted to Osier's health
insurance carrier identify Dr. Owen G. Reese as the provider on February 12, 1988.
however, Osier never saw Dr. Reese.
56. On or about February 9, 1988, Claudia B. Gibbins visited DAVIS
at Family Medical Center and was treated by DAVIS. Gibbins was taken to an
examination room where an assistant drew blood, took blood pressure,
temperature, and obtained a urine sample. DAVIS came in and took a strep
culture. DAVIS insisted Gibbins have an x-ray and an EKG. DAVIS informed
Gibbins her strep test was positive, gave her two prescriptions and instructed her
to make another appointment in two or three days. As a consequence of services
rendered to Gibbons on February 9, 1988, DAVIS billed Gibbins' health insurance
carrier, Southland Life Insurance, code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive
service). ''Comprehensive" was not the level of service provided.
57. For services ostensibly rendered to Gibbins on or about February
9, 1988, DAVIS billed Southland for services which were not performed. DAVIS
billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" although the test described in the records and
by the patient is code 87082 "(culture)". DAVIS billed code 81000 (urinalysis),
although records submitted to Southland by DAVIS report a dipstick urine without
microscope, which is a code 81002 (urinalysis routine). DAVIS also billed Code
80053 (executive profile), Codes 84439 (T-4) and 86008 (cold agglutinins),
however, no lab results are noted in the records submitted by DAVIS for February
9, 1988. DAVIS billed code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views), however, no chest x-ray
report appears in the records for this date. DAVIS also billed codes 85009 (manual
differential) and 85021 (complete blood count) which results in higher fees because
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they can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS reported a
diagnosis of pneumonia and angina, although there is little or no support for these
diagnoses, based on the records. The health insurance claim forms submitted by
DAVIS to Southland for services DAVIS rendered to Gibbins on February 9, 1988
represent Owen G. Reese as the provider of services.
58. On or about February 12, 1988, Gibbins returned to see DAVIS
for a follow-up appointment. As a consequence of services rendered to Gibbins.
DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). No
"comprehensive" services were described by Gibbins or contained in the typed
records DAVIS furnished to Southland. DAVIS performed and billed code 93015
(treadmill stress test), although Gibbins had no cardiac complaints and had a
normal EKG on February 9, 1988. The following services were billed for but not
performed on February 12, 1988: Code 81000 (urinalysis) - a dip stick urine
without microscope was actually performed. Code 85009 (manual differential) was
billed, however, no differential was done because no slide accompanied the
sample. Code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views), however, no chest x-ray report was
included in the records submitted to Southland by DAVIS. A diagnoses of
"hematuria" is based on a dipstick result which reported large quantities of blood
in the urine of February 9, 1988. This was not confirmed by microscopic
evaluation. The health insurance claim forms submitted by DAVIS for services he
rendered to Gibbins on February 12, 1988 represent Owen G. Reese as the
provider.
59. On or about February 16, 1988, Gibbins returned to see DAVIS as
instructed. DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive
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service), however "comprehensive" services are not described in the records
submitted to Southland by DAVIS. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood
count) and 85009 (manual differential) which results in inflated costs because they
can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS billed code 80085
(microcytic anemia panel) which was not reported on this date in the patient
records submitted to Southland. The diagnosis of hyperthyroidism made by DAVIS
on February 16. 1988, is not borne out by the laboratory results obtained. The
health insurance claim forms submitted by DAVIS for services he rendered to
Gibbins on February 16, 1988, represent Owen G. Reese as the provider.
60. On or about March 30, 1988. Gibbins became sick again and
went back to see DAVIS. As a result of services rendered. DAVIS billed Southland,
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service.) The records, however,
do not reflect "comprehensive" services. DAVIS also billed code 71020 (chest x ray 2 views) although no chest x-ray report is noted in ttle records provided.
DAVIS billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" which is the code for a complement
fixation test and results in a higher fee than if the proper code is used. DAVIS also
billed codes 85007 (manual differential) and 85021 (complete blood count) resulting
in higher fees as they can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential).
DAVIS made a diagnosis of "allergic reaction" on March 30, 1988, but the
diagnoses is not borne out by the records submitted. The health insurance claim
forms submitted

id for services rendered to Gibbins on March

30, 1988 represent Owen G. Reese as the provider.
61. On or about April 4, 1988, Gibbins returned to DAVIS for a
follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered to Gibbs

illed

.000056
- - > - > -

Southland code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service)
level of service is described in the records

A lower

DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete

blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which exacts higher fees because
they can be rebundled to code 80522 (CBC with differential)

DAVIS also billed

code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) when no chest x-ray report appears in the
records he submitted to Southland. The health insurance claim forms submitted
by DAVIS for services he rendered to Gibbms on April 4, 1988, represent Owen G
Reese as the provider
62

On or about April 27, 1988, Gibbms returned to Family Medical

Center to see DAVIS

DAVIS spent only a few minutes in the examining room and

Gibbons was given an allergy shot

As a result of services rendered to Gibbms

DAVIS billed Southland code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service)
The records do not reflect any service as having been performed by DAVIS.
DAVIS also billed code 36415 (blood draw) 85021 (complete blood count), 85007
(manual differential) and 80085 (microcytic anemia panel)
were performed

None of these tests

The health insurance claim forms submitted by DAVIS for

services rendered to Gibbms on April 27, 1988 represent Owen G Reese as the
provider.
63

On or about May 11,1988, May 1 3, 1988, M ay 16, 1988 and May

19, 1988, Gibbms returni i to f irmly Medical Center irnl rpcvivprl ilfpiqpn "li is
from a nurse. Although she never saw DAVIS again, DAVIS submitted health
insurance claim forms to Southland Life Insurance Company charging code 95155
(Professional services alter) with a diagnostic code of 995 3 "allergic reaction" on
each occasion

On each of these claim forms, DAVIS also represents these
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services were provided by Owen G. Reese. The claim form for services rendered
on May 16, 1988, and May 19, 1988, were submitted and ostensibly signed by
Owen G. Reese on May 23, 1988, when in fact Reese left Family Medical-Center
on May 18, 1988.
64. On or about May 23, 1988, Gibbins returned to Family Medical
Center to receive an allergen shot. DAVIS submitted a claim form to Southland.
dated July 28, 1988, misrepresenting services rendered by billing code 90060
(established patient - intermediate service) and 95125.52 (Professional services
allergy). Gibbins did not see a physician and was in the office less than 5 minutes.
DAVIS further represented the service was provided by Taira Fukushima although
Fukushima was not working foi DAVIS in May. 1988.
65. On or about March 5, 1988. Sharon Willette (Willette) took her
t h r e e - y e a r - o l d daughter, Jamie, to Family Medical Center where she w a s seen by
DAVIS. DAVIS took an x i ay, blood test and did a strep ci ilti n e

I ie diagnosed

bronchial pneumonia a n d prescribed Augmentin, an antibiotic. Jamie threw up
each time she w a s given the medication and Willette discontinued its use. She
t o o k J a m i e back to see DAVIS on March 7, 1988. DAVIS again ran a blood test
and g a v e her a sample carton of Septra which he instructed her to give Jamie
t o g e t h e r with the A u g m e n t i n . The next morning (March 8, 1988), Willette took
J a m i e to a pediatrician w h o told her Jamie did not have bronchial pneumonia. As a
result of services i e i i ci e i e ci t c: I a i i i i e c • i i March 5. 1988, a i i d c i i 11 t e f o 11 o r* i i p visit
on March 7, 1988, DAVIS billed Willette codes 85021 (complete blood count) and
85009 (manual differential) resulting in higher fees because they should be
rebundled to code 85022 (CBC < \ II differential).
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1988, DAVIS billed Blevins' insurance carrier, Pacific Heritage Administration, Inc.,
Portland, Oregon, code 80053 (executive profile) as well as codes 85021 (complete
blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4) although codesL85021,
85007 and 84439 are included in an executive profile (code 80053). DAVIS also
billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" which is the code for a complement fixation test
and results in a higher fee than if the proper code is used. DAVIS caused health
insurance claim forms to be submitted to Pacific Heritage Administration, Inc.,
representing services were provided on April 14, 1988, by Owen G. Reese, when
they were not.
71. On or about April 19, 1988, Blevins returned to Family Medical
Center for a follow-up visit as instructed. As a consequence of services rendered
to Blevins on April 19, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient comprehensive service). The patient did not receive this level of service. DAVIS
billed code 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which
exacts higher fees because these can be rebundled as code 85022 (CBC with
differential). DAVIS also charged code 93262 (24-hour holter monitor) which was
not received by the patient.
72. On or about April 22, 1988, Blevins returned to Family Medical
Center to have her cholesterol checked. DAVIS billed code 90060 (established
patient - intermediate service). "Intermediate" was not the level of service
performed.
73. On or about May 16, 1988, Blevins called DAVIS' office to ask
DAVIS about a prescription. Blevins spoke with an assistant who represented that
DAVIS agreed to call in the prescription. DAVIS thereafter caused a health
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insurance claim form to be submitted to Pacific Heritage Administration, Inc. billing
code 90050 (established patient - limited service). DAVIS also represented the
sefvices rendered to Blevins on April 22, 1988 and May 16, 1988, as having been
provided by Owen G. Reese, when they were not.
74. On or about April 23, 1988, Blevins took her son, Martin, to see
DAVIS for what she thought was a strep throat

In connection with services

rendered to Martin on April 23, 1988, DAVIS billed Smith Administrators, Murray.
Utah code 86171 (strep screen). This code is incorrect for a strep screen and
exacts higher fees than if the proper code is used. DAVIS also billed codes 85021
(complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which results in inflated
fees because these should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). On
the claim form submitted to Smith Administrators, DAVIS represented the services
as having been provided by Owen G. Reese, when in fact they were provided by
DAVIS.
75. On or about April 21, 1988, Mildred Marie Martin cut her thumb
and consulted DAVIS. DAVIS sutured her thumb and subsequently billed Martin's
insurance company, Smith Administrators, codes 90517.52 (emergency care extended service) and 13132 (laceration repair - complex). 905 codes are
designated for use in hospital emergency rooms. Code 13132 should include the
cost of the office visit. Additionally, the procedures the patient described would
not fall in the category of code 13132.
76. During the course of suturing Martin's thumb on April 21, 1988
DAVIS indicated he wanted to purchase a motorhome. Martin told him she had a
motorhome for sale and DAVIS expressed an interest in it. On or about April 25.
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1988, Martin drove her motorhome to DAVIS' office so DAVIS could drive it. She
arrived early and waited in his office 10 to 15 minutes before he came out and
toek the motorhome for a drive. DAVIS subsequently billed Smith Administrators,
code 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) for services ostensibly
rendered to Martin on April 25, 1988. DAVIS recorded "hiatal hernia" as the
diagnosis for the alleged visit. Martin has never consulted DAVIS for a "hiatal
hernia", nor has he discussed this diagnosis with her. DAVIS caused the claim
form to be submitted representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of services.
77. On or about May 16, 1988, Martin experienced a bladder infection
and returned to see DAVIS. DAVIS did not see Martin, but instructed one of his
assistants to obtain a urine specimen. Martin was unable to void urine and left the
office without being seen by DAVIS. DAVIS subsequently billed Martin's health
insurance carrier, Smith Administrators, Murray, Utah, code 90070 (established
patient - extended service), 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count),
85007 (manual differential) and 87088 (urine culture). DAVIS did not examine
Martin on May 16. 1988 and she did not provide either blood or urine on that date
DAVIS caused the claim form to be submitted representing Owen G. Reese as the
provider of services.
78. On or about April 22, 1988, Cary Wayne Patterson jarred his
back. He sought treatment at Family Medical Center and was seen by DAVIS on
April 25, 1988. As a result of services rendered to Patterson on April 25, 1988,
DAVIS billed Patterson's health insurance carrier, U.B.I.T., Salt Lake City, Utah,
code 90520.52 (emergency care - comprehensive services.) Patterson was not
treated on an "emergency" basis, nor do the services reach the "comprehensive
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level. The claim form submitted to U.B.I.T., Salt Lake City, Utah, by DAVIS also
represented the services were provided by Owen G. Reese, when they were not.
79. On or about April 25, 1988, Donald W. Stump sought services at
Family Medical Center because he had a sore throat and was not feeling well. He
was seen by Dr. Owen G. Reese. As a result of services rendered by Reese to
Stump on April 25, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt Lake City,
Utah code 90017.52 (new patient - extended service), while the records of Owen
G. Reese submitted by DAVIS to Gem State for evaluation show that this level of
service was not given. Code 86171 (strep screen) was also billed. This is the
code for a complement fixation test and results in a higher fee than if the proper
code is used. Code 80053.52 (executive profile) was billed as well as codes
85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4)
although codes 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in an 80053.52.
80. On or about May 14, 1988, Stump returned to Family Medical
Center for a follow-up visit, because DAVIS' office staff had represented to him
that abnormal laboratory results were found on his first visit. As a consequence of
services rendered to Stump on May 14, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State code 90080
(established patient - comprehensive service). This was not the level of service
provided by DAVIS. The only service performed was the drawing of some blood.
DAVIS billed codes 84132 (potassium and electrolytes), 82948 (blood sugar), and
80059 (liver profile), which exacts higher fees because potassium, electrolytes,
sugar, and liver profiles can all be combined into a single multi-channel chemistry
code. DAVIS caused health insurance claim forms to be submitted to Gem State
Mutual of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, representing these services were provided by
Owen G. Reese, when they were not.
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81. On or about May 18, 1988, Mr. Stump accompanied his wife,
Ester F. Stump (Ms. Stump) for a follow-up visit to see DAVIS because she was
nojt feeling well. Stump mentioned that he was having trouble with impotgncy and
DAVIS suggested they try a hormone shot. At this time, DAVIS gave Stump a
hormone shot without examining him, and billed code 90060 (established patient intermediate service). Stump did not receive any service other than the shot.
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt
Lake City. Utah, representing these services were provided by Owen G. Reese,
when they were not.
82. On or about June 1, 1988. Stump returned to Family Medical
Center for a hormone shot. Stump walked in. got the shot and left. DAVIS billed
code 90060.52 (established patient - intermediate service). DAVIS caused the
claim form to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah,
representing the services were provided by Owen G. Reese, when they were not.
83. On or about April 25, 1988, Ms. Stump went to Family Medical
Center for treatment of a strep throat and bronchitis. As a result of services
rendered to Ms. Stump on April 25, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State Mutual of Utah.
Salt Lake City. Utah code 90020.52 (new patient - comprehensive service).
Records submitted to Gem State by DAVIS for evaluation indicate that a lower
level of service was provided. DAVIS billed code 86171 (strep screen) which
results in higher fees than if the proper code is used. DAVIS billed code 80053.52
(executive profile) and in addition he billed codes 85021 (complete blood count).
85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4) although codes 85021, 85007 and
84439 are included in an 80053.52. DAVIS also billed code 71020 (chest x-ray 2
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views), however, no chest x-ray report is found in the records DAVIS submitted to
Gem State. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah representing these services were provided by Owen G.
Reese, when they were not.
84. On or about May 14, 1988, Ms. Stump returned to Family Medical
Center because DAVIS' nurse had called and informed her there were problems
with her tests and they needed to run more. DAVIS had his staff draw blood and
take chest x-rays. In connection with services rendered to Ms. Stump on May 14,
1988. DAVIS billed Gem State code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive
service). The records and patient describe a lower level of service. DAVIS billed
codes 82948 (blood sugar). 80073 (renal profile), and 80059 (liver profile) creating
inflated fees because these can be combined into a simple multi-channel
chemistry. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah representing services were provided by Owen G. Reese,
when they were not.
85. On or about May 18f 1988, Ms. Stump returned to see DAVIS
after he contacted her and insisted he needed to check her blood again. As a
result of services rendered to Ms. Stump on May 18. 1988, DAVIS billed Gem
State code 94010.52 (pulmonary functions), however, pulmonary function tests
were not done. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007
(manual differential) resulting in inflated fees because they can be rebundled.
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt
Lake City, Utah representing these services were provided by Owen G. Reese,
when they were not. The signature of Owen G. Reese on the claim forms is dated
May 23, 1988, when in fact Reese left Family Medical Center on May 18, 1988.
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86. On or about April 26. 1988, Connie J. Halcom's (Ms. Halcom)
daughter, Bre, sustained a laceration on the top of her head. Ms. Halcom took her
to-Family Medical Center during regular office hours where the assistants' cleaned
and deadened the wound. DAVIS sutured the wound with stitches and told her to
return in a week to have the stitches taken out. DAVIS billed Alta Health
Strategies, Inc. (Alta), West Valley City, Utah, codes 90515.52 (emergency care intermediate service) and 13121 (laceration repair 2). The office visit and laceration
repair are both covered by billing code 13121. The use of a code 905 is reserved
for use in hospital emergency rooms. Code 13121 describes a complicated wound
closure. DAVIS billed code 70250 (skull x-ray 1-3 views) although skull x-rays are
not required for simple scalp lacerations. DAVIS caused health insurance claim
forms to be submitted to Alta representing services were provided by Owen G.
Reese, when they were not.
87. On or about May 5, 1988, Bre returned to see DAVIS to have the
stitches removed. For this service, DAVIS billed Alta codes 90060.52 (established
patient - intermediate service) and 99070G (sterile surgical kit). Removal of
stitches does not require "intermediate service" and a sterile surgical kit is not
needed to remove stitches. A diagnosis of "cellulites" was rendered by DAVIS
during this visit, although there is no clear basis for this diagnosis and the
diagnosis was not discussed with the family. DAVIS caused a claim form to be
submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of these services,
when in fact they were provided by DAVIS.
88. On or about April 26, 1988, while at Family Medical Center with
his daughter, Bre, James R. Halcom (James), decided to have an x-ray taken of
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his finger which he had injured a few weeks earlier. DAVIS billed Alta code
90580.52 (emergency care - established patient - comprehensive service). The
use of a 905 emergency room code is for use in a hospital emergency room. In
addition the services provided did not reach the "comprehensive" level billed.
DAVIS also billed code 99070 (supplies and materials) when supplies and materia's
were not provided. DAVIS caused a claim form to be submitted to Alta
representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, when in fact they were
provided by DAVIS.
89. Michelle Halcom hurt her shoulder and her mother called Family
Medical Center and made an appointment with DAVIS for on or about June 10,
1988. during regular business hours. DAVIS billed Alta code 90517.52 (emergency
care - new patient - extended service). The 905 code is designated for use in
hospital emergency rooms. DAVIS also billed code 90070A (splint and casting
material), although only a cloth sling was provided. DAVIS caused a claim form to
be submitted to Alta representing these services were rendered by Owen G.
Reese, when they were not.
90. On or about May 2, 1988, Ms. Halcom consulted DAVIS for
treatment of a ganglion cyst on her left wrist. As a result of services rendered to
Ms. Halcom on May 2, 1988, DAVIS billed Alta codes 85021 (complete blood count)
and 85007 (manual differential). Charging these codes exacts higher fees because
they should be combined into code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS also
billed code 20550 (trigger point injection) in addition to code 9J0810 (cortisone
injection). Ms. Halcom claims no trigger point injection was administered. DAVIS
caused a claim form to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as the
provider of services, when he was not.
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9 1 . On or about May 5, 1988, Ms. Halcom returned to see DAVIS for
treatment of her ganglion cyst. In connection with this service, DAVIS billed Aita
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service.) The visit lasted
approximately 5 minutes and consisted of a cortisone injection. DAVIS also billed
codes 80053.52 (executive profile) as well as codes 84439 (T-4), and 81000
(urinalysis). Codes 84439 and 81000 are included in an executive profile (code
80053.52). DAVIS billed code 9J0810 (cortisone injection) and 20550 (trigger point
injection), although only a cortisone injection was provided on this date. DAVIS
caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as the
provider of services, when he was not.
92. DAVIS billed Alta code 90070 (established patient - extended
service) for services rendered to Ms. Halcom on May 13, 1988. The patient
describes the visit as no more than five minutes. "Extended" was not the level of
service provided. DAVIS also billed code 90060 (established patient - intermediate
service) for services rendered to Ms. Halcom on May 20, 1988. and again on June
2. 1988. although the patient describes the visits as no more than five minutes
each. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G.
Reese as the provider of services on May 13. 1988, May 20. 1988 and June 2.
1988, however, Reese left Family Medical Center on May 18, 1988.
93. On or about May 5, 1988, Ms. Halcom took her daughter, Jaylene
Hardman, to DAVIS because Jaylene was on Ritalin therapy and required a
physician evaluation. DAVIS gave Jaylene a physical examination, found two warts
and decided to treat them. DAVIS later billed Alta code 90020 (new patient comprehensive service). The "comprehensive" level of service was not provided.
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DAVIS also billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000
(urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439
(T-4).

Codes 81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in an 80053.52.

DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as
the provider of services, when he was not.
94. On or about May 13, 1988, Jaylene returned to see DAVIS as
instructed, for further treatment of her warts. DAVIS later billed Alta code 90070
(established patient - extended service) and code 11420 (lesion removal 0.5 cm).
DAVIS recorded the diagnosis for code 90070 as "hyperactivity" and the diagnosis
for code 11420 as "lesion removal-hand". The diagnosis of "hyperactivity" was
not discussed with the mother. Code 11420 is a non-asterisk code which implies
coverage of the office call. DAVIS caused a claim form to be submitted to Alta
representing Taira Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not.
95. On or about May 20, 1988, Ms. Halcom took Devin Hardman to
DAVIS. In connection with services provided to Devin on May 20, 1988, DAVIS
billed Alta code 80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis),
85021 (complete blood count); 85007 (manual differential), and 84436 (T-4). Codes
81000, 85021, 85007 and 84436 are included in an executive profile (code 80053).
96. On or about May 23, 1988, Devin returned to see DAVIS for a
follow-up visit and DAVIS later billed Alta code 90060 (established patient intermediate service). A lower level of service was provided in the five minute visit
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing services rendered
to Devin on May 20, 1988 and May 23, 1988 were provided by Owen G. Reese.

C0Q070
-

36

-

97. On or about June 2, 1988, Devin returned to see DAVIS for a
follow-up visit. DAVIS subsequent billed Alta code 90060 (established patient intermediate service), although DAVIS did not spend more than five minutes with
Devin. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count), and 85007 (manual
differential) resulting in inflated fees because they can be rebundled to code 85022
(CBC with differential). DAVIS also billed code 99070G (sterile surgical kit), which
would be unnecessary for suture removal. DAVIS caused a claim form to be
submitted to Alta representing services on June 2, 1988 were rendered by Owen
G. Reese.
98. On or about April 30. 1988, Vickilyn M. Patterson took her four
year old daughter, Shalise. to see DAVIS because she had a sore throat. DAVIS
examined Shalise, took a swab culture of Shalise's throat and gave her a
prescription for an antibiotic. The strep culture was negative and DAVIS said
Shalise had tonsillitis. DAVIS subsequently billed Patterson's insurance, Mail
handlers, Rockville, Maryland, codes 36415 (blood draw), 85021 (complete blood
count) and 85007 (manual differential) for services rendered to Shalise, although no
blood was drawn. DAVIS also billed code 861 71.52 for a "strep screen". Code
86171 is the code for a compliment fixation test and results in higher fees than if
the proper code is used. These claim forms represented that services were
rendered by Owen G. Reese, when they were not.
99. On or about May 5, 1988, Pamela S. Whitlock (Whitlock)
consulted DAVIS for treatment of a cough. He diagnosed her as having
pneumonia. In connection with services rendered to Whitlock on May 5, 1988,
DAVIS billed Equicor, Albuquerque, New Mexico, code 80053 (executive profile) in
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addition to codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and
84439 (T-4). Codes 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in an executive profile.
code 80053. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Equicor representing
services rendered to Whitlock on May 5, 1988, were provided by Owen G. Reese
when they were not.
100. On or about May 7, 1988, Whitlock returned to see DAVIS for a
follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered on May 7, 1988. DAVIS billed
codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which exacts
higher fees because both can be combined into code 85022 (CBC with differential)
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Equicor representing services
rendered to Whitlock on May 7, 1988, were performed by Owen G. Reese, when
they were not.
101. On or about June 2, 1988, Whitlock returned to see DAVIS for a
follow-up visit. As a consequence of services rendered on June 2, 1988, DAVIS
billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which
exacts higher fees because both can be combined into code 85022 (CBC with
differential). DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Equicor representing
services rendered to Whitlock on June 2, 1988. were performed by Owen G. Reese
and ostensibly signed by Owen G. Reese on June 7, 1988t although Reese no
longer worked at the Family Medical Center.
102. On or about May 17, 1988, Whitlock took her five year old
daughter, Wendee, to DAVIS because she thought Wendee had an ear infection
DAVIS examined Wendee's ears, took a swab for a strep screen, and one of his
assistants pricked Wendee's finger for a glass straw blood sample. In connection
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with services rendered to Wendee on May 17, 1988, DAVIS billed Equicor code
90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). The level of service provided was
not "comprehensive". DAVIS billed code 36415 (blood draw), this code number
describes a "venepuncture" which is a different and more costly procedure. DAVIS
also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential)
which exacts higher fees because they should be combined together in code
85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS rendered a diagnosis of pneumonia, which he
did not discuss with the mother. DAVIS submitted claim forms to Equicor
representing services were provided to Wendee by Owen G. Reese, when they
were not.
103. Whitlock was instructed to bring Wendee back in two days, so
she returned to see DAVIS on May 19? 1988, for a follow-up visit. DAVIS took
another finger stick blood sample and looked into Wendee's ears. DAVIS also
attempted to obtain a urine sample, which Wendee was unable to provide. As a
result of services rendered to Wendee on May 19, 1988, DAVIS subsequently billed
Equicor code 90070 (established patient - extended service). "Extended" service
is a higher level than that which was provided. DAVIS billed code 36415 "(blood
draw)", however, the mother described a finger stick blood sample and not a
"venepuncture" as the billed code indicates. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete
blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which exacts higher fees because
these codes should be combined as code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS
also billed code 81000 (urinalysis) which according to the mother was not done.
DAVIS submitted a claim form to Equicor representing services were provided to
Wendee on May 19, 1988, by Owen G. Reese, when they were not.
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104. On or about May 12, 1988, Rolando I. Galano needed to obtain
a blood test and made an appointment at Family Medical Center for that evening.
When Galano went in, he filled out a family medical history and checked the box
indicating genetic blood pressure runs in his family. A nurse drew blood before
DAVIS came in. DAVIS asked if Galano was consulting a doctor and he said "no"
A nurse took Galano's blood pressure, which was high. DAVIS wanted to do an
EKG, treadmill and other tests but Galano refused. DAVIS gave Galano a booklet
on blood pressure, a week's supply of Tenormin and instructed him to come back
to obtain results of his blood test. Galano related DAVIS spent no more than five
minutes with him

In connection with services rendered to Galano on May 12,

1988, DAVIS billed Educators Mutual. Murray, Utah, code 90020 (new patient comprehensive service). DAVIS billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) in addition
to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual
differential), 86593 (VDRL) and 84439 (T-4), although codes 81000, 85021, 85007,
86593 and 84439 are found in an executive profile. DAVIS caused claim forms to
be submitted to Educators Mutual representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of
services, when he was not.
105. On or about May 17, 1988, Galano returned to see DAVIS.
DAVIS gave him the results of his blood tests, which were normal. DAVIS wanted
to draw more blood, claiming they made the mistake of sending the entire sample
to the laboratory, when they usually keep some in their office for their own
analysis. Galano let them draw more blood. His blood pressure was still high and
DAVIS insisted on doing an EKG which was apparently normal. Galano said the
Tenormin made him sick and DAVIS gave him another type of drug. DAVIS spent
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approximately ten minutes with him. DAVIS billed Educators Mutual code 90070
(established patient - extended service). The records DAVIS submitted to
Edjjcators Mutual do not show services to justify an "extended" level of service.
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Educators Mutual representing
Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, when he was not.
106. On or about June 1, 1988, Galano returned to see DAVIS.
DAVIS billed Educators Mutual code 90070 (established patient - extended
service) for the visit. The service described in the progress notes submitted by
DAVIS to Educators Mutual describe a lower level of service. DAVIS also billed
code 80059 (hepatitis panel) which should be found in the executive profile (code
80053) done on May 12, 1988. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to
Educators Mutual representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of services on June
1, 1988.
107. On or about August 15, 1988, Linda H. Henline (Henline) took
her 18 year old son, Robert, to DAVIS, because Robert was leaving for college and
had experienced a stomach ache all summer. DAVIS drew blood, took urine and
stool samples and x-rays of Robert's chest and stomach. DAVIS diagnosed
Robert as having either cancer or tuberculosis. DAVIS gave Robert a prescription
for Septra saying Robert's problem could possibly be a parasite, but he didn't
think so. Henline became upset and sought a second opinion. Three days later,
August 18, 1988, a second physician ran tests similar to those run by DAVIS and
reported a perfectly normal examination. The second doctor diagnosed Robert as
having a spastic colon.
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108. On or about August 18, 1988, Sheri Murray (Murray) consulted
DAVIS for treatment of hay fever. DAVIS took sinus x-rays, six tubes of blood, ran
a BAST test and checked her rectum. As a result of services rendered to Murray
on August 18, 1988, DAVIS billed her insurance carrier, Value Care, Salt Lake City,
Utah, code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). DAVIS subsequently
provided Value Care with typewritten records for their evaluation of the claim. The
notes provided by DAVIS describe a lower level of service. The rectal examination
is not noted in DAVIS' progress notes. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood
count) and 85007 (manual differential) which creates higher fees because they
should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS billed code
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete
blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4). An executive profile
(80053) includes codes 81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439.
109. On or about August 23, 1988, Murray returned so DAVIS could
recheck her sinuses. DAVIS took more x-rays, drew more blood and checked her
rectum. For services rendered on August 23, 1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code
70210 (sinus x-ray). The need for a second set of sinus x-rays following the ones
taken on August 18, 1988, is not documented. DAVIS also billed code 90080
(established patient - comprehensive service). A lower level of service is
described in the records submitted with the claim. DAVIS billed codes 85021
(complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential), this causes higher costs
because they should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential).
110. On or about August 26, 1988, Murray returned to see DAVIS.
According to Murray, she returned to receive a shot of cortisone and to see if she

000076
-

42 -

had gout as DAVIS had claimed on her previous visit. Blood was drawn and
DAVIS performed another rectal examination. DAVIS pushed on her face and aave
her a laxative. He again billed Value Care code 90080 (established patientcomprehensive service). Records indicate a lower level of service was performed
DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential)
which creates inflated fees because they should be rebundled.
111. On or about September 8, 1988. Murray returned to see DAVIS
She was given a shot of cortisone for her allergies and an assistant attempted to
obtain more blood. Murray questioned the necessity of drawing more blood and
none was taken. DAVIS gave Murray prescriptions for Prednisone, Nolamine and
Fionnal. For services rendered, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90080 (established
patient - comprehensive service). The contact described by the patient would not
be consistent with a "comprehensive" level of service.
112. On or about September 22, 1988. Murray returned to see DAVIS
for follow-up care. DAVIS later billed Value Care for a number of blood tests
including renal profile, liver profile. CBC and differential although none of these
tests were performed. The codes used on this billing 85021 (complete blood
count), 85007 (manual differential). 80073 (renal profile). 80058 (liver profile) should
have been done as a panel of tests.
113. On or about October 5, 1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code
90070 (established patient - extended service) for a return visit Murray made on
September 24, 1988, to be informed of the results of a CAT scan she had taken at
St. Marks Hospital. The CAT scan results were not back so DAVIS called and got
them. DAVIS wanted to do other tests and ultrasound but Murray refused. The
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records describe a lower level of service than the "extended service" that was
billed for. DAVIS also rendered a diagnosis of "hepatitis" which is not documented
in the records and was not discussed with Murray.
114. On or about October 10, 1988, Murray returned to Family
Medical Center to receive her first allergy shot. She had been walking as an
exercise and her foot was hurting. She asked DAVIS why her foot was hurting ana
he insisted on taking x-rays. For services rendered on October 10. 1988. DAVIS
billed Value Care code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service) for a
visit described by the patient as taking approximately 10 minutes. The level of
service billed for is higher than the level described in typed records DAVIS
submitted to Value Care for that date. The patient denies blood was drawn,
however, laboratory tests appear in the billing as codes 85021 (complete blood
count) and 85007 (manual differential) which, if done, should be combined into a
simple code 85022 (CBC with differential). The patient was not cast, yet a bill for
splint and casting material is noted (code 99070A). DAVIS billed code 29540
(strapping - ankle), which should preclude the use of a code 90080 (established
patient - comprehensive service) charge because it includes the cost of the office
visit. DAVIS billed codes 73620 (foot x-ray 2 views) and 73620.26 (foot x-ray
interpretation), although the reading of an x-ray 73620.26 is included in code
73620. DAVIS billed code 95125.52 (professional services allergy) for giving a
simple allergy shot.
115. On or about October 13, 1988, Murray returned to Family
Medical Center for an allergy shot only. DAVIS billed code 90060 (established
patient - intermediate service) for services rendered on October 13, 1988, despite
the fact that Murray did not see DAVIS and no actual examination was performed
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116. On or about October 17, 1988, October 20, 1988, October 24,
1988, October 27, 1988, November 1, 1988, November 4, 1988 and November 7,
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced
intermediate service) for services rendered to Murray with a diagnosis of
''bronchitis" and "allergic reactions". These diagnoses are not consistent with the
description of the case in the physician's notes. These diagnoses were not
discussed with the patient. Murray relates she simply returned for allergy shots
which were administered by office personnel. There is no evidence for a code
90060.52 in addition to code 95125.52 (immunotherapy - allergen) service filled on
these dates. Records from the physician describe injections, vital signs, and time
spent in the physician's office waiting for reactions to occur on October 17. 1988
and October 20, 1988. This is inconsistent with Murray's memory.
117. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 10.
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care two code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced
intermediate service) charges in addition to a code 95125.52 (immunotherapy allergan) charge. This is inconsistent with information provided by the patient who
only received one allergy injection.
118. On or about November 14, 1988, Murray received an allergy
injection administered by a staff person and DAVIS billed Value Care for code
95125.52 (immunotherapy - allergan). Physicians notes describes the injection,
vital signs and waiting for allergic reactions to occur. Murray did not see DAVIS
that day.
119. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 17,
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced
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intermediate service). However, Murray states she was there for an allergy shot
only and did not see DAVIS.
120. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 21,
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced
intermediate service) in addition to two billings for code 95125.52
(immunotherapy - allergan). Murray only received one injection in this visit. DAVIS'
notes do not indicate receipt of a 90060 level of service or two injections.
121. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 25,
1988, November 28, 1988, December 1, 1988. December 5, 1988, December 8.
1988, December 13, 1988, December 15. 1988 and December 19, 1988. DAVIS
billed Value Care for both 95125.52 (immunotherapy - allergan) and 90060.52
(established patient - reduced intermediate service) when in fact Murray did not
see DAVIS on any of these dates.
122. On or about October 8, 1988, Sharon Louise Grennan (Grennan)
became ill and sought treatment at Family Medical Center. She made an
appointment and went in and saw DAVIS the same day. She complained of
weakness, tiredness and nausea. She related background information explaining
she had been on Synthroid .15 mg for ten years for "hereditary thyroid disease".
As a result of services rendered to Grennan on October 8, 1988, DAVIS billed her
insurance company, Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah code 90020
(new patient - comprehensive service). Later DAVIS provided records to Gem
State concerning his claim. In these records, DAVIS claimed the patient
complained of chronic upper respiratory tract infection, had a sore throat, swollen
glands, congestion, runny nose and earache. Grennan denies that she was
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suffering from these symptoms. Her physical examination included "lungs, some
rhondis". The typewritten evaluation DAVIS provided does not show services that
meet the definition of a "comprehensive" initial new patient evaluation. DAVIS also
billed codes 84439 (T-4), 80053.52 (executive profile) 86300 (monospot), 86006
(cold agglutinins) and 82270 (hemocult), however, none of these laboratory studies
are documented in the records submitted as having been done on that date. The
laboratory test that are documented as having been done on that day include a
CBC with differential and urinalysis. DAVIS billed code 85021 (complete blood
count) and code 85007 (manual differential) which exacts higher fees because they
should be rebundled. DAVIS billed codes 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) and
71020.26 (chest x-ray - interpretation) resulting in double billing because the chest
x-ray charge (71020) includes the charge for interpretation (71020.26). There is no
chest x-ray recorded although it is mentioned in the plan. In addition the chest x ray reading (71020.26) is not apparent in the records. DAVIS made a diagnosis of
"pneumonia", although he did not discuss this diagnosis with the patient.
123. On or about October 11, 1988, Grennan returned to see DAVIS,
as instructed, for a follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered to Grennan on
October 11, 1988. DAVIS billed Gem State code 90070.52 (established patient extended service). The patient states the examination lasted only a minute.
Additionally, the typed records submitted by DAVIS are not consistent with an
"extended" level of service. DAVIS billed codes 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) and
71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation). Code 71020.26 is included in a code 70120
billed the same date. In addition, there is no formal x-ray report included in the
records. DAVIS also billed the following laboratory tests: 85021 (complete blood
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count), 85007 (manual differential), 84132.52 (potassium and electrolytes),
84479.52 (T-3), 84439.52 (T-4), 84443.52 (TSH) and 84480.52 (TT-3) which can a'!
be rebundled.
124. On or about October 14, 1988, Grennan returned to see DAVIS
for a follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered to Grennan on October 14
1988, DAVIS billed code 90070.52 (established patient - extended service). The
patient states the exam took approximately two minutes, which would not
constitute "extended" service. Office notes submitted to Gem State also reflect a
lower level of service. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and
85007 (manual differential) exacting higher fees because they should be rebundled
DAVIS billed codes 87088 (urine culture) which was unnecessary in light of
negative nitrites noted in urinalysis and only 1-3 white cells noted on microscopic
Additionally, there were no genitourinary symptoms. DAVIS also billed code 84122
(potassium and electrolytes) but electrolytes are not documented in the records as
having been done.
125. On or about December 7, 1988, David Gallegos hurt his
shoulder at his place of employment, Southwire Company (Southwire), West
Jordan, Utah. Gallegos went to DAVIS for treatment that same evening. DAVIS
took three x-rays, drew some blood, took a urine sample, gave Gallegos
ultrasound and diathermy therapy on his shoulder and advised him he had a "rotocuff injury". DAVIS gave Gallegos prescriptions for Tolectin and Prednisone, put
his arm in a cloth sling and instructed him to return every day for a week to
receive ultrasound and diathermy therapy. In connection with services rendered.
DAVIS billed Southwire code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). The
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services described do not reach the level of "comprehensive." DAVIS billed code
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete
blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4). An executive ^profile
(code 80053) includes codes 81000, 85021, 85007, and 84439. DAVIS billed code
99070A (splint and casting material), although no splint or cast was applied.
DAVIS billed codes 73030 (shoulder x-ray 2 views) and 73030.26 (shoulder x-ray
interpretation). Code 73030 includes the charges for reading the film (code
73030.26). DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Southwire representing
services were rendered by Taira Fukushima, when they were not.
126

On or about December 8, 1988, Gallegos returned to Family

Medical Center for therapy. DAVIS subsequently billed code 90070 (established
patient - extended service). The patient, however, states he was not examined by
DAVIS on December 8, 1988.
127. On or about the following dates Gallegos returned as instructed
by DAVIS for ultrasound and diathermy treatments: December 9, 1988. December
12, 1988, December 13, 1988, December 14, 1988. December 15, 1988, December
16, 1988, December 17, 1988, December 19, 1988, December 20, 1988, December
22, 1988, December 26, 1988 and December 27, 1988. DAVIS later billed
Southwire codes 90060 (established patient - intermediate service), 97128
(ultrasound therapy) and 97024 (diathermy therapy) for each visit. According to
Gallegos, DAVIS only re-examined him on one of these occasions and he did not
see DAVIS on the eleven other visits. The diathermy and ultrasound were
performed by office personnel. On each of the above occasions, DAVIS caused
claim forms to be submitted to Southwire representing Taira Fukushima as the
provider of services, when he was not.
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128. On a December 10, 1988, visit, Gallegos was told by DAVIS that
there was a problem with his blood, his thyroid count was too high. As a
coosequence of services rendered on December 10, 1988, DAVIS billed Southwire
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). Discussing blood test
results does not warrant a "comprehensive" level of service. DAVIS billed codes
80073 (renal profile) and 80058 (liver profile) exacting higher fees because these
tests should be combined into a panel such as a multi-channel chemistry and are
not billed separately. DAVIS also billed codes 84480 (TT-3 RIA), 84443 (TSH),
84479 (T-3) and 84439 (T-4) which also results in inflated fees because these
codes should be combined into one or two thyroid panels. DAVIS caused claim
forms to be submitted to Southwire representing Taira Fukushima as the provider
of services.
129. On or about December 19, 1988, DAVIS billed Southwire code
99070 (supplies and materials) for services allegedly rendered to Gallegos. The
patient denies having ever received supplies on that date.
130. On or about December 2 1 , 1988, Davis billed Southwire code
90070 (established patient - extended service) for services allegedly rendered to
Gallegos. The patient did not see DAVIS on that date and the diathermy and
ultrasound were performed by office personnel.
131. For services rendered to Gallegos on or about December 16,
1988, December 2 1 , 1988, December, 27, 1988, December 28, 1988 and
December 30, 1988, DAVIS submitted claim forms to Southwire claiming a
diagnosis of "peptic ulcer disease". Gallegos did not suffer from a peptic ulcer
and this diagnosis was not discussed with him. Gallegos also states a number of
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other inaccurate diagnosis were submitted on claim forms sent to his employer by
DAVIS including "cruciate ligament tear" which appears on claim forms for services
rendered on December 15, 1988 and December 30, 1988; "leg injury" which
appears on claim forms for services rendered December 16, 1988; "hepatitis"
which appears on claim forms for services rendered December 10, 1988; and
"hyperthyroidism" which appears on claim forms for services rendered December
7, 1988, and December 10, 1988. Gallegos has never had a "cruciate ligament
tear", a "leg injury", "hepatitis", or "hyperthyroidism" and DAVIS never discussed
these diagnosis with him.
132. On or about December 12. 1988, Robin L Snyder experienced
pain in her right shoulder and consulted DAVIS. For services rendered to Snyder
on December 12, 1988, DAVIS billed her husband's insurance carrier, Western
Teamsters Welfare (Teamsters), Salt Lake City, Utah code 90020 (comprehensive
service - new patient). The patient claims DAVIS spent only a short period of time
with her which would indicate a lower level of service. DAVIS listed "asthma" as
the diagnosis when the patient went in for shoulder pain. DAVIS also billed code
86422 (Allergy Panel - RAST) when the patient was not complaining of allergies or
asthma and did not authorize a RAST test. DAVIS billed codes 99000 (handling
fee) and 36415 (blood draw). Code 99000 includes a 36415 (blood draw). DAVIS
billed codes 90782 (injection) and 9J0420 (aristocort injection), but the patient
denies having received an injection. DAVIS billed code 81000 (urinalysis), but the
patient denies having given a urine specimen. DAVIS billed code 90070P (sterile
pelvic tray) when a pelvic tray is included in the price of an office visit. Code
80053 (executive profile) was billed in addition to codes 85021 (complete blood
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count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4) which are included in an
executive profile. DAVIS billed code 72110 (lumbrosacral x-ray complete) which,
according to the patient was not done. In addition, DAVIS billed code 72110.26
(lumbrosacral x-ray interpretation) when interpretation is included in the price of
code 72110 previously billed. DAVIS billed codes 73030 (shoulder x-ray 2 views)
and 73120 (hand x-ray 2 views) in addition to codes 73030.26 (shoulder x-ray
interpretation) and 73120.26 (hand x-ray interpretation). Reading fees are included
in the procedure code for the x-rays (73030 and 73120). The claim forms
submitted to Teamsters by DAVIS for services rendered to Snyder on December
12. 1988 represent Taira Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not.
133. On or about December 15, 1988, Snyder returned to see DAVIS,
who informed her of the results of a CAT scan and mammogram she obtained at
Park View Radiology on December 14, 1988. DAVIS did not examine her and
spent very little time with her. He instructed a nurse where to apply heat and for
how long. He then billed Teamsters code 90070 (established patient - extended
service). The claim forms submitted by DAVIS to Teamsters for services rendered
to Snyder on December 15, 1988, represent Taira Fukushima as the provider of
services, when he was not.
134. On or about December 16, 1988, Snyder returned to Family
Medical Center where a nurse performed therapy on her back. DAVIS had Snyder
fitted into a back brace, by telling his nurse what to do. The nurse followed
DAVIS' instructions and DAVIS returned to check when the nurse was finished.
DAVIS billed Teamsters code 90070 (established patient - extended service) which
is a higher level than that described. The claim forms submitted to Teamsters by
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DAVIS for services, rendered to Snyder on December 16, 1988 represent Taira
Fukushima as the provider of services when he was not.
135. On or about December 18, 1988, Snyder fell on the stairs in her
house and injured the ball of her foot. On December 19, 1988, she saw DAVIS for
treatment of the injury. He billed Teamsters code 90080 (established patient comprehensive service). "Comprehensive" was not the level of service provided
DAVIS also billed codes 97128 (ultrasound therapy), 97024 (diathermy therapy),
and 97145 (ultrasound - additional). The patient denies receiving either ultrasound
or diathermy on this date. DAVIS billed codes 73630 (foot x-ray complete) and
73630.26 (foot x-ray interpretation), although the reading fee (73630.26) is included
in the code for the x-ray (73630). The claim forms submitted to Teamsters by
DAVIS for services rendered to Snyder on December 19, 1988, represent Taira
Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not.
136. On or about December 21,1988, Snyder returned to Family
Medical Center and received ultrasound and diathermy therapy from a nurse.
DAVIS asked how she was feeling. He then charged code 90080 (established
patient - comprehensive service). The claim forms submitted by DAVIS to
Teamsters for services rendered to Snyder on December 21, 1988, represent Tatra
Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not.
137. On or about January 20, 1989, Snyder took her son, Reese, to
see DAVIS. DAVIS drew blood, looked at Reese's throat and ears and said he had
a bad ear infection which was draining and spreading down his throat. On the
claim form submitted to Teamsters for his service, DAVIS recorded the diagnosis
as "peritonsillar abscess". The diagnosis of tonsilor abscess is not consistent with
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the services provided. For services rendered to Reese on January 20, 1989,
DAVIS billed Teamsters code 90015 (new patient - intermediate service), although
the description of the visit would not justify an "intermediate" level of secvice.
DAVIS billed code 81000 (urinalysis), although Reese was not requested to and did
not provide a urine specimen. DAVIS also billed code 86317 (strep test immunoassay) which exacts a higher fee than the proper code. DAVIS billed codes
85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) exacting higher fees
because they should be rebundled. The claim forms submitted to Teamsters by
DAVIS for services rendered to Reese on January 20, 1989 represent Taira
Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not.
138. On or about February 6, 1989, Bart L Coverstone consulted
DAVIS at Family Medical Center for a sore throat. An assistant took his
temperature, blood pressure and drew three vials of blood. He gave the assistant
a urine specimen and he was given an x-ray. DAVIS listened to his breathing with
a stethoscope, through his shirt, and told him he sounded terrible. DAVIS took a
throat culture and talked with him about his family medical history. Although
Coverstone was in the room three hours, DAVIS spent a total of only approximately
15 minutes with him. As a result of services rendered to Coverstone on February
6, 1989, DAVIS billed Coverstone's insurance carrier, Value Care, Salt Lake City,
Utah code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). Medical records
submitted by DAVIS to Value Care show the history is brief, the physical
examination is not complete, and the services provided do not justify a
"comprehensive" level of service. DAVIS also billed code 80053 (executive profile)
in addition to codes 81000, 84439, 85021 and 85007 which are included in an
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executive profile (code 80053). DAVIS billed code 86317 (strep test - immunoa).
This is an immunoassay performed on serum and not a throat culture as is
described in the records. DAVIS billed for code 71020.26 (chest x-ray ~
interpretation) in addition to code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) although code
71020.26 is included in code 71020. There is no x-ray report included in the
records. DAVIS submitted a diagnosis of "abdominal pain" and "pneumonia".
Coverstone denies he made any complaint about abdominal pam and DAVIS never
discussed "abdominal pain" or "pneumonia" with him.
139. On or about February 8, 1989, Coverstone returned to see
DAVIS for a follow-up visit. An assistant took his temperature, blood pressure
and drew three vials of blood. When DAVIS came in, Coverstone told DAVIS about
his brother, who had experienced a prolonged sore throat and subsequently died
of cancer. After looking at a chart, DAVIS told Coverstone he did not have cancer
because it would have shown up in his blood. DAVIS informed Coverstone his
blood sugar was positive and gave him a prescription for Micronase. DAVIS again
checked Coverstone's lungs through his shirt and said they sounded better.
DAVIS subsequently billed Value Care for services rendered to Coverstone on
February 8, 1989, wherein he recorded diagnoses of "diabetes" and "pneumonia",
"hyperbilirubinemia", and "hyperlipidemia". Coverstone contends DAVIS never said
a word to him about "pneumonia", "hyperlipidemia" or "hyperbilirubinemia". DAVIS
billed code 90070 (established patient - extended service) which level of service is
not confirmed by the records submitted to Value Care. DAVIS also billed codes
85021 (complete blood count), 80073 (renal profile), 80058 (liver profile) and 83715
(lipoprotein). These tests are not confirmed in the records submitted.
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140. DAVIS submitted claim forms to Value Care for services
rendered to Coverstone on February 8, 1989, Coverstone, however, claims he did
not see DAVIS on one of these days. DAVIS billed codes 90080 (established
patient - comprehensive service), 80058 (liver profile), 36415 (blood draw), 82948
(blood sugar), 80073 (renal profile) and 83715 (lipoprotein). Codes 80058, 80073
and 83715 are all part of a multi-channel test that should have been identified with
a single code. The test is confirmed in the records submitted, but fails to confirm
a diagnosis of "hyperlipidemia". The blood sugar test (code 82948) was not
confirmed in the records submitted to Value Care. The progress notes submitted
by DAVIS to Value Care for February 9, 1989, are an exact duplicate of those
submitted by DAVIS for February 8, 1989, with the exception of the date.
141. On or about February 14, 1989, Coverstone returned to see
DAVIS, after having fasted in order to obtain an accurate blood sugar reading. An
assistant took his temperature, blood pressure and drew three vials of blood.
DAVIS spent 5 to 10 minutes with Coverstone and reported his blood sugar and
cholesterol were high and instructed him to continue the medication. As a result of
services rendered to Coverstone on February 14, 1989, DAVIS billed Value Care
code 90070 (established patient - extended service) and listed his diagnoses as
"diabetes", "hyperbilirubinemia", "hyperlipidemia", and "gout". The records
submitted to Value Care for this visit describe a follow-up type of visit, which is
limited in scope. The recorded blood sugar of 54 fails to confirm the diagnosis
of'diabetes". DAVIS did not say anything to Coverstone about the possibility of
"gout". DAVIS also billed codes 80058 (liver profile), 84550 (uric acid) and 83715
(lipoprotein) which are all part of multi-channel chemistry and should have been
billed as one code.
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142. On or about February 2 1 , 1989, Coverstone returned to see
DAVIS. The assistant took his temperature, blood pressure and drew three vials of
blood. For services rendered to Coverstone on February 2 1 , 1989, DAVIS billed
Value Care code 90070 (established patient - extended service) which is not the
level of service described by Coverstone. DAVIS also billed codes 36415 (blood
draw), 82948 (blood sugar), 83715 (lipoprotein), 85007 (manual differential), 80072
(arthritis panel), 80073 (renal profile) and 80058 (liver profile) there were, however,
no physician records submitted by DAVIS to indicate these studies were done.
DAVIS again listed his diagnoses for Coverstone as "diabetes" and "polycythemia".
Coverstone, however, tested for diabetes by using a glucose reflectance meter
and discovered his blood sugar was in normal range, even after he discontinued
his medication. DAVIS' records do not show blood sugar over 140.
143. On or about March 13, 1989, Michelle S. Coverstone (Michelle)
consulted DAVIS because she was experiencing stomach cramps. DAVIS had her
give a urine specimen and three vials of blood. DAVIS felt her stomach, gave her
a pelvic examination, took a pap smear and checked her rectum. Following the
examination, DAVIS said she had "pelvic inflammatory disease" or an "ulcer" and
gave her a prescription for Septra. For services rendered to Michelle on March 13,
1989, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service).
This level is inconsistent with the examination described by the patient. DAVIS
also billed code 80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis),
85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4). Codes
81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439 are all included in code 80053. DAVIS also billed
code 99070-P (sterile pelvic tray) which should be included in the office visit code.
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144. On or about Wednesday, March 15, 1989, Michelle drove to a
radiologist for an upper Gl series which DAVIS had arranged. DAVIS subsequently
billed Value Care codes 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service).
81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and
87088 (urine culture) for services he claimed were rendered to Michelle on Marcn
15, 1989, although she did not see him that day.
145. On or about February 24, 1989, Audrey D. Callister was in
DAVIS' office accompanied by her mother, Mildred Bailey, and daughter, Brooke.
DAVIS had checked Callister when she asked him if Brooke could have her last
immunization. DAVIS said Brooke had everything except the TB tine and he
administered the shot. DAVIS subsequently billed Value Care codes 90060
(established patient - intermediate service) and 86585 (TB tine test) for services
allegedly provided to Callister on February 24, 1989. DAVIS also billed Value Care
codes 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) and 86585 (TB tine test)
for services allegedly provided to Brooke on February 24, 1989. DAVIS provided
Value Care with typewritten progress notes outlining a physical examination for
Brooke on February 24, 1989. Callister denies DAVIS examined Brooke and DAVIS
did not administer any shot to Callister on February 24, 1989.
146. On or about April 12, 1989, Timothy Davis (Timothy) had a
cough and a runny nose. He made an appointment with Family Medical Center
and consulted with DAVIS. After Timothy completed medical and personal history
forms, a nurse took him to an examination room where she took his temperature,
blood pressure, and drew blood. DAVIS came in and obtained a strep culture from
Timothy's throat and had him provide a urine sample. DAVIS returned, listened to
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his lungs and had a staff person take x-rays. DAVIS told Timothy he had
"bronchial pneumonia", wrote a prescription and told the receptionist he needed to
se"e Timothy in two days. Timothy states DAVIS spent only a few minutes with
him. As a result of services rendered to Timothy on April 12, 1989, DAVIS billed
Western Paper, Salt Lake City, Utah code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive
service.) DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual
differential) resulting in higher fees because they should be rebundled to code
85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS billed code 80053 (executive profile) in
addition to codes 84439 (T-4), 85021 (complete blood count), and 85007 (manual
differential) Codes 84439, 85021, and 85007 are included in code 80053. DAVIS
billed code 71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation) in addition to code 71020 (chest
x-ray 2 views), although reading is included in code 71020.
147. On or about April 14, 1989, Timothy returned to see DAVIS for a
follow-up visit as instructed. As a result of services rendered, DAVIS billed
Western Paper code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service) which is
inconsistent with the estimated examination time made by the patient. DAVIS
billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) resultma
in higher fees because they should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with
differential). DAVIS billed code 71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation) in addition to
code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views). Code 71020.26 is included in code 71020.
DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential80073 (renal profile), 80058 (liver profile) 84550 (uric acid), 83715 (lipoprotein) ana
81000 (urinalysis) which results in higher fees as they are included in the
"executive profile" (code 80053).

^ nOnOQ
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148. On or about May 8, 1989, George Ray Lewis experienced lower
abdominal pain and consulted DAVIS. As a result of services rendered to Lewis on
May 8, 1989, DAVIS billed Lewis' insurance carrier, Value Care, Salt Lake City,
Utah code 80053 (executive profile) and in addition billed codes 81000 (urinalysis).
85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4),
although codes 81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in code 80053.
DAVIS also billed Value Care code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) in addition to code
71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation), although code 71020 includes code
71020.26.
149. During the course of his treatment, Lewis mentioned to DAVIS
his back and hip problems. DAVIS had a CAT scan done on Lewis at Jordan
Valley Holy Cross Hospital on June 6, 1989, and reported the results to Lewis on
June 8, 1989. Davis informed Lewis that he had a herniated disc and gave him an
ultrasound treatment. DAVIS also set up a series of ultrasound and diathermy
therapy for June 9, 10, 12, 14, and 16, 1989. Lewis did not see DAVIS on June
12, 1989. but did receive an ultrasound treatment from an office assistant. DAVIS,
however, billed Value Care code 90060 (established patient - intermediate service)
and also submitted typed notes to Value Care claiming he performed an
examination of Lewis on June 12, 1989.
150. On or about July 27, 1987, T. P. visited DAVIS concerning an
anxiety attack. Davis examined T. P. and informed her that she was having a
"conversion breakdown" and suffering from anxiety and stress. He provided her
with several sample bottles of Tranxene, a schedule IV controlled substance. T.P.
became depressed and suicidal while taking the Traxene. She visited DAVIS
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approximately four times in the next two weeks. On each visit DAVIS advised T.P.
that she needed to "get herself laid". He provided T.P. with a card for his private
club and gave T.P. a package of birth control pills which he suggested she start
taking right away.
151. On or about August 3, 1989, DAVIS saw T.P. outside of the
office setting and coerced her to have a sexual relationship with him. DAVIS
threatened T.P. to keep her from disclosing the relationship he had coerced her
into.
152. On or about the summer 1987, T.S. consulted DAVIS concerning
her medical problems. During an office visit DAVIS asked T.S. out to dinner.
Davis attempted to force his physical attention on T.S. against her will and then
told her not to tell anyone because he was not supposed to go out with his
patients.
153. During the period of time he treated T.S., DAVIS prescribed
Xanax, a highly addictive substance, for her to the point where she became drug
dependent. DAVIS continued to prescribe Xanax for T.S., even after he was aware
she had become drug dependant.
154. On or about August 1, 1989, A.C., a file clerk at Family Medical
Center, resigned her employment with DAVIS due to his sexual inappropriate
behavior towards her.
155. On or about September 27, 1989, C M . was employed by
DAVIS. During her employment DAVIS's behavior toward her was sexually
inappropriate. When C M . confronted DAVIS about his office practices and
treatment of patients DAVIS struck her and threatened to fire her.
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COUNT I
4. The Division re-alleges and incorporates by reference the
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 above as if fully set out herein.
5. Section 58-12-35(1 )(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
provides that the Division may revoke, suspend or place on probation the license if
the holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
6. Section 5 8 - 1 2 - 3 6 , Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, defines
unprofessional conduct to include:
(7) refusing to divulge to the division upon demand the
means, methods, device or instrumentality used in
the treatment of a disease, injury, ailment or
infirmity;
(14) the use of false or fraudulent statements in any
document connected with the practice of medicine;
(15) any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized
standards of ethics of the medical profession, or
any conduct or practice which does or might
constitute a danger to the health, welfare or
safety of the patient or the public, or any
conduct, practice or condition which does or might
impair the license holder's ability to practice
medicine safely and skillfully;
(18) willfully and intentionally making any false
statement or entry in any hospital records, medical
records or reports; or
(19) willfully and intentionally making any false
statement in reports or claim forms to governmental
agencies or insurance companies with the intent to
secure payment not rightfully due.
7. Because he violated the Division's Order regarding his probation,
overutilized and overprescribed medical services, submitted false claims to secure
insurance payments, made false diagnosis, failed to discuss diagnosis of diseases
with patients, failed to provide patient records to the Division, was sexually
inappropriate with patients and staff, prescribed addictive drugs to a patient to the
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point the patient became drug dependant, and then continued to prescribe the
drug, ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS has violated the provisions of Section 5 8 - 1 2 36(7). (14), (15), (18) and (19), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, constituting
grounds for imposing an appropriate sanction against his licenses under the
provisions of Section 58-12-35(1 )(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.
COUNT II

8.

The Division re-alleges and incorporates by reference the

allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 7 above as if fully set out herein.
9.

Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(iv), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended

makes it unlawful:
(iv) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in
excess of medically recognized quantities necessarily to treat the ailment, malady
or condition of the ultimate user.
10.

Section 5 8 - 1 2 - 3 6 , Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,

defines unprofessional conduct to include:
(11) knowingly prescribing, selling, giving away, or
administering, directly or indirectly, or offering to
prescribe, sell, furnish, give away or administer any of
the drugs or compounds mentioned in Subsection (10) to
a drug dependant person, as defined in Subsection 5 8 37-2(14) unless permitted by law.
10.

Because he prescribed controlled substances for a patient after

he was aware she had become dependant as described in paragraph number 3
above, Robert Charles Davis has violated the provisions of Section 58-37-8(2) ana
5 8 - 1 2 - 3 6 , Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, constituting grounds for imposing
an appropriate sanction against his licences under the provisions of Section 5 8 12-35(1 )(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.
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WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1

That ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS be adjudged and decreed to ha:e

engaged in the acts alleged herein.
2. That by engaging in the above acts, ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS oe
adjudged and decreed to have violated the provisions of the Medical Practice Act
3. That an Order be issued imposing an appropriate sanction agams:
the licenses of ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS to practice medicine and to administer
and prescribe controlled substances.
DATED this 7 ^ day of December, I989.
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Divisioryof Occupational &
Professional Licensing
Department of Commerce •
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STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Qnth^ 1V\ dav of

i<[\'\V-\'r

1989, personally appeared

before me Golden Perrett, and after being duly sworn, deposes and says; that he
has read the foreg£ in 9 Petition and knows the contents thereof; and the same is
true to the best of h»s knowledge except as to matters stated on information and
belief, and that as to those matters he believes it to be true.

L

jjcL

L A—A

Investigator
Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this _[iii_day of 1989.
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

I \* . V. ;:>. .v.
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FILED !.V UMTcO STATES DISTRICT
COURT. DISTRICT OF UTAH

PETER STIR3A (Bar No. 3118)
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
A c c o m e y s for Plaintiff
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135

DEC 0 ? 1989
MARKUS B. ZIMMER. CLERK
gy

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIVISION, DISTRICT OF UTAH

R03ERT C. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs .

:

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE
AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

:
:

DAVID E. ROBINSON, IN HIS
:
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR
OF THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL :
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
:
REGULATION, and THE DIVISION
OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL:
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION, STATE OF
:
UTAH,

Civil No.

Defendants.

Robert C. Davis, M.D., plaintiff, complains of David E.
Robinson in his individual capacity as the director of the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Business Regulation, and the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Department of Business
Regulation, State of Utah, ("Defendants"), as follows:

JURISDICTION AND THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a physician duly licensed to practice

medicine in the State of Utah, with his principal place of
practice in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.
director of

Defendant David E. Robinson ("Robinson"), is the
the Division of Occupational and Professional

Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, State of
Utah.
3.

Defendant Division of Occupational and Professional

Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, State of
Utah ("'The Division1'), is an agency of the State of Utah which
has specific duties for the licensing and regulation of professionals, such as physicians, in the State of Utah under Utah
Code Ann., § 51-1-1, et seq. and § 58-12-26 to 39.
4.

Jurisdiction is proper in this court under 25 U.S.C.

§ 1331(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as it involves the violation of
plaintiff's rights arising under the Constitution of the United
States.
5.

Venue is proper in this district because plaintiff

is a resident of the State of Utah, and defendant is a governmental division of the State of Utah.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
6.

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive

relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §5 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and
2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from bringing an
- 2 -

administrative proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1 , et
seq. (Administrative Procedures Act), Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16
(Occupational and Professional Licensing Act), and Utah Code
Ann. §58-12-26 (Medical Practice Act). The Division has violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution of the United States, as alleged below.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7.

Plaintiff's license, allowing him to practice

medicine in the State of Utah, is a property right protected by
the due process provisions of the United States Constitution.
8.

For over the past two years, the defendants have,

been engaged in a surreptitious yet intense investigation of
plaintiff.
9.

The defendants1 investigation has included the use

of illegal and improper subpoenas issued without authority of
statute, rule of procecure or court or administrative order, and
unconscionable and unethical investigative procedures.
10.

In the course of such investigations, plaintiff has

been continually approached and harassed by the media wich
questions based on information gathered by the State in its
investigative process•
11.

Plaintiff's business has suffered as a result of

the State's investigation and will continue to suffer and be
damaged if the State is permitted to proceed with such
investigation.
12.

The defendants have filed or intend to file ^n
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administrative petition under the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah Code Ann., § 63-^6b-l, et seq.; the Occupational and
Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., § 58-1-16, et seq.;
and, the Utah Medical Protective Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26
et seq., seeking to suspend or revoke plaintiff's license to
practice medicine in the State of Utah.
13.

The factual basis for the defendant's petition was

obtained by the issuance of unlawful investigative subpoenas by
defendants, issued before any petition, administrative action or
court proceeding was filed by the Division.
14.

Additionally, the defendants did not comply with

the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq. and Rule
45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in issuing such
subpoenas.
15.

The issuance of investigative subpoenas by the

defendants without notice to plaintiff, and prior to the time of
any proceeding being instituted against the plaintiff is not
authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act, the Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, nor the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
16.

There was no statutory or other basis for the

issuance of the investigative subpoenas, therefore, they are
unreasonable searches, violative of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as well as Utah law.
17.

The violation of the Fourth Amendment and Utah Law

in obtaining evidence and information through unlawful means
- U .-

employed by defendants, also violates plaintiff's due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution in that his property right (his license) may be
taken, or substantially impaired without due process of law.
18.

Because plaintiff had no notice of the unlawful

subpoena he could not challenge their prooriety or determine if
the subpoenas sought to obtain privileged information.
19.

Defendants may attempt to immediately suspend

plaintiff's license to practice medicine in the State of Utah,
without a hearing, in clear violation of plaintiff's due process
rights under the United States Constitution.
20.

Plaintiff is currently on probation as established

by the division at a prior hearing.
21.

Defendants did not inform plaintiff of any

violations of his pending probation except to inform him that a
second petition was about to be filed against him.
22.

Defendants have refused to advise plaintiff of anv

specific allegation giving rise to the second petition and havrefused to discuss the nature of the petition.
23.

Plaintiff's rights will be far more seriously

impaired under this procedure than if he were informed through
proper probationary contacts.
24.

Defendant Robinson, as Director of the Division,

statutorily vested with sole authority to make the ultimate
decision whether or not plaintiff's license is revoked,
suspended or what other action should be taken under Utah Coo
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Ann. § 58-12-35.

He also supervises discovery, che

investigation of claims by the Division, directs any hearings
before the Division, and is closely involved with each claim
from its inception until he makes the ultimate decision.
25.

Plaintiff has been investigated on at least two

previous occasions, at the direction of defendant Robinson.
26.

As a result of alleged wrongful acts done bv the

Division during one of these investigations, in August of 1983
plaintiff filed a claim with the Division, with the intent to
file legal procedings under the procedure outlined in Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.

A copy of Plaintiff's previous notice is

attached as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof.

Plaintiff's

claim was denied by the Division.
27.

Plaintiff believes that defendants have allowed

confidential information within their control regarding plaintiff to be disclosed to public media sources and to third
parties unrelated to any investigation in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§ 63-2-85.4 and § 67-16-4, resulting in substantial harm

to Plaintiff's reputation and business.
28.

The defendants are unduly biased against plaintiff

because of their past involvement with plaintiff, their direct
involvement in this current investigation and petition, and
their involvement with claims made against them by piaintitf.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Illegal Subpoenas)
29.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through
- 6 -

24 above .

30.

The major factual basis for the Petition filed or

to be filed by defendants has as its basis information obtained
through the use of illegal subpoenas, and was hence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Cons titution.
31.

As the factual basis of the petition was improperly

obtained the Division should be permanently enjoined from
pursuing its administrative petition to revoke or suspend the
license of the plaintiff based on the improperly obtained
evidence or from ever using the improperly obtained evidence for
any purpose.
32.

If defendants are allowed to continue their admin-

istrative petition proceeding, plaintiff's rights will be
immediately and irreparably injured or lost.
33.

Plaintiff is entitled to immediate injunctive

relief, under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
enjoining the Division from proceeding further with its
administrative petition.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Due Process, Illegal Subpoenas, Biased
Administrative Process)
34.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 throueh

33 above.
35.

The defendants are attempting to take or
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substantially impair plaintiff's property right without due
process of law through the use of evidence obtained by che use
of unlawful investigative subpoenas, without proper notification
to plaintiff.
36.

Plaintiff has never been given the opportunity to

challenge the subpoenas or to assert any privilege he may have
relating to the information sought to be obtained by the
subpoenas.
37.

Plaintiff is further being denied due process by

the failure to have his petition and property right reviewed and
determined by an unbiased tribunal.

The defendant Pvcbinson has

become so involved in this process, and in litigation with
plaintiff that he cannot be unbiased nor fairly weigh evidence
and render a just decision.
38.

The procedure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35(1) as

applied in these circumstances is a violation of due process and
the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the decision maker is so
interwined in the claims investigation, discovery and hearing
process that he can not possibly be unbiased and fair.
39.

The Division should be enjoined from continuing its

petition to suspend or revoke plaintiff's license to practice
medicine in Che State of Utah based on its violation of plaintiff's due process rights.
IvTIEP.EFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Statute Unconstitutional)
40.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1-39

41.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 empowers the Director

above.

of the Division with the authority to administer oaths, certify
to official acts and records of the Division, issue subpoenas,
compel production of documents, and otherwise oversee and direct
the investigation.
42.

In addition, § 53-12-35.1 vests in the Director the

sole discretion in meting out the appropriate penalty for
violations of the Act, including public or private reprimand;
suspension or restriction of license; revocation of license;
requiring licenseholder to submit to care, counseling or
treatment; requiring participation of licenseholder in education
program; or, assigning licenseholder to the direction of another
physician.
43.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 vests in one person,

the Director, the authority to investigate, issue subpoenas,
adjudicate and rule in cases of alleged violations of the
Medical Practices Act.
44.

As applied in this case, the section vests such

authority in a person who has had a lens-running bias against
the plaintiff and has been involved in protracted prior
investigations of plaintiff culminating in the filing by
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pLaintirf or a notice of suit against him for alleged
wrong-doings in prior investigations.
45.

Plaintiff will be irreparably damaged by the

statute and as it is intended to by applied in these
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Due Process - Pending Administrative Proceeding)
46.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through

45 above.
47.

Defendants have violated plaintiffs1 due process

rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution by filing a new petition while plaintiff had the
expectation, because of his probation, of being informed by
defendants of any claimed violation of the Utah Medical Practice
Act.
48.

The filing of a new petition has injured or will

injure plaintiff's property right in his license to practice
medicine by harming his reputation with his patients and professional colleagues.

This would not occur if defendants followed

proper due process procedures to protect plaintiff's property
rights within the course of the pending probation.
49.

Defendants should be enjoined from further pursui. r

this petition for violation of plaintiffs constitutional ri^:.*
to due process.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosure of Confidential Information)
50.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1-49

51.

Defendants have not complied with Utah law in

above.

improperly issuing subpoenas and obtaining information without
specific statutory authorization to do so under the Division cf
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the Administrative
Procedures Act, cr Che Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
52.

Defendants have disclosed confidential information

obtained from an official investigation of plaintiff, to the
public media and other third parties unrelated to the
investigation in violation of Utah Law.
53.

Defendants should be permanently enjoined from

continuing to pursue its administrative petition attempting to
suspend or revoke plaintiff's license to practice medicine iv
the State of Utah because of its violation cf Utah State Law in
connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For a judgment declaring chat defendants, through

the improper issuance of investigative subpoenas, has violated
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution.
2.

For a judgment declaring thac defendants have,

1 i
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DAVID ROBINSON,
Defendant,
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1 I;
THE COURT: And if there is going to be stay of
;
jj
• ^
•:
2 jjanything it could be just as well obtained there, couldn't it?1
3

MR. HATHAWAY:

Yes it could, Your Honor.

Within thej
I
j
4 administrative enactment that we're attacking there are those i

I
5

provisions but they also likewise require that exhaustion.

J
i

I
6

THE COURT:

Well then, after all of that happens,
'

7
8

you really feel aggrieved, you come back here.
MR. HATHAWAY: And we'll be several years down the

j
i

*
i

j
!
i

!

9

road and several decisions later, that's true Your Honor.

We •
!

10

hope to preempt that in light of the evidence that we obtained;
I

11

to date that we intend to put on before this court, again in

i

j
i

12

the interests of economy, and in the interests of getting thisj

j
13

matter resolved.

i

14

We sought to do in this proceeding initially rather I

15

than to wait until several hearings are held, several dollars :,
i

16

are spent and reputations are impacted.

17

THE COURT:

Well, I'm sensitive to what you're

18

saying on that but it does seem to me that in comity as veil

19

as the doctrine of exhaustion you ought to be proceeding in

20

State Court and that's what I'm going to rule.

21
22

The case is dismissed for further proceedings in
State Court.

23

MR. BUTLER:

24

THE COURT:

25

Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.
You can prepare an order to that etr-:".

,
\
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:

\« '• N S T 1 "i* * v* *.
i
. • •• < u i ) - \ . \ N : ?- 12-35.1

Dr. Davis, b> a nd thi on igh his attoi ney Peter Stirba. respectfi lib si ibi in lits 1 lis K lotioi i to
Dismiss Based on the Unconstitutionality of U'tah. Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1

Dr. Davis bases his

and Professional Licensing is empowered violates the due process rights of physicians by

Director Mr. Robinson. This concentration of f unctions is unconstitutional on its face.
Ii i addi* »" •' "!|

,HI

ite i a;; 1:1 ne stati itoi ) s :::! lei i ic 1 vas applied v » t,|: " • ' » ^ • , iolates Dili: Da \ is' di le

process rights, Director Robinson is so extensively involved am: prejudiced in this case that it
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,KI
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J II

uli.i! .md detached iiiuin ni laet.

This Motion is supported by a Memorandum of law, filed and served herewith.

DATED th

is

ZA. day of August, 1991

ny._

hV

PETERvSTIRBA
Attorneys for Dr. Robert Davis
*T

nr

SPRVIC'E

August, iW., . •.-.aiicd a true and correct copy

I hereby certify that on the L^
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Melissa M. Hubbell
Assistant Attorney General
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PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118)
STIRBA AND HATHAWAY
Attorneys for Dr. Robert Davis
215 South State, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of:

:

Case No. OPL-89-73

ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS

:

DR. DAVIS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-35.1

:
:

Dr. Davis, by and through his attorney Peter Stirba, respectfully submits his
Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Based on the Unconstitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1. Dr. Davis challenges the constitutionality of the statutory scheme on
its face and as applied.
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-35.1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ON ITS FACE
A.

Utah's Statutory Scheme Improperly Allows Investigatory, Prosecutorial and
Adjudicatory Power to be Concentrated in a Single Individual.
1.

Utah's Statutory Scheme

Utah's Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division'') is created under

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-1 et seq. (1985). It has a Director, presently David E. Robinson, and
a five member board. When the Division investigates a physician, Robinson administers oaths,
issues subpoenas and compels discovery.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.l(2)(b) (1987). A

hearing is conducted before the board, over which the director presides. After the board's
conclusions, the director has the authority to consider the evidence and make a decision. The
final determination is made by the director, Mr. Robinson, and him alone. Utah Code Ann. §
58-12-35.1(3) (1987).
This statutory scheme consolidates an constitutionally intolerable amount of investigatory,
prosecutorial and adjudicative power in one individual. Mr. Robinson in this case instituted,
zealously promoted and relentlessly pursued the allegations against Dr. Davis. Mr. Robinson
now holds the exclusive power to decide the final disposition of Dr. Davis' license to practice
medicine.
2.

Statutory Schemes of Other States

Other states have medical license revocation procedures which, unlike Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-12-35.1 (1987), protect the integrity of the truth seeking process and protect the due
process rights of the physicians. Nevada, Colorado and New York are examples of states who
have schemes which do not violate the constitutional rights of physicians investigated by their
state licensing bureaus.
In Nevada different committees, who are made up of members of the licensing board,
conduct the investigation. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 630.311(1) (1987). After the investigation is
completed, the board reviews the committee's findings, "but no member or advisory member
of the board who participated in the investigation may participate in this review or in any

2

subsequent hearing or action taken by the board/ Nev. Rev. Stat. § 630.311(2) (1987).
Colorado provides for a licensing board with two panels. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36118(1) (1989). Each is empowered to act as both an inquiry panel and a hearings panel.

H

[I]n

no event shall the president or any other member who has considered a complaint as a member
of one panel acting as an inquiry panel take part whatever in the consideration of a formal
complaint involving the same matter." Id. "All matters referred to one panel for investigation
shall be heard, if referred for formal hearing, by the other panel or a committee thereof." Id.
New York's State Board of Medical Conduct has three tiers: (1) a committee who
investigates; (2)

a Commissioner who studies the committees' reports and issues an

recommendation; and (3) a Board of Regents, elected by the legislature, who makes the final
decision.

N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230 et seq. (McKinney 1989). By comparing other

states' statutes with Utah's, the potential for abuse inherent in Utah's scheme and its violative
procedures is demonstrated.
3.

Dr. Davis Has a Property Interest In His License to Practice Medicine Which is
Protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dr. Davis has a property interest in his license to practice medicine. Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Beauchamp v. DeAbadia, 779 F.2d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 1985) ("A clearer
example of 'new property' is not easily imagined."); see Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1233
(7th Cir. 1988); Domino v. O'Neill, 702 F.Supp. 949, 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).

Property

"interests attain . . . constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially
recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or
significantly alter that protected status." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976).
3

Dr. Davis may not be deprived of a protected property interest without due process of
law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Schware v. Bd of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
Due process has three basic elements: (a) notice of the charges; (2) the opportunity to be
heard; and (c) the process used must be reasonably calculated to protect the person's property
interest. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). "A fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1954).
An unbiased decision-maker is a fundamental part of a fair trial. These principles apply
to adjudicating administrative agencies as well as to courts. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
579 (1973). "[E]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law/ Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
4.

The Concentration of Adjudicatory, Prosecutorial and Investigative Functions in
One Body Violates Dr. Davis' Due Process Rights.

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that there be a separation
between the adjudicator, prosecutor and investigator.

There are dangers associated with

combining these functions within a single entity. A judge who is not neutral, detached and
disinterested cannot properly serve his function. "A genuinely impartial hearing, conducted with
critical detachment, is psychologically improbable if not impossible, when the presiding officer
has at once the responsibility of appraising the strength of the case and of seeking to make it as
strong as possible."

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44 (1949); e.g. In re

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954) see also Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F.Supp.
1178 (M.D.Penn. 1974) (loss of medical staff privileges; "It is well settled that a tribunal which
combines the functions of prosecutor and judge into one body does not meet the due process
4

requirement of basic fairness."). "Fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let
prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
137 (1954).
We value the very appearance of fairness in our courts and tribunals.
It is not accidental that many of the specific provisions of the original constitution
and the Bill of Rights are procedural. The only way we know when the
government is behaving within its limits is when it goes through each step that we
require of it. Those are not silly technicalities, but they are the essence of
ordered liberty.
Ramirez v. Ahn, 686 F.Supp. 590, 591 (S.D.Tex. 1987) (Procedural irregularities resulted in
a denial of due process in a physician's license revocation proceeding.) "To perform its high
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."* In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (quoting Offutt v. United States 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
Mere combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions within the same
administrative agency without more, will not violate due process. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 58 (1974). Withrow is factually distinguishable from this case. It discusses the combination
of functions in a single agency. The Utah Licensing Statute and the Board have combined these
functions in a single individual, the Director Robinson. However, Withrow1s reasoning is
persuasive.
Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but Mour system
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." In
re Murchison, supra, at 136; cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). In
pursuit of this end various situations have been identified in which experience
teaches us that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are
those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in
which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before
him.

5

It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process
is to be adequately implemented.
Id. at 47. (Emphasis added); accord Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Allphin, 431 F.Supp. 1168, 1170-71
(S.D.I11. 1977), vacated on other grounds, Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Whitler, 585 F.2d 817 (7th
Cir. 1978).
The Utah Supreme Court considered the Withrow standards and found them persuasive
in In re Disciplinary Action of McCune, 111 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). McCune involved the
discipline of a lawyer by the Utah State Bar Association. Drawing no distinction between state
and federal due process standards, the Utah Supreme Court said Tilt would have been a clear
violation of state due process had bar counsel investigated, prosecuted and then participated as
a judge in the adjudication of this case." Id. at 706. (Emphasis added). Unlike Utah's
licensing scheme for physicians, the Utah State Bar Rules adequately divide the different
functions and protect the integrity of the disciplinary process. Therefore, in McCune the Court
held there was no violation of due process.
The way the licensing statutes are structured, the Division Director Robinson is endowed
with investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory power. This, on its face, is constitutionally
impermissible.

n.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-35.1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS APPLIED TO DR. DAVIS IN THIS CASE

1.

The prejudicial and extensive involvement of Robinson in the investigation of Dr.
6

Davis.
In the present case, Mr. Robinson has intensely investigated and then actively and
viciously prosecuted the Board's charges against Dr. Davis.

The cumulative effect of

Robinson's involvement renders him constitutionally unfit to act as adjudicator in the matter of
Dr. Davis' license to practice medicine in the State of Utah.
a.

Dr. Davis sued Robinson in past and pending litigation.

Due to the interrelationship between the Director Robinson and Dr. Davis in the past,
Dr. Davis sued or tried to sue Robinson on at least three occasions. See Notice of Claim, dated
August 3, 1988 (ultimately, no lawsuit was filed); (attached as Exhibit HAM); Davis v. City of
West Jordan, Golden Barrett, David Robinson, Vie Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, Robert Shober and Sandra Harrington, and John Does 1-10, United States District
Court No. 90-C-638G; Davis v. Robinson, et. al., District Court No. 89-C-1087G, 10th Cir.
appeal pending, Case No. 91-4034. The fact that Robinson now sits as adjudicator and sole fact
finder of the Board's disciplinary division is inherently prejudicial to Dr. Davis. Among the
various situations identified by the Supreme Court as unconstitutionally prejudicial is the
situation where "the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has
been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him." Withrow, 421 U.S.
at 47. In spite of any good faith on the part of Robinson he is unable, based on a "fair appraisal
psychological tendencies and human weakness" to act as an unbiased finder of fact in this matter.
Id.
b.

Robinson has investigated and pursued Dr. Davis in the past.

Due to the confidential and sensitive nature of these issues, Dr. Davis has respectfully

7

requested that the Court hold an in camera hearing to consider the nature and extent ot
Robinson's investigations of Dr. Davis since 1986. See Dr. Davis' Motion to Dismiss and
Request for an In Camera Hearing, filed August 2, 1991.
c.

Robinson was extensively involved in the present investigation and
prosecution of Dr. Davis.

Robinson saw the Division's Petition against Dr. Davis the day before it was filed.
(Robinson Deposition, p. 30 - 31, attached as Exhibit "B"). Robinson has been in attendance
at hearings regarding Dr. Davis. (Robinson Deposition, p. 55 - 56, attached as Exhibit MB").
Robinson signed the investigative subpoenas issued in this matter. (See Exhibit HC"). He is
ultimately responsible for the investigation and the state employees working on it.

Mr.

Robinson's bias, interest and personal involvement in the case violates Dr. Davis' due process
rights to a fair and impartial tribunal. Under a "realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies
and human weakness," it is clear in this case that Dr. Davis cannot receive a fair and impartial
adjudication at his licensing revocation hearing from Mr. Robinson.
CONCLUSION
The Division's Petition against Dr. Davis should be dismissed because the statute under
which it is filed is unconstitutional on its face. The statute deprives Dr. Davis of his due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to a fair and
impartial tribunal.
Alternatively, the Petition should be dismissed based on the unconstitutionality of the
statute as applied in this case.

Director Robinson's involvement in the investigation and

prosecution of Dr. Davis in this case is so extensive that it is utterly impossible for Dr. Davis
to receive a fair and impartial hearing with Robinson sitting as sole and final finder of fact.
8

DATED this

day of August, 1991.
STIR

Robert C. Davis
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1^

I hereby certify that on the
day of August, 1991, I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, to the following:
Melissa M. Hubbell
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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August 3, 1988

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATIONS
DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
L60 East Third South
Salt Lake City, UT
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION
The u n d e r s i g n e d a t t o r n e y s as c o u n s e l f o r Robert D a v i s ,

pursuant
et.seq.

to

the

provisions

of

Utah Code Annotated

( 1 9 5 3 , as amended), do h e r e b y n o t i f y

Department

of

Business

Regulations,

Division

Licensing

("Respondent")

on b e h a l f

of Robert D a v i s , M.D. ("Claimant")

United S t a t e s

District

§63-30-1

t h e S t a t e of U t a h ,
of

Professional

t h a t t h e y i n t e n d t o commence an a c t i o n

Court f o r

a g a i n s t you i n

t h e D i s t r i c t of Utah,

(90) days from s e r v i c e of t h i s n o t i c e .
the following

and

the

ninety

The a c t i o n a r i s e s out of

facts:
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or a b o u t August 5, 1987, the Respondent was c o n d u c t -

i n g an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
2.

Claimant.

That p u r s u a n t t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Claimant.

Respon-

d e n t s u p p l i e d an i n d i v i d u a l known to the Claimant w i t h a r e c o r d ing device for

t h e p u r p o s e of s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y

s a t i o n s between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and C l a i m a n t .

recording

conver-

3.

That at the encouragement and direction of Respondent

numerous conversations between the said individual and Claimant
were recorded between August 5, 1987, and September 1, 1987.
4.

That said individual at the direction of Respondent,

induced and entrapped through seductive behavior Claimant to make
certain statements and disclosures of a confidential, personal
and compromising nature,
5.

Respondent or it employees or agents failed to keep the

investigation

confidential

and

disclosed

said

confidential

information to third parties unrelated to the investigation with
the intent to deny Claimant his civil or constitutional rights or
to otherwise defame or damage Claimant.
NATURE OF CLAIMS ASSERTED
1.

Violation of plaintiff1s rights as protected by the

Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
2.

Violation of plaintiff's rights as guaranteed by Section

14, Article I, of the Constitution of Utah.
3.

Violation

of

Claimant's

Civil Rights under

42

U.S.C.§1983.
4.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress.
DAMAGES

Claimant has, among other things, suffered a deprivation of
rights, severe emotional distress, humiliation, inconvenience and
attorney's fees as a result of Respondent's intentional acts as
set forth generally

above and other intentional acts and

omissions of a similar nature.

DATED t h i s

3 ^ " day of

4 ^"[^^~~

, 1988.

^—J

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

By:
Attorneys for Claimant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION was mailed, postage prepaid,
this

3r

day of August, 1988 to the following:

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATIONS
DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
160 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney General
State of Utah
State CaDitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

BAL3

84114

^"^

1

Q

When did that take place?

2

A

Probably three weeks ago, I would best guess.

3

don't know.

4

About three weeks ago, I would think.

I don't have my calendar.

I can't tell you.

5

Q

Was a decision made at that time?

6

A

No.

7

Q

Whose decision is that?

8

A

It is my understanding that it is the Attorney

9
10
11
12

General's decision.
Q

I believe you were going to indicate another

occasion and I cut you off.
A

I was just trying to enumerate increased involvement

13

I had in the Davis case.

14

changed.

15

I

Q

I don't think of anything that has

I still keep more than an arm's length from it.
In the Davis case —

and I'm referring to this most

16

recent petition —

did you review this specific petition

17

before it was submitted to the Attorney General's Office?

18

A

No.

19

Q

When was the first time you saw this petition?

20

A

On the day —

21
22
23

minute?
Q

You may.

(Discussion off the record between witness and his counsel.)

24
25

may I confer with counsel for a

MR. HATHAWAY:
A

Back on the record.

I saw the petition the day before it was filed.

It
30

1

was presented to me by Melissa Hubbell, and she was in the

2

process of reviewing it, as I recall, with Golden Berrett.

3
4

There were some errors that you recall, some typo
errors your secretary had made?

5
6

MS, HUBBELL:
A

7

Yes.

You took it back to your office.
They had brought it believing it was a finished

8

product for filing and they had to take it back and amend it

9

and I saw it the next day again.

10

and the day it was filed.

11
12

MS. HUBBELL:
A

13
14
15

So, I saw it the day before

I didn't read it.
MS. HUBBELL:

You didn't really see it the —
I just saw it.
I brought it in and realized

there were typos.
A

To this day, I have not read the whole petition.

16

have scanned the petition.

17

frankly, I have not read every word in that petition.

18

a general understanding of what's there, but I have not read

19

it in its entirety.

20
21
22

Q

I

It is rather redundant and,
I have

Have you read the last five allegations of the

petition?
A

I'm aware that the last allegations in the petition

23

have to do with sexual matters.

24

are, whether it is five or three.

25

I would have said three.

I don't know how many there
If you had asked me a number

I'm aware that the last items in the
31

1

A

The filing of the petition?

2

Q

Yes.

3

A

It may have been*

4

Q

You don't recall specifically whether it was or not?

5

A

No.

6

Q

Do you know, was Steve Davis involved in the filing

7

of that petition?

8

A

He was the chief investigator.

10

Q

Do you typically attend the hearings held by the

11

board?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Were you in attendance at these hearings that you've

9

14

He would have been,

yes.

been referring to with Dr. Davis?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Do you recall whether the board ever had a hearing

17

where Dr. Davis or his counsel were not present?

18

A

I'm not aware of any.

19

Q

Other than your letter, does the board ever prepare

20

21

an o r d e r or any type of

A

findings?

When a hearing is held, the hearing goes forward.

22

At the conclusion of the hearing —

I'm present at that hearing

23

and participate in that hearing.

24

completed, the board deliberates on their own.

25

participate in that deliberation.

When the hearing is
I do not

With the Administrative
55

1

Law Judge, the board considers the case and makes its

2

recommendations as to an order based upon the findings of fact

3

that they make as a result of the hearing.

4

fact and their recommended order is then drafted by the

5

Administrative Law Judge.

6

findings of fact and recommended order.

7

me.

8
9
10

Q

That findings of

And so, yeah, they do make their
That is presented to

Do you typically include that with your letter to

the licensee?
A

What is generally included is, then I will cover

11

that recommended order with an order adopting the recommended

12

order, and that is then sent to the licensee.

13
14
15

Q

Have you ever had an occasion where you have not

adopted the findings and recommendations of the board?
A

I think there are two times since I have been the

16

Director that that has occurred.

One I remember specifically,

17

and I think there was one more but I don't remember which case

18

it was.

19

Q

Neither of the cases involved Dr. Davis?

20

A

No.

21

Q

Once the board has made a decision, what procedure

22

is followed?

23

revoke a license.

24
25

A

For example, in this case, a decision is made tc
What then is procedurally done?

The order would be issued revoking the license and

he would be given generally 30 days to submit —

the
56

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wei Is Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45302
Salt Lake City, Utah 34145
Telephone: (801) 530-6721

r

I?

;!

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ANO PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0
IN THE MATTER OF THE

)

S U B P O E N A

INVESTIGATION OF

)

ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D.

)

DUCES

TECUM

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
ROBERT C. DAVIS and/or FAMILY MED. CENTER
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH
WEST JORDAN, UTAH

GREETINGS:
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 53-1-16 (3), Utan Code Ann., (1953
as amended), you are required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items
in your possession:
Copies of all patient medical and business records identified on
the attached pages including but not limited to sign in logs,
patient consent forms, x-ray or imaging records, records and
reports of laboratory work.—both requested and performed,
progress notes, patient insurance authorization forms, health
insurance claim forms and billing records.
If not delivered on date of service, they are to be brought to Room
460 of the Heber M. Wells Building. 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110, within five (5) working days from date of service.
DATED this

7

-cal.

,:.>.jj'.lr.- .-.

SEAL

dav of

'A

1989.

0AV10 E. ROBINSOt/. DIRECTOR

-2-

A00RESS:
Janet K. Blevins

11481 fit. Ridge Circle
Sandy, UT 84092

Martin Blevins

11481 fit. Ridge Circle
Sandy, UT 84092

8 ill Brown

78 Wheatfield Circle
Draper, UT 84020

Audry 0. Callister

3368 West Starlight Orive
West Jordan, Utah 84088

Brooke Ashley Callister

3368 West Starlight Drive
West Jordan, Utah 84088

Justin Clay Chesnut

7260 South 2700 West //5
West Jordan, UT 84084

Janice Lynn Cisneros

3969 South Jester Drive
West Valley City, UT 84123

i/Bart L. Coverstone

Michelle S. Coverstone

v Timothy Davis

,''

5542 Heathrow Circle
Kearns, UT 84118
5542 Heathrow Circle
Kearns, UT 84118
5811 West Lodestone Avenue
Kearns, Ut 84118

Rolando I. Galano

275 Truman Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

Dav id Gal legos

23 4 7 West Sugar Factory Road
West Jordan, UT 84088

-- Claudia B. Gibbons

13537 South 1300 West
Riverton, UT 84065

\yy Sharon Grennan

4768 South 700 East #135
Murray, UT 84107

j

Ore Halcom

3877 West Leicester 8ay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Connie J. Halcom

38/7 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan, UT 84065

- James R. Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan, UT 84065

-3-

Michelle Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 8406S

Devin Jay Hardman

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan, UT 8406S

Jaylene Hardman

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 8406S

/Robert Calvin Henline

Carla G. Jacobson

/George Ray Lewis

1629 West 11745 South
Riverton. UT 84065
7245 South 700 East 09
Midvale. UT 84047
7981 South 3725 West
West Jordan. Ut 84088

Mildred fl. Martin

7089 South 1160 West
West Jordan. UT 84084

Sheri Murray

2076 Happiness Orive
West Jordan. UT 84084

Carol Ann Osier

7260 South 2700 West 05
West Jordan. UT 84084

Cary Wayne Patterson

9285 Vista West Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

Shalise Patterson

7451 Miriam Way
Magna. UT 84120

Reese Snyder

3134 West 8565 South
West Jordan. UT 84088

Robin Snyder

3134 West 8565 South
West Jordan. UT 84088

Tanya Anne Stauffer

7980 South 2760 West
West Jordan. UT 84088

Oonald W. Stump

84 West Inglenood Drive 01112
Midvale, UT 84047

F. Esther Stump

84 West Inglenook Orive 01112
Midvale, UT 84047

Clifton Leon Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 84044

Deborah Ann Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 84044

-4Jennifer Ann Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Hagna, UT 84044

Kenneth Dean Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
ttagna, UT 84044

Pamela Sessions Whitlock

1407 West 12295 South
Riverton, UT 84065

Wendee Whitlock

1407 West 12295 South
Riverton, UT 84065

x Bonnie K. Wilcox

7245 South 700 East H9
nidvale, UT 84047

»•' David LeRoy Wilcox

633 East 9000 South
Sandy, UT 84070

. Gloraine R. Wilcox

633 East 9000 South
Sandy, UT 84070

»/ Jamie Raye Willette

2840 West Strawberry Loop
West Jordan. UT 84084

DIVISION OF" OCCUPATIONAL AND PKOrCGGIONAt LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6721
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
^^^

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

0-0^^-0-O-O-O-0^^^-O--CM3-O^^^-O-O-O-O-^^
IN THE MATTER OF THE
INVESTIGATION OF
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D.

)
)
)

S U B P O E N A
DUCES

T E C U M

_ _ _ )

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D.
FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088

GREETINGS:
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 58-1-16 (3). Utah Code Ann., (1953
as amended), you are required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items
in your possession:
ALL PATIENT RECORDS INCLUOING X-RAYS, LABORATORY REPORTS, PROGRESS NOTES,
CONSULTATION NOTES, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMS & 8ILLING STATEMENTS
FOR THE FOLLOWING:
NAME:,
tC'Ienri E. Albertoni
David Wilford Andersen

V

Ur'tyn E. Asay, Jr.
'^Jo-tTeph J. Balfour

ADDRESS:
974 Wellwood Road #29K
Midvale, Utah 84047
4953 West Edinburgh Lane
West Jordan, Ut 84088
10425 Larkspur Drive
Sandy, UT 84070
1243 West 800 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104

-2-

ADDRESS:

NAME:

[jJamtfTa Barnes

2069 West 53SO South
Salt Lake City, UT 84118

Tzabeth Ann Black

2104 West 7420 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

L a u r e n c e Oean 8lack

2104 West 7420 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

a n e t K. Ble\/ins

11481 Mountain Ridge Circle
Sandy, UT 84092

til

78 Wheatfield Circle
Draper, UT 84020

Brown

1 J £ a n L. B rown

r e a Burton

s t i n Clay Chesnut

i JfrrCicG Lynn C i s n e r o s

1551 West Riverdale Road, Apt H5
Ogden. UT 84405
8976 South 1050 West
West Jordan, UT 84088
7260 South 2700 West ffS
West Jordan, UT 84084
3969 South Jester Drive
West Valley City, UT 84123

a r v i n R. Coon

4962 Bonnyview Street
Murray, UT 84107

ffad Wayne Crowe 11

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

^Ctn^lstine Crowe 11

ig Scott Crowe 11

iffini Shay Dunn

cob Grant Ourtschi

\j}x>rothy riae Ellis

) Barbara Ann Espiinoza

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084
4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084
2436 Rustic Roads Drive
South Jordan, UT 84065
2330 West 12090 South
Riverton. UT 84065
46 West Malvern Avenue
Salt Lake City. UT 84115
263 Worth Sun Arbor Terrace #1164
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

-3-

NAttE:

AOORESS:

MAcfrn Arthur Fenstermaker

1401 Luck Lane
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Rolando I. Galano

275 Truman Avenue
Salt Lake City. UT 84115

David Gallegos

2347 West Sugar Factory Road
West Jordan. UT 84088

Rosetta K. Groves

767 Galena Orive
Sandy. UT 84094

(_^Br^Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

LConnie J . Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065
3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065
3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065
1625 West 4270 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84123

I D-ervin Jay Hardman

3877 West Leicester 8ay
South Jordan. UT 84065

y l e n e Hardman

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

FrQd Harlman

6950 Flamingo Way
West Jordan. UT 84084

Kenneth Ray Henline

12711 Bergen Circle
Riverton. UT 84065

L>faert

Calvin Henline

een Sue H e p l e r

<U2rYydQ LeRoy Hone,

2910 West 4650 South tfl48
West Valley City, UT 84119

Jr.

Catherine Elizabeth Hummell

L-

1629 West 11745 South
Riverton, UT 84065

2285 West 12250 South
Riverton, UT 84065
3546 West 13400 South
Riverton, UT 84065

-4-

NAHE:

ADDRESS:

ristopher Edward Hummell

es Fredrick Hummell

PMfQr

Rose I v e r s o n

3S46 West 13400 South
Riverton. UT 8406S
3546 West 13400 South
Riverton. UT 84065
1716 South 2nd East
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

and A

Rose Beagley

fCajzl^rG.

/Epvfn

/

Jacobson

R. Judd

Dei^blTe Kuronya

Ac^Eric
Lea Lawrence

^ d cam Jamison Lolofie

en Joseph'Lolofie

L^ftfis* a J o v e t t e L o l o f i e
ori

Jo

Lolofie

W a l f o r d Fagatuluimalerr.alo
Lolofie
LWarfter G. f l a l m b o r g

276 I Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
7245 South 700 East #9
ttidvale. UT 84047
2754 West 7000 South
West Jordan. UT 84084
4798 Settlers Way #11
Murray. UT 84123
1433 West Little Creek Drive
West Jordan. UT 84084
1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084
1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084
649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084
1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084
1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084
3221 South 8000 West
Magna. UT 84044

esha 0. Mangum

4552 Barrington Orive
West Jordan. UT 84088

sa A.

4552 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

ttangum

I S i f h u y l e r A. Mangum

4552 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

-5-

NAME:

ADORESS:

red M. Martin

nald Edward Miller

Canoa Ann Osier

L~Si5mr~T^an3on

LX^-ry^Iayne

Ray

WAmanda J .

LJ£aren J .

Patterson

Pettit

Reagan

Reagan

CJ^PT^fopher M. Shepherd

\ E&r€h

A.

Shepherd

enda Jean Smith

Tanya Anne Stauffer

fnald W. Stump

rsther

i>* rid a
1/

8858 South Capernaum Orive
West Jordan, UT 84084
7260 South 2700 West #5
West Jordan. UT 84084
4 Regal #63
Murray. UT 84107

} Sh^Tise P a t t e r s o n

tarvin

7089 South 1160 West
West Jordan. UT 84084

Stuinp

V. Thomas

ravis Bront Thomas

9285 Vista West Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088
7451 Miriam Way
Magna, UT 84120
1241 West 10875 South
South Jordan. UT 84065
9556 South Angus Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065
9556 South Angus Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle
West Jordan, UT 84084
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle
West Jordan. UT 84084
9830 South 475 East
Sandy. UT 84070
7980 South 2760 Wc?st
West Jordan. UT 34088
84 West Inglenood Drive No. 1112
Midvale, UT 84047
84 West Inglenook Or. #1112
Midvale, UT 84047
9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan, UT 84088
9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan, UT 84088

v.*
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL A NO PNOrCSSIONnL LICErjHirjG
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6721
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ANO PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
O-O-O-O^-O^-O-O-O-O^-O-O^-O-O-O-O^-^^
IN THE MATTER OF THE

)

INVESTIGATION OF

)

ROOERT C. OAVIS, (1.0.

)

S U B P O E N A
OUCES

TECUM

) •

:

THE PEOPLE. OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.O.
FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088

GREETINGS:
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 58-1-16 (3), Utah Code Ann., (1953
as amended), you are required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items
in your possession:
ALL PATIENT RECORDS INCLUDING X-RAYS, LABORATORY REPORTS, PROGRESS NOTES,
CONSULTATION NOTES, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMS £ BILLING STATEMENTS
FOR THE FOLLOWING:
NAME:

ADDRESS:

Glenn E. Albcrtoni

974 Wellwood Road #28K
Midvale, Utah 84047
4953 West Edinburgh Lane
West Jordan, Ut 84088

David Wilford Andersen

Arlyn E. Asay, Jr.

10425 Larkspur Orive
Sandy, UT 8 4070

Joseph J. Balfour

1243 West 800 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84104
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NAME:

ADDRESS:

Pamela Barnes

2069 West 53SO South
Salt Lake City. UT 84118

Elizabeth Ann Black

2104 West 7420 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Laurence Dean Black

2104 West 7420 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Janet K. Blevins

11481 nountain Ridge Circle
Sandy. UT 84092

B i l l 8 rown

78 Wheatfield C i r c l e
Draper. UT 84020

Jean L. Brown

1551 West Riverdale Road, Apt H5
Ogden, UT 84405

Andrea Burton

8976 South 1050 West
West Jordan, UT 84088

Justin Clay Chesnut

7260 South 2700 West (fS
West Jordan, UT 84084

Janice Lynn Cisneros

3969 South Jester Drive
West Valley City. UT 84123

Marvin R. Coon

4962 Bonnyview Street
Murray. UT 84107

Chad Wayne Crowe 11

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Christine Crowell

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Craig Scott Crowell

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Tiffini Shay Dunn

2436 Rustic Roads Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065

Jacob Grant Durtschi

2330 West 12090 South
Riverton. UT 84065

Oorothy rtae Ellis

46 West ttalvern Avenue
Salt Lake City. UT 84115

Barbara Ann Espinoza

263 Worth Sun Arbor Terrace #1164
Salt Lake City. UT 84116

-3-

AQORESS:
Vern A r t h u r

Rolando I .

Fenstermaker

Galano

1401 Luck Lane
Salt Lake City. UT 84106
275 Truman Avenue
Salt Lake City. UT 84115

Oav/id G a l l e g o s

2347 West Sugar Factory Road
West Jordan. UT 84088

R o s e t t a K. Grov/es

767 Galena Drive
Sandy. UT 84094

8re

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan, UT 84065

Halcom

Connie J. Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

James R. Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Michelle Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Tony James Hall

1625 West 4270 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84123

Devin Jay Hardman

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Jaylene Hardman

38/7 West Leicester 8ay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Fred Hartman

6950 Flamingo Way
West Jordan. UT 84084

Kenneth Ray Henline

12711 Bergen Circle
Riverton, UT 84065

Robert Calvin Henline

1629 West 11745 South
Riverton. UT 84065

Kaloen Sue Hepler

2910 West 4650 South # M 8
West Valley City, UT 84119

Clyde LeRoy Hone, Jr.

2285 West 12250 South
Riverton, UT 84065

Catherine Elizabeth Hummel 1

3546 West 13400 South
Riverton, UT 84065

NAttE:

ADORESS:

Christopher Edward Hummell

3546 West 13400 South
Riverton, UT 84065

James Fredrick Hummell

3546 West 13400 South
Riverton. UT 84065

Piper Rose Iverson

1716 South 2nd East
Salt Lake City. UT 84115

and/or
Piper Rose Beagley

276 I Street
Salt Lake City. UT 84103

Carla G. Jacobson

7245 South 700 East #9
ttidvale. UT 84047

Ervin R. Judd

2754 West 7000 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Debbie Kuronya

4798 Settlers Way #11
Murray. UT 84123

Erica Lawrence

1433 West Little Creek 0
West Jordan. UT 84084

Adam Jamison Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Aren Joseph Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Atisa Jovette Lolofie

649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Lori Jo Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Walford Fagatuluimalemalo
Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Walter G. ttalmborg

3221 South 8000 West
ttagna. UT 84044

Alesha 0 ttangum

4552 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

Lisa A ttangum

4552 Barrington Drive
West Jordan, UT 84088

Schuyler A. ttangum

4552 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088
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NAME:

AOORESS:

Mildred M

Martin

7089 South 1160 West
West Jordan, UT 84084

Donald Edward Miller

8858 South Capernaum Drive
West Jordan. UT 84084

Carol Ann Osier

7260 South 2700 West #5
West Jordan. UT 84084

Sam Panson

4 Regal 063
Murray. UT 84107

Cary Wayne Patterson

9285 Vista West Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

Shalise Patterson

7451 Miriam Way
Magna. UT 84120

Marvin Ray Pettit

1241 West 10875 South
South Jordan. UT 84065

Amanda J. Reagan

9556 South Angus Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065

Karen J. Reagan

9556 South Angus Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065

Christopher M. Shepherd

6696 Thimbleleaf Circle
West Jordan. UT 84084

Edith A. Shepherd

6696 Thimbleleaf Circle
West Jordan. UT 84084

8renda Jean Smith

9830 South 475 East
Sandy. UT 84070

Tanya Anne Stauffer

7980 South 2760 Wc^t
West Jordan. UT 84088

Donald W. Stump

84 West Inglenood Drive Wo
Midvale. UT 84047

F

84 West Inglenook Or
Midvale. UT 94047

Esther Stump

Lynda V

Thomas

Travis Brent Thomas

9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan. UT 84088
9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jo-dan. UT 84088

01112

1112
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NAME :
Troy Lynn Thomas

9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan. UT 84088

Clifton Leon Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
magna, UT 84044

Deborah Ann Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 84044

Jennifer Ann Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 8404 4

Kenneth Oean Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 84044

Pamela Sessions Whitlock

1407 West 1229S South
Riverton. UT 8406S

Uiendee Whitlock

1407 West 12295 South
Riverton, UT 8406S

Bonnie K. Wilcox

7245 South 700 East #9
Midvale, UT 84047

David LeRoy Wilcox

633 East 9000 South
Sandy. UT 84070

Gloraine R. Wilcox

633 East 9000 South
Sandy. UT 84070

Jamie Raye Willette

2840 West Strawberry Loop
West Jordan, UT 84084

Julia Alice Zeeman

2502 Rustic Road Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065

If not delivered on date of service, they are to be brought to Room
460 of the Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110, within five (5) working days from date of service.

DATED this

//-^day of

%k^r^,s.u/

1989.

DAVID E
E. ROBINSON. DIRECTOR
S E A L

• Jr. v^v=•«'.-- f.\

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AMD PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
lleber n. Wei Is 3ui Iding
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6721
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0-0^-0--0-^-0~0^^^^^-0^-0^^^-0^-0-0-0-0-0^^
IN THE MATTER OF THE

)

INVESTIGATION OF

)

ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D.

)
)

S U B P O E N A
DUCES

TECUM

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
R08ERT C. DAVIS, M.D.
FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088

GREETINGS:
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 58-1-16 (3), Utah Code Ann., (1953
as amended), you arQ required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items
in your possession:
ALL PATIENT RECORDS INCLUDING X-RAYS, LABORATORY REPORTS, PROGRESS NOTES,
CONSULTATION NOTES, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMS & BILLING STATEMENTS
FOR THE FOLLOWING:
NAME:

ADDRESS:

Glenn E. Albertoni

974 Wellwood Road #28K
Midvale, Utah 04O47
4953 West Edinburgh Lane
West Jordan. Ut 8A»088

David Wilford Andersen

Arlyn E. Asay, Jr.

1042b Larkspur Drive
Sandy, UT 84070

Joseph J. Balfour

1243 West 800 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104

-2-

Pamela Barnes

2069 West 5350 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84118

Elizabeth Ann 81ack

2104 West 7420 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Lawrence Oean Black

2104 West 74 20 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Janet K. Bievins

11481 Mountain Ridge Circle
Sandy, UT 84092

Bill Brown

78 Wheatfield Circle
Draper, UT 84020

Jean L. Brown

1551 West Riverdale Road, Apt H5
Ogden. UT 84405

Andrea 8urton

8976 South 1050 West
West Jordan. UT 84088

Justin Clay Chesnut

7260 South 2700 West #5
West Jordan. UT 84084

Janice Lynn Cisneros

3969 South Jester Orive
West Valley City, UT 84123

Marvin R. Coon

4962 Bonnyvieui Street
Murray. UT 84107

Chad Wayne Crowe 11

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan.

UT 84084

Christine Crowell

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Craig Scott Crowell

4934 West 6600 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Tiffini Shay Dunn

2436 Rustic Roads Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065

Jacob Grant Durtschi

2330 West 12090 South
Riverton, UT 84065

Dorothy Mae Ellis

46 West Malvern Avenue
Salt Lake City. UT 84115

Barbara Arm Espino^a

263 Worth Sun Arbor Terrace #1164
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

-3-

PJA.^E:
\JQTH

AOORESS:
Arthur Fenstermaker

H O I Luck Lane
Salt Lake City. UT 84106

Rolando I. Galano

275 Truman Avenue
Salt Lake City. UT 84115

Ore Halcom

38/7 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Connie J. Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

James R. Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

niche 1le Halcom

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Tony James Hall

1625 West 4270 South
Salt Lake City. UT 84123

Devin Jay Hardman

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Jaylene Hardman

3877 West Leicester Bay
South Jordan. UT 84065

Robert Calvin Henline

1629 West 11745 South
Riverton, UT 84065

Kaleen Sue Hepler

2910 West 4650 South #148
West Valley City. UT 84119

Clyde LeRoy Hone, Jr.

2285 West 12250 South
Riverton. UT 84065

Catherine Elizabeth Humme11

3546 West 13400 South
Riverton. UT 84065

Christopher Edward Humme11

3546 West 13400 South
Riverton, UT 84065

James Fredrick Hummel 1

3546 West 13400 South
Riverton, UT 84065

Piper Rose

1716 South 2nd Last
Salt i *ke City. UT 84115

Everson

and/or
Piper Rose Beagley

Car la G.

Jacobson

276 I Street
Salt L.^ke Ci ty, UT 84103
7245 South 700 East #9
nidv^ie UT ^ o n 7

_4-

NAME:

AOORESS:

Ervin R. Judd

2754 West 7000 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Oebbie Kuronya

4798 Settlers Way #11
Hurray. UT 84123

Erica Lawrence

1433 West Little Creek Drive
West Jordan. UT 84084

Adam Jamison Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Aron Joseph Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Atisa Jov/ette Lolofie

649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Lori Jo Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan. UT 84084

Walford Fagatuluimalomaio
Lolofie

1649 West 8740 South
West Jordan, UT 84084

Walter G. Malmborg

3221 South 8000 West
Magna, UT 34044

Alesha 0. Mangum

4 5*52 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

Lisa A. Mangum

45152 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 84088

Schuyler A. Mangum

4552 Barrington Drive
West Jordan. UT 34088

Mildred M. Martin

7089 South 1160 West
West Jordan, UT 84084

Donald Edward Miller

8858 South Capernaum Drive
West Jordan. UT 84084

Carol Ann Osier

7260 South 2700 West //S
West Jordan, UT 'M084

Sam Panson

4 tfegal //6 3
Murray. UT 84 107

Gary Wayne Patterson

9285 Vista West 0ri\jQ
West Jordan, UT 84088

-5-

NAME.

AODRESS:

Shalise Patterson

7451 Miriam Way
Magna, UT 84 120

Marvin Ray Pettit

1241 West 10875 South
South Jordan, UT 84065

Amanda J. Reagan

9556 South Angus Drive
South Jordan. UT 84065

Karen J

9556 South Angus Drive
South Jordan, UT 84065

Reagan

Christopher M. Shepherd

6696 Thimbleleaf Circle
West Jordan, UT 84084

Edith A. Shepherd

6696 Thimbleleaf Circle
West Jordan, UT 04O84

Brenda Jean Smith

9830 South 475 East
Sandy, UT 84070

Donald W. Stump

84 West Inglenood Drive Wo. 1112
Midvale, UT 84047

F. Esther Stump

84 West Inglenook Or. #1112
Midvale, UT 84047

Lynda V. Thomas

9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan, UT 84088

Travis 8rent Thomas

9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan, UT 84088

Troy Lynn Thomas

9210 South Lisa Avenue
West Jordan, UT 84088

Clifton Leon Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 84044

Deborah Ann Wallace

3126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 84044

Jennifer Ann Wallace

3 126 South 9000 West
Magna. UT 84044

Kenneth Dean Wallace

3 126 South 9000 West
Magna, UT 8404A

Pamela Sessions Whit lock

1407 West 12295 South
Riverton, UT 84065

Wendee Whitloc.K

1407 West 12295 South
Riverton, UT 84065

-6-

NAttE:

ADDRESS:

8onnie K. Wilcox

724S South 700 East #9
flidvale, UT 84047

David LeRoy Wilcox

633 East 9000 South
Sandy, UT 84070

Gloraine R. Wilcox

63 3 East 9000 South
Sandy, UT 94070

Jamie Raye Willette

2840 West Strawberry Loop
West Jordan, UT 84084

Julia Alice Zeeman

2502 Rustic Road Drive
South Jordan, UT 84065

If not delivered on date of service, they are to be brought to Room
460 of the Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110, within five (5) working days from date of service.

DATED this J H J L

da

Y

of

(Q^>tw

1988,

A • rtf* - •
DAVID E. ROBIT^ON, DIRECTOR
S E A L

lUCTORK THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL.LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ''''"'• "' 1991
f
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

r^"° j>^"^L

A PROFEqcm.,

• ^ - i lOlfMO

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH

Subpoena for

TO:

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

CASE OPL-89-73

X

Person

X

Documents

Dr. Ted Ailred
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER
100 North Medical Drive
(Pathology)

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time specified
below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case.
Place

Date and Time

215 South State Street
Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

April 16, 1991
9:00 a.m.

YOU- ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers,
documents, or other items:
Any and all files, notes, memos, letters and/or other documents you have in your
possession that in any way relate to Dr. Robert C. Davis.
Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby admonished pursuant to Rule 4(B)(5), Model Administrative Discovery Rules for
Agency Adjudicative Proceedings to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing directors, or managing agents, or other persons who
consent to testify on its behalf, and setting forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will testify or produce documents or things.
The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization.

if ? • ? /
^ P i i ^ I D I N G OFFICER/ _
PLTFK STIRRA
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South Stale Street
Suite 1150
Salt Lake Ctl>. I'Mh S41II
Telephone (SOI) 3A4-S300

'-:<l?f?^s*z$

UEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL A PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH
Subpoena for

TO:

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
CASE OPL-89-73
Person

Documents

DR. DOUGLAS M. VOGELER
9600 South 1300 East ^ ^ - t f H ^ j
S u i t e 303
Sandy, Utah

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time
specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case.
p,acc

Date and Time

Thursday, January 17, 1991 a t 4 : 0 0 P.M.

1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers,
documents, or other items:
Any and all files, notes, memos, letters and/or other documents you have
in your possession that in any way relate to Dr. Robert Davis.

Any subpoenaed organization not a p a a y to this suit is hereby adnKynishcd pursuant to Rule 4(B)(5), Model Administrative Discovery
Rules for Agency Adjudicative Proceedings to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing dircaors. or managing agents,
or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and setting forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will
testify or produce documents or things. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the
organization.

ZL-

^2l~

'RESIDING OFFICER

*£^Vv

•%-j%:

-

^

^

Haie

I-?'?/

P I T E R bTTRJIA
McKAY. BURTON & TIHJRMAN
/
/ - ~f
1200 Kennecott Building
l £ « * VY»?r. _ ^ / ^ / £
10 East South Temple
Salt IJWC C i v . I T S4I33
Telephone: (KOI) 521-U35

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IK THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH
Subpoena for

TO:

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
CASE OPL-89-73
Person

Documents

Dr. Kent Richards
Bryner Clinic
745 East '300 South
Salt Lake City, UT

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time
specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case.
Place

Date and Time Wednesday J a n u a r y 16, 1991 at

9:30 A.M.

1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers,
documents, or other items:
Any and all files, notes, memos, letters and/or other documents you have
in your possession that in any way relate to Dr. Robert Davis.

Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby admonished pursuant to Rule 4(B)(5), Model Administrative Discovery
Rules for Agency Adjudicative Proceedings to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing directors, or managing agents.
or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and setting fonh. for cact\ person designated, the matters on which he will
testify or produce documents or things. The persons so designated sh3(l testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the
organization.

M^^M^£=^=.

/-/*-?/

PRESIDING OBFICER

PITTER STIIUIA
McKAY. BURTON & THURMAN"
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake Gty. L T S4133
Telephone: (SOU 521-4135

Tab I

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSING
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THE
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. OPL-89-73

-0O0-

October 29, 1991
1:00 p.m.
Heber Wells Building, Third Floor

-oOo-

Administrative Law Judge:

Steve Eklund

-oOo-

COPY
Eocky 44ctrtilr
Eepcitlr( Sendee,!™:.
322 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt take City Utah 84111
Phon* (801) 531-0256

Diana Kent, C . S . R . ,

Statewide Reporting
National and Merit Certified Reporters
Expedited Delivery
Computerized Transcription
IBM Compatible Disks
Litigation Support Software
Video Depositions

R.P.R.

so
issue.

Thus, the assertion that we should exhaust this

administrative remedy to subsequently aid the court in its
review of that matter doesn't carry a great deal of
persuasion with me.
On the other hand, Mr. Stirba, I have a little
difficulty with the fact that you have urged the need to get
a declaratory action initiated and obtain a court decision
before we have a hearing here.

And from what you have

represented today, you were aware indirectly, through
counsel and the Federal District Court proceedings, that
Judge Green had suggested that you were in the wrong forum
there when you sought the same relief, but you haven't
already filed that relief now.
think that if it

I question the delay.

I

it is a potential issue of

significant importance.

I admit and acknowledge that.

But

it seems to me, in requesting me to stay this proceeding, it
would have been more appropriate to have already filed that
action and have taken the steps to pursue that remedy before
you ask me to stay this proceeding now.
I acknowledge the fact, as set forth in the Clayton
versus Bennett case, which is cited by the Division, through
the Supreme Court, decided 298 Pacific 2nd 531 that Justice
Crocket recognizes that declaratory relief and injunctive
relief pursuant thereto is a correct method for challenging
the constitutionality of a statute.

Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.

81
I think what 1 am suggesting from what 1 just
indicated is I v/ould deny any stay here and leave to you the
opportunity to file that request for a declaratory relief in
the district courts and accompany it with a request for
injunctive relief and let the court address the issue
whether they think these proceedings ought to be stayed.

It

is going to sound like a proverbial passing of the buck.
But under the circumstances, I think it is the most
equitable decision to make.
The motion to stay, then, pending a request for
declaratory judgment action in the District Court, is
denied.
Your other motions?
MR. STIRBA:

Fifth Amendment.

a dismissal motion or a stay.

It is in the nature of

And basically the Court is

aware of the issue because we ran through this in discovery.
And the cases we are relying on, I believe we have cited
them all.
cases.

But basically there are three Supreme Court

And it is the Uniform Sanitation Man Association

versus the Commissioner, which is 280 U.S. 280.
Yes.

That f s right.

I f m sorry.

No. 392 U.S. 280.

Another case is Stevik versus Kline, which is 385
U.S. 511.

Supreme Court case.

And the final case the Gardner versus Broderick case,
which is 392 U.S. 273.

Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.

o o

o2

And in essence, Judge, right now, and I think we
attached this to our reply memo.

Just recently, within the

last month, Dr. Davis received a Grand Jury subpoena where
he is named as a target of a federal investigation, which is
a continuation of what previously was starting when they
executed a search warrant in January of 1990.
a continuing series of subpoenas.

There's been

And clearly they

reference, as is indicated in the search warrant, their
billing issues, same patients that overlap some of the
patients in the Division's petition.
There's absolutely no question, although there was
some raising of this in the Division's response, there's no
question as we sit here right now he is the target of a
federal investigation, a criminal investigation, as
witnessed by the subpoena that was issued to him, produce
documents as of October 9, I believe it was, which we
attached.
Given that, and given the disability he has and the
right he has under the Fifth Amendment to assert claims of
privilege, it is our position that, based upon the Supreme
Court cases which I just cited, which aren't directly on
point, but they are as close as I could find, it is clear
that you can't sanction somebody, you can't punish somebody,
you can't say to somebody

you are going to lose your job,

much less your livelihood, where you are validly asserting a

Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE"STATE"OF "UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSING
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THE
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. OPL-89-73

-0O0-

October 29, 1991
1:00 p.m.
Heber Wells Building, Third Floor

-oOo-

Administrative Law Judge:

Steve Eklund

-oOo-

COPY
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322 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
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Diana Kent,

Statewide Reporting
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Litigation Support Software
Video Depositions

C.S.R;>,R.P.R.
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1

against.

In a typical case, that individual that is the

2

subject of this action may not be on probation and he,

3

meaning Mr. Robinson, may not have been involved in

4

monitoring compliance with that probation.

5

your position, is not a typical case.

6

MR. STIRBA:

7

THE COURT:

8

But this, in

You said it very well.
Before I open it to Miss Hubbell, we will

take a brief recess before she begins.

9

Let me comment on the matter you last raised.

You're

10

sensitive and correctly accurate when you indicate that I

11

don't believe I have the authority and would not presume to

12

exercise any jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme

13

here is unconstitutional on its face.

14

cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the

15

courts to decide.

16

to raise the issue here, for purposes of preserving it if

17

necessary, for judicial review or independent action before

18

any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on

19

that aspect of your motion, although I do note that it was

20

filed.

It is clear, from the

Although it is not inappropriate for you

Because I don't have the authority to address it.

21

MR. STIRBA:

22

THE COURT:

Very well.
Maybe that will save Miss Hubbell a

23

little time in having to respond to that.

24

brief five minute recess and then we will proceed.

25

Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.

Let's take a

TabK

R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312
Utah Attorney General
MELISSA M. HUBBELL, #5090
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-3200
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
PRESCRIBE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

NOTICE

CASE NO. OPL-89-73

In order to prevent unnecessary delay in the above stated
matter, David Robinson, Director of the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing will recuse himself from his usual role
in these proceedings.

The memorandum, depositions, and argument

that have addressed this issue have clearly demonstrated that Mr.
Robinson

is

not

prejudice

and

participate in these proceedings.

could

fairly

and

impartially

Dr. Davis' due process rights

have not and would not be violated by Robinson's participation.
Robinson has withdrawn in order to present further unnecessary
delay in an already lengthy proceeding.

DATED this v 3

da

y of

VJ^MHM&</I

/p 1931.

CC01C0

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
Notice

was

mailed,

postage

pre-paid

on

th is

S{& day

, 1991 to the following:
Peter Stirba
Stirba & Hathaway
215 South State, #1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

0C01C1

of
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO
ADMINISTER AND PRESCRIBE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
::

ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO STAY
LICENSURE HEARING
CASE NO. OPL-89-73

Appearances:
Peter Stirba for Respondent
Delia M. Welch for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Pursuant to a September 2, 1992 motion, Respondent requests
an indefinite stay of the hearing presently scheduled to commence
on November 16, 1992 in this proceeding.
response September 14, 1992.

The Division filed its

Respondent's final reply was filed

September 18, 1992.
Oral argument was conducted September 23, 1992 and
telephonic conferences with respective counsel were subsequently
conducted September 28, 1992 and October 1, 1992.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the
premises, now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent contends the hearing in this disciplinary
licensure proceeding should be indefinitely postponed until the
resolution of a 41 count mail fraud indictment, now pending in

federal district court.

Respondent asserts any hearing in this

adjudicative proceeding while that criminal prosecution is also
pending would violate his privilege against self-incrimination,
he would be substantially prejudiced by the "parallel prosecution
of the administrative and criminal matters" and this Court
"should exercise its discretion and ensure" he receives "a fair
disposition of the charges pending against him in both matters".
In response, the Division acknowledges the pending criminal
prosecution involves "much of the same subject matter as the
Petition in this case and even alleges misconduct with respect to
some of the same patients".

However, the Division contends no

stay of the hearing in this proceeding is constitutionally
mandated and Respondent would suffer no substantial prejudice if
the November 16, 1992 hearing were conducted as presently
scheduled.

The Division further asserts the state's interest "in

protecting the citizens of Utah from potential harm outweighs Dr.
Davis' interest in delaying the hearing" in this forum.
Prior to specifically addressing the instant motion, a brief
summary is warranted as to the procedural history of both this
licensure matter and the pending criminal prosecution.

The

Division initiated this adjudicative proceeding on December 7,
1989 and substantial prehearing discovery has since been
conducted.

This Court previously stayed discovery in this

proceeding for approximately three (3) months to increase the
likelihood that a related criminal prosecution in state court
proceedings could be concluded prior to any hearing in this
2

forum.

Thereafter, further discovery was conducted and numerous

motions and other procedural matters have been addressed.
On August 2, 1991, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or
stay this administrative proceeding pending the resolution of
various criminal investigations by the U.S. Attorneys Office,
the State of Utah and the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
This Court took both that and numerous other motions under
advisement as additional prehearing matters were addressed and
resolved.
denied.

By Order, dated May 7, 1992, Respondent's motion was
When that Order was entered, no federal, state or county

criminal prosecution had been filed.

Pursuant to a July 22, 1992

Scheduling Order, a hearing of approximately 4 - 5

weeks is

presently scheduled to commence in this proceeding on November
16, 1992.
On August 13, 1992, a federal grand jury returned a 41 count
indictment which includes allegations of mail fraud, fictitious
and fraudulent claims and aiding and abetting.

On September 21,

1992, the anticipated four week criminal trial was placed on a
second calendar setting for November 30, 1992.

Respective

counsel in the criminal prosecution subsequently agreed to
continue the trial of that matter, which is presently scheduled
to commence April 5, 1993.
This Court now reaffirms certain conclusions set forth in
its May 7, 1992 Order.

Specifically, no dismissal or stay of

this adjudicative proceeding is constitutionally mandated by
reason of any criminal prosecution which parallels - in some
3

respects - certain charges to be heard in this forum as to
whether a basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction
concerning Respondent's licenses to practice medicine and to
administer and prescribe controlled substances.

Simply put, no

infringement of Respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege would
occur if this case proceeds forward to a hearing under such
circumstances.

See Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477 (1st. Cir.

1977); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982); Diebold v.
Civil Service Commission of St. Louis County, 611 F.2d 697 (8th
Cir. 1979) ; Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Unnamed
Attorney. 298 Md. 36, 467 A.2d 517 (1983); Smith v. Charnes. 728
P.2d 1287 (1986).
A court may decide "in its discretion to stay civil
proceedings . . . when the interests of justice seerof ] to
require such action" and such a determination is to be made "in
light of the particular circumstances of the case".

Securities

and Exchange Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d
1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

The most compelling reason to enter

a stay exists where "a party under indictment for a serious
offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action
involving the same matter".

Id. at 1376.

Thus, a court "may be

justified in deferring" a noncriminal proceeding if delay of that
proceeding "would not seriously injure the public interest". Id.
(Emphasis added).
This Court necessarily concludes it would be a gross
miscarriage of justice to merely await the resolution of the
4

pending criminal prosecution at some unknown and distant time and
to thus permit Respondent to effect any intended delay of that
(and/or this) proceeding in efforts to promote and protect his
varied interests which may be jeopardized by the eventual outcome
of either that criminal prosecution or this administrative
action.

The Division has an appropriate ongoing interest in

proceeding expeditiously to bring this case to resolution.

This

Court acknowledges Respondent will elect not to testify in any
disciplinary licensure hearing conducted while the criminal
prosecution is still pending.

This Court finds no merit in

Respondent's repeated assertion this administrative proceeding
was initiated to obtain evidence for any subsequent criminal
trial.
Notwithstanding the similarities between certain allegations
pertinent to both this administrative action and the pending
criminal prosecution, the Court notes the distinctly different
nature of sanctions which could enter in each proceeding.
Regardless of the outcome of the criminal prosecution, further
proceedings would likely still be necessary in this forum to
address the status of Respondent's licenses to practice medicine
and to administer and prescribe controlled substances.
It is unknown whether Respondent's ongoing medical practice
involves any conduct allegedly similar to that set forth in the
December 7, 1989 Petition as to pose an immediate, significant or
continuing danger to the public.

However, this Court emphasizes

a just and expeditious resolution of this proceeding is a proper
5

objective to both promote the public interest and bring this
extended controversy between the Division and Respondent to an
ultimate conclusion.

This Court squarely rejects Respondent's

urgence that a continuing and indefinite delay of the hearing
before the Physicians Licensing Board in this proceeding is
tolerable simply because approximately three years has already
elapsed since the Division initiated this proceeding.
Both parties acknowledge it rests within the sound
discretion of this Court to determine whether there should be any
continuance of the November 16, 1992 hearing.

This Court is

generally aware of the previous publicity attendant to this
disciplinary licensure proceeding. The Court fully anticipates
continued publicity of an escalated nature would probably occur
during any subsequent hearing in this forum.

It is foreseeable

such publicity could jeopardize Respondent's right to a fair
trial if this licensure action were held prior to that criminal
prosecution.
Further, the parallel proceedings in question involve
certain common allegations of either unlawful or unprofessional
conduct.

Were Respondent to understandably and necessarily elect

to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege in this proceeding
prior to any subsequent criminal prosecution, certain evidence
which might be otherwise presented to the Board during a hearing
in this forum and which could assist the Board in its
understanding of this case would not be available.
With due regard for all of the foregoing, this Court
6

reluctantly concludes the November 16, 1992 hearing should be
continued for a reasonably brief time.

It is unfortunate the

criminal prosecution will not commence until April 5, 1993.

This

Court would have preferred an earlier calendaring of that matter.
However, this Court also concludes the public interest will not
be seriously injured if the pending criminal prosecution is
concluded on or about April 30, 1993 and this adjudicative
proceeding is resolved - either by a stipulation or an order
entered pursuant to a hearing before the Board - no later than
mid-June 1993.
One further matter must be addressed.

This Court recognizes

the possibility exists some intervening circumstances could
prompt a rescheduling of the trial in the criminal prosecution to
a later date.

Entry of the order set forth below is only

intended to afford Respondent the opportunity to defend the
pending criminal prosecution as it is presently scheduled.

There

is little, if any, measurable likelihood of a continuance of the
hearing in this adjudicative proceeding beyond mid-May 1993.
This Court concludes the pending matter in this forum should be
resolved within the above-described time.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the November 16, 1992 hearing
before the Physicians Licensing Board in this proceeding is
continued.
It is further ordered a subsequent hearing before the Board
shall commence on or about mid-May 1993.
7

The parties, respective

counsel, any witnesses and Board members shall be available and
prepared to so commence that hearing, which may not conclude
until mid-June 1993.

The Court will contact respective counsel

during the week of March 22 - 26, 1993 to address a schedule for
both a final prehearing conference and the subsequent hearing in
this proceeding.
Counsel for Respondent shall notify the Court of any change
in the date presently scheduled for commencement of the pending
criminal prosecution.
Dated this

c

day of October, 1992

8
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[8] Petitioner places great weight on
oar decision in United States Catholic
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S.Ct 2268, 101
L.Ed.2d 69 (1988), a case involving a civil
contempt order entered by the District
Court. The contemnors, two nonparty witnesses, refused to comply with a district
court document subpoena. The District
Court found them in civil contempt and
ordered them to pay a fine of $50,000 per
day. The contemnors, as was their nght,
immediately appealed the contempt order,
challenging the District Court's subjectmatter jurisdiction. We held that the
Court of Appeals was obligated to consider
the jurisdictional challenge in full, rather
than simply contenting itself with an inquiry into whether the District Court colorably had jurisdiction. We further concluded that if the district court was found to be
lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, that the
contempt order would also fall. Focusing
on this second part of our decision, petitioner cites Catholic Conference as establishing the proposition that a sanction must
fall if imposed when jurisdiction is in fact
absent 4

The interest in having rules of procedure
obeyed, by contrast, does not disappear
upon a subsequent determination that the
court was without subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts do make mistakes; in cases
such as Catholic Conference it may be
possible immediately to seek relief in an
appellate tribunal. But where such an immediate appeal is not authorized, there is
no constitutional infirmity under Article III
in requiring those practicing before the
courts to conduct themselves in compliance
with the applicable procedural rules in the
interim, and to allow the courts to impose
Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their
failure to do so.5

Catholic Conference does not stand for
such a broad assertion. A civil contempt
order has much different purposes than a
Rule 11 sanction. Civil contempt is designed to force the contemnor to comply
with an order of the court, id., at 79, 108
S.Ct, at 2272; Rule 11 is designed to punish a party who has already violated the
court's rules. Cooter & Gell, supra, 496
U.S., at
110 S.Ct, at
. Given that
civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with the court's decree, it is logical
that the order itself should fall with a
showing that the court was without authority to enter the decree. Accord, United
States v. Mine Workers, supra,

v.

4. Petitioner does acknowledge certain limited
exceptions, see supra, n. 2.
5. Our conclusion that the District Court acted
within the scope of the Federal Rules and that
the sanction may constitutionally be applied
even when subject-matter jurisdiction is even-

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

John J, MCCARTHY, Petitioner,
Larry MADIGAN et al.
No. 90-6861.
Argued Dec. 9, 1991.
Decided March 4, 1992.
Federal prisoner brought Bivens action seeking only money damages for denial of medical care. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Richard Dean Rogers, J., dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 914 F.2d 1411. The Supreme
tually found lacking makes it unnecessary for
us to consider respondent's alternative contention that the sanction may be upheld as an
appropriate exercise of the District Court's "inherent powers."
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Court, Justice Blackmun, held that prisoner
who sought only money damages was not
required to exhaust administrative remedies provided by Bureau of Prisons' grievance procedure.
Reversed.
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
e»229
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one among related doctrines, including abstention, finality, and
ripeness, that govern the timing of federal
court decision making.
1. Miivmistratwt L O T smd Procwhure
«=»229
Of paramount importance to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent;
where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required but, where Congress
has not clearly required exhaustion, sound
judicial discretion governs.
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>229
Constitutional Law «=>70.1(11)
Appropriate deference to Congress'
power to prescribe the basic procedural
scheme under which claim may be heard in
federal court requires fashioning of ex*
haustion principles in a manner consistent
with congressional intent and any applica*
ble statutory scheme.
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
<8=>229

Exhaustion is required because it
serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<fc=>229
Exhaustion doctrine recognizes the no*
tion, grounded in deference to Congress'
delegation of authority to coordinate
branches of government, that agencies, not

the courts, ought to have responsibility for
programs that Congress has charged them
to administer.
6. Administrative Law and Procedure
<*=229
Exhaustion concerns apply with particular force when action under review involves exercise of agency's discretionary
power or when agency proceedings in question allow agency to apply its special expertise.
7. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>229

Exhaustion doctrine acknowledges
commonsense notion of dispute resolution
that agency ought to have an opportunity
to correct its own mistakes with respect to
programs it administers before it is haled
into federal court
8. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>229

Exhaustion principles apply with special force when frequent and deliberate
flouting of administrative processes could
weaken agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard of its procedures.
9. Administrative Law and Procedure
<*=>229

When agency has opportunity to correct its own errors, judicial controversy
may well be mooted, or at least piecemeal
appeals may be avoided and, even when
controversy survives administrative review,
exhaustion of administrative procedure
may produce useful record for subsequent
judicial consideration, especially in a complex or technical factual context
10. Administrative Law and Procedure
<S=>229
Federal Courts <&»41
Notwithstanding substantial institutional interests in favor of exhaustion requirement, federal courts are vested with
virtually unflagging obligation to exercise
jurisdiction given them.
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11. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>229
In determining whether exhaustion is
required, federal courts must balance interests of individual in retaining prompt access to federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion; application of balancing principle is intensely practical because attention
is directed to both the nature of the claim
presented and the characteristics of particular administrative procedure provided.

er prisoners in the custody of the Bureau
should have direct access to federal courts.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001(b), 4042.

12. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>229
Circumstances in which interests of individual weigh heavily against requiring
administrative exhaustion are when requiring resort to administrative remedy may
occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action, when the administrative remedy is inadequate because of
some doubt as to whether the agency is
empowered to grant effective relief, or
when the administrative remedy would be
inadequate because the administrative body
is shown to be biased or has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.

16. United States e=>50(3)
Bivens remedy does not lie where Congress has provided equally effective alternative remedy and declared it to be substitute for recovery under Constitution or
where, even in absence of affirmative action by Congress, special factors counsel
hesitation.

13. United States <3=>127(2)
Administrative Law and Procedure
e=>229
Federal prisoner who brought Bivens
action seeking only money damages for
violation of Eighth Amendment rights because of inadequate medical treatment was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies through Bureau of Prisons' general
grievance procedure; grievance procedure
presented significant procedural hurdles to
assertion of claim and did not provide for
award of money damages. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 8.
14. United States e=»127(2)
By delegating authority in the most
general terms to the Bureau of Prisons to
administer federal system, Congress did
not speak to the particular issue of wheth* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the

15. United States <*=>127(2)
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, imposing limited exhaustion requirement for claim brought by state prisoner under federal civil rights statute, does
not apply to Bivens claims. Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, § 6, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1997e.

Syllabus *
While a federal prisoner, petitioner
McCarthy filed a damages action under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct 1999, 29
L.Ed.2d 619, alleging that respondent prison officials had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference
to his needs and medical condition resulting
from a back operation and a history of
psychiatric problems. The District Court
dismissed his complaint on the ground that
"he had failed to exhaust the Federal Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy procedure, which, inter alia, includes rapid
filing and response timetables to promote
efficient dispute resolution but does not
provide for any kind of hearing or for the
granting of any particular type of relief.
The court then denied McCarthy's motion
for reconsideration, rejecting his argument
that exhaustion was not required because
he sought only money damages, which the
Bureau could not provide. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct 282, 287. 50 LXd.
499.
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Held: Exhaustion of the Bureau of
Prisons1 administrative procedure is not required before a federal prisoner can initiate
a Bivens action solely for money damages.
Pp. 1086-1092.
(a) Exhaustion serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency.
Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. Otherwise, the federal courts must exercise sound judicial discretion, determining whether to require exhaustion by balancing the individual's interest in retaining prompt access to a federal
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. Individual interests have weighed heavily
where resort to the administrative remedy
would occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action, where
there is some doubt as to whether the
agency is empowered to grant effective
relief, or where the administrative body is
shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it Pp. 10861088.
(b) Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner's Bivens claim.
And, given the type of claim McCarthy
raises and the particular characteristics of
the Bureau's general grievance procedure,
McCarthy's individual interests outweigh
countervailing institutional interests favor-^
ing exhaustion. The procedure's short,
successive filing deadlines and the absence
of any monetary remedy heavily burden a
petitioning inmate's individual interests.
In contrast, while the Bureau has a substantial interest in encouraging internal
resolution of grievances and in preventing
the undermining of its authority by unnecessary resort of prisoners to the federal
courts, other institutional concerns do not
weigh heavily in favor of exhaustion. The
Bureau's alleged failure to render medical
care implicates only tangentially its authority to carry out the control and manage1. Compare Hessbrook v. Lennon, 111 F.2d 999
(CA5 1985) (exhaustion required), and Brice v.
Day, 604 F.2d 664 (CA10 1979) (same), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 1086,100 S.Ct. 1045, 62 L.Ed.2d

ment of the federal prisons, and the Bureau does not bring to bear any special
expertise on the type of issue presented for
resolution here. Nor are the interests of
judicial economy advanced substantially by
the grievance procedure, which does not
create a formal factual record of the type
that can be relied on conclusively by a
court for disposition of a prisoner's claim
on the pleadings or at summary judgment
without the aid of affidavits. Pp. 10881092.
914 F.2d 1411 (CA10 1990), reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which WHITE, STEVENS,
O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER,
JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, CJ., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.

Paul M. Smith, argued, for petitioner.
Maureen E. Mahoney, argued, for respondents.
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the
opinion of the Court
The issue in this case is whether a federal prisoner must resort to the internal
grievance procedure promulgated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons before he may
initiate a suit, pursuant to the authority of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct 1999, 29
L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), solely for money damages. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled that exhaustion of the grievance procedure was required. McCarthy
v. Maddigan, 914 F.2d 1411 (CA10 1990).
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals.1 — U.S.
, 111 S.Ct 1618, 113 L.Ed.2d 716
(1991).
772 (1980), with Muhammad v. Carlson, 739
F2d 122 (CA3 1984) (exhaustion not required),
and Goar v. Civtletti, 688 F.2d 27 (CA6 1982)
(same).
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I
While he was a prisoner in the federal
penitentiary at Leavenworth, petitioner
John J. McCarthy filed a pro se complaint
in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas against four prison employees: the hospital administrator, the
chief psychologist, another psychologist,
and a physician. McCarthy alleged that
respondents had violated his constitutional
rights under the Eighth Amendment by
their deliberate indifference to his needs
and medical condition resulting from a
back operation and a history of psychiatric
problems. On the first page of his complaint, he wrote: "This Complaint seeks
Money Damages Only." App. 7.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner had
failed to exhaust prison administrative remedies. Id., at 12. Under 28 CFR Part 542
(1991), setting forth the general "Administrative Remedy Procedure for Inmates" at
federal correctional institutions, a prisoner
may "seek formal review of a complaint
which relates to any aspect of his imprisonment/' § 542.10.* When an inmate files a
complaint or appeal, the responsible officials are directed to acknowledge the filing
with a "signed receipt" which is returned
to the inmate, to "[conduct an investigation," and to "[r]espond to and sign all
complaints or appeals." §§ 542.11(aX2) to
(4). The general grievance regulations do
not provide for any kind of hearing or for
the granting of any particular type of relief.
2. Certain categories of filings, however, "will
not be accepted" under the general procedure.
These include, among others, "tort claims.'* See
' 28 CFR § 542.12 (1991). The Bureau of Prisons
has interpreted this "tort claims'* exception to
include claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act but not constitutional claims for relief recognized under the Bivens case. Brief for Respondents 3, n. 1. Claims under the Federal
Tort Claims Act are governed by a separate
administrative procedure. See §§ 543J0 to
543.32 (1991).
3. McCarthy actually had initiated a grievance
prior to filing his complaint in the District
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To promote efficient dispute resolution,
the procedure includes rapid filing and response timetables. An inmate first seeks
informal resolution of his claim by consulting prison personnel. § 542.13(a). If this
informal effort fails, the prisoner "may file
a formal written complaint on the appropriate form, within 15 calendar days of the
date on which the basis of the complaint
occurred." § 542.13(b). Should the warden fail to respond to the inmate's satisfaction within 15 days, the inmate has 20 days
to appeal to the Bureau's Regional Director, who has 30 days to respond If the
inmate still remains unsatisfied, he has 30
days to make a final appeal to the Bureau's
General Counsel, who has another 30 days
to respond. §§ 542.14 and .15. If the inmate can demonstrate a "valid reason for
delay," he "shall be allowed" an extension
of any of these time periods for filing.
§ 542.13(b).
Petitioner McCarthy filed with the District Court a motion for reconsideration
under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 60(b), arguing
that he was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies, because he sought
only money damages which, he claimed, the
Bureau could not provide.3 Record (Exh.
7), The court denied the motion. App. 14.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming, observed that because Bivens actions are a
creation of the judiciary, the courts may
impose reasonable conditions upon their filing. 914 F.2d, at 1412. The exhaustion
rule, the court reasoned, "is not keyed to
the type of relief sought, but to the need
for preliminary fact-finding" to determine
Court. Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7. But he did
not exhaust the procedures at that time and, in
any event, he concedes that that grievance related to his request for a private cell and not to the
medical issues at the heart of his federal complaint. After his initial grievance was dismissed, he filed a grievance with respect to the
medical issues. It was accepted, even though it
was late, but was denied by the warden on the
merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. McCarthy's subsequent appeal to the Bureau's regional office was
rejected because it was filed late. Id., at 16;
Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7.
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"whether there is a possible Bivens cause
of action." Ibid. Accordingly, "'[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could
not award money damages . . . , administrative consideration of the possibility of corrective action and a record would have aided a court in measuring liability and determining the extent of the damages.' " Ibid.,
quoting Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F.2d 27, 29
(CA6 1982) (emphasis in original). Exhaustion of the general grievance procedure
was required notwithstanding the fact that
McCarthy's request was solely for money
damages.
II
[1-3] The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one among related
doctrines—including abstention, finality,
and ripeness—that govern the timing of
federal court decisionmaking. Of "paramount importance" to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent Patsy v.
Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496,
501, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2560, 73 L.Ed.2d 172
(1982). Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489
U.S. 561, 579, 109 S.Ct 1361, 1371, 103
L.Ed.2d 602 (1989); Patsy, 457 U.S., at 502,
n. 4, 102 S.Ct, at 2560, n. 4. But where
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479,^83,
n. 6, 91 S.Ct 1565, n. 6, 29 L.Ed.2d 47
(1971). See also Patsy, 457 U.S., at 518,
102 S.Ct, at 2568 (WHITE, J., concurring
in part) ("[E]xhaustion is 'a rule of judicial
administration/ . . . and unless Congress
direete othfcr*ri&fc, rigtvtfulfy %vb}e£t to
crafting by judges."). Nevertheless, even
in this field of judicial discretion, appropriate deference to Congress* power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under
which a claim may be heard in a federal
court requires fashioning of exhaustion
principles in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any applicable statutory scheme. Id., at 501-502, and n. 4, 102
S.Ct, at 2560, and n. 4.

A
[4] This Court long has acknowledged
the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before
seeking relief from the federal courts.
See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, and n. 9, 58
S.Ct 459, 463-464, and n. 9 (1938) (discussing cases as far back as 1898). Exhaustion
is required because it serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency.
[5-8] As to the first of these purposes,
the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to Congress'
delegation of authority to coordinate
branches of government, that agencies, not
the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has
charged them to administer. Exhaustion
concerns apply with particular force when
the action under review involves exercise
of the agency's discretionary power or
when the agency proceedings in question
allow the agency to apply its special expertise. McKart v. United States, 395 U S.
185, 194, 89 S.Ct 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d
194 (1969). See also Bowen v. City of New
York, 476 U.S. 467, 484, 106 S.Ct 2022,
2032, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). The exhaustion doctrine also acknowledges the commonsense notion of dispute resolution that
an agency ought to have an opportunity to
correct its own mistakes with respect to the
programs it administers before it is haled
into federal court. Correlatively, exhaustion principles apply with special force
when "frequent and deliberate flouting of
agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard of its procedures. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S., at 195, 89 S.Ct, at
1663.
[9] As to the second of the purposes,
exhaustion promotes judicial efficiency in
at least two ways. When an agency has
the opportunity to correct its own errors, a
judicial controversy may well be mooted, or
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at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided.
See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,
37, 92 S.Ct 815, 817, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972);
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S., at 195,
89 S.Ct., at 1663. And even where a controversy survives administrative review,
exhaustion of the administrative procedure
may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration, especially in a
complex or technical factual context. See,
e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765,
95 S.Ct 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)
(exhaustion may allow agency "to compile
a record which is adequate for judicial review").
B
[10,11] Notwithstanding these substantial institutional interests, federal courts
are vested with a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction given
them. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817-818, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246-1247, 47
L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). "We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). Accordingly,
this Court has declined to require exhaustion in some circumstances even where administrative and judicial interests would
counsel otherwise. In determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts
must balance the interest of the individual
in retaining prompt access to a federal
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.
"[Administrative remedies need not be
pursued if the litigant's interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further." West v.
Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (CA8 1979),
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 821, 101 S.Ct. 79, 66
L.Ed.2d 23 (1980). Application of this balancing principle is "intensely practical,"
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S., at
484, 106 S.Ct, at 2032, citing Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331, n. 11, 96 S.Ct
893, 901, n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), be
cause attention is directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the characteristics of the particular administrative
procedure provided.
C
[12] This Court's precedents have recognized at least three broad sets of circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion. First, requiring
resort to the administrative remedy may
occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action. Such prejudice
may result, for example, from an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 575, n. 14, 93 S.Ct 1689, 1696, n.
14, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (administrative
remedy deemed inadequate "[m]ost often
. . . because of delay by the agency"). See
also Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 489 U.S., at 587, 109 S.Ct, at 1376
("Because the Bank Board's regulations do
not place a reasonable time limit on
FSLIC's consideration of claims, Coit cannot be required to exhaust those procedures"); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385
U.S. 196, 198, 87 S.Ct 365, 366, 17 L.Ed.2d
294 (1966) (possible delay of 10 years in
administrative proceedings makes exhaustion unnecessary); Smith v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591-592, 46
S.Ct 408, 410, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926) (claimant
"is not required indefinitely to await a decision of the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court for equitable relief). Even where the administrative decisionmaking schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite, a particular plaintiff may
suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure
immediate judicial consideration of his
claim. Bowen v. City of New York, 476
U.S., at 483, 106 S.Ct, at 2031 (disabilitybenefit claimants "would be irreparably injured were the exhaustion requirement
now enforced against them"); Aircraft &
Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331
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countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.

[14] Turning first to congressional intent, we note that the general grievance
procedure was neither enacted nor mandated by Congress. Respondents, however,
urge that Congress, in effect, has acted to
require exhaustion by delegating power to
the Attorney General and the Bureau of
Prisons to control and manage the federal
prison system. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001(b)
and 4042. Brief for Respondents 3, 16; Tr.
of Oral Arg. 41-42. We think respondents
confuse what Congress could be claimed to
allow by implication with what Congress
affirmatively has requested or required.
By delegating authority, in the most general of terms, to the Bureau to administer the
federal prison system, Congress cannot be
said to have spoken to the particular issue
whether prisoners in the custody of the
Bureau should have direct access to the
federal courts.
[15] Respondents next argue that Congress, by enactment of § 7 of the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,
Pub.L. 96-247, 94 Stat 352, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e, has articulated a policy favoring
exhaustion of the prison grievance procedure prior to the filing of a constitutional
claim against prison officials. Section
1997e imposes a limited exhaustion requirement for a claim brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provided that
the underlying state prison administrative
remedy meets specified standards. See
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457
U.S., at 507-512, 102 S.Ct, at 2563-65.
4. The Conference Committee report states: "It is
the intent of the Congress that the court not find
such a requirement [of exhaustion] appropriate
in those situations m which the action brought
. •. raises issues which cannot, in reasonable
probability, be resolved by the grievance resolution system...." HJLConf.Rep. No. 96-897, p.
15 (1980).
The Attorney General, charged under the statute with certifying the adequacy of state administrative remedial schemes, has provided by reg112ASCL-6
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Section 1997e has no direct application in
this case, because at issue here is a Bivens
claim by a federal prisoner against federal
prison officials. We find it significant that
Congress, in enacting § 1997e, stopped
short of imposing a parallel requirement in
the federal prison context.
Section 1997e is not only inapplicable to
Bivens claims, but—by its own terms—
cuts against respondents' claim that the
particular procedure now at issue need be
exhausted. First, unlike the rule of exhaustion proposed here, § 1997e does not
authorize dismissal of an action for failure
to exhaust Instead, it provides that the
action is to be stayed for a maximum of 90
days. See § 1997e(a)(l). Second, § 1997(e)
does not mechanically require exhaustion in
every case where an acceptable state procedure is in place. Rather, it directs federal
courts to abstain "if the court believes that
such a [waiting] requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice."
§ 1997e(aKl). In other words, if an inmate
fails to meet filing deadlines under an administrative scheme, a court has ample discretion to determine that exhaustion nonetheless should be forgone. Third, in contrast to the absence of any provision for
the award of money damages under the
Bureau's general grievance procedure, the
statute conditions exhaustion on the existence of "effective administrative remedies." 4 It is difficult to see why a stricter
rule of exhaustion than Congress itself has
required in the state prison context should
apply in the federal prison context
[16] Respondents also argue that requiring exhaustion is appropriate because
Bivens relief gives way when necessary to
ulation: The [state] grievance procedure shall
afford a successful grievant a meaningful remedy." 28 CFR § 40.6 (1991) (emphasis added).
At the time of promulgating these regulations,
the Department of Justice observed on the public record: "Presumably, where monetary relief
was the sole adequate remedy and could not be
obtained through a grievance procedure, exhaustion would not be appropriate." 46 Fed.
Reg. 3845 (1981).
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accommodate either the effective functioning of government or an articulated congressional policy. Brief for Respondents
15. We have recognized that a Bivens
remedy does not lie in two situations: (1)
where Congress has provided an equally
effective alternative remedy and declared it
to be a substitute for recovery under the
Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress, special
factors counsel hesitation. Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19, 100 S.Ct 1468,
1471-72, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). As to the
first exception, Congress did not create the
remedial scheme at issue here and that
scheme, in any case, as noted above, cannot
be considered to be equally effective with
respect to a claim for money damages. As
to the second exception, respondents appear to confuse the presence of special
factors with any factors counseling hesitation. In Carlson, the Court held that
"special factors" do not free prison officials from Bivens liability, because prison
officials do not enjoy an independent status
in our constitutional scheme nor are they
likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties by the assertion of a
Bivens claim. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.,
at 19, 100 S.Ct, at 1472.
Interpreting the "special factors" exception in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,
108 S.Ct 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988), and
in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct.
2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), the Court
found the Bivens remedy displaced because
Congress had legislated an elaborate and
comprehensive remedial scheme. Sckweiker, 487 U.S., at 425, 108 S.Ct, at 2469;
Bush, 462 U.S., at 388, 103 S.Ct, at 2416.
"When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may
occur in the course of its administration,
we have not created additional Bivens remedies." Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S., at
423,108 S.Ct, at 2468. Here Congress has
enacted nothing.

B
Because Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner's Bivens
claim, we turn to an evaluation of the individual and institutional interests at stake in
this case. The general gnevance procedure heavily burdens the individual interests of the petitioning inmate in two ways.
First, the procedure imposes short, successive filing deadlines that create a high risk
of forfeiture of a claim for failure to comply. Second, the administrative "remedy"
does not authorize an award of monetary
damages—the only relief requested by
McCarthy in this action. The combination
of these features means that the prisoner
seeking only money damages has everything to lose and nothing to gain from
being required to exhaust his claim under
the internal grievance procedure.
The filing deadlines for the gnevance
procedure require an inmate, within 15
days of the precipitating incident, not only
to attempt to resolve his gnevance informally but also to file a formal wntten
complaint with the prison warden. 28 CFR
§ 542.13. Then, he must successively hurdle 20-day and 30-day deadlines to advance
to the end of the grievance process.
§ 542.15. Other than the Bureau's general
and quite proper interest in having early
notice of any claim, we have not been apprised of any urgency or exigency justifying this timetable. Cf. Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 435, 64 S.Ct 660, 672,
88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) ("The sixty days' period
allowed for protest of the Administrator's
regulations cannot be said to be unreasonably short in view of the urgency and exigencies of wartime price regulation"). As
a practical matter, the filing deadlines, of
course, may pose little difficulty for the
knowledgeable inmate accustomed to grievances and court actions. But they are a
likely trap for the inexperienced and unwary inmate, ordinarily indigent and unrepresented by counsel, with a substantial
claim.
Respondents argue that the deadlines
are not jurisdictional and may be extended
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for any "valid" reason. See 28 CFR
§§ 542.13(b) and 542.15. Yet the regulations do not elaborate upon what a "valid"
reason is. Moreover, it appears that prison
officials—perhaps the very officials subject
to suit—are charged with determining
what is a "valid" reason.
All in all, these deadlines require a good
deal of an inmate at the peril of forfeiting
his claim for money damages. The "first"
of "the principles that necessarily frame
our analysis of prisoners' constitutional
claims" is that "federal courts must take
cognizance of the valid constitutional
claims of prison inmates." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96
L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Because a prisoner ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote,
the right to file a court action might be
said to be his remaining most "fundamental political right, because preservative of
all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220
(1886). The rapid filing deadlines counsel
strongly against exhaustion as a prerequisite to the filing of a federal court action.5
As we have noted, the grievance procedure does not include any mention of the
award of monetary relief. Respondents argue that this should not matter, because
"in most cases there are other things that
the inmate wants." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
This may be true in some instances. But
we cannot presume, as a general matter,
that when a litigant has deliberately for5. Petitioner concedes that if his complaint contained a prayer for injunctive relief, exhaustion
principles would apply differently. Brief for
Petitioner 20, EL 20. Were injunctive relief
sought, the grievance procedure probably would
be capable of producing the type of corrective
action desired. Additionally, because of the
continuing nature of conduct subject to injunctive relief, the short filing deadlines would pose
less difficulty because the limitations period
would be triggered anew by ongoing conduct.
6. Respondents contend that Bivens claims are
almost always categorizable as FTCA claims,
especially in view of the Attorney General's concession that corrections guards are "law enforcement officers" within the meaning of the
exception to the intentional-tort exception of the
FTCA Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. As to those claims

gone any claim for injunctive relief and has
singled out discrete past wrongs, specifically requesting monetary compensation only,
that he is likely interested in "other
things." The Bureau, in any case, is always free to offer an inmate administrative
relief in return for withdrawal of his lawsuit. We conclude that the absence of any
monetary remedy in the grievance procedure also weighs heavily against imposing
an exhaustion requirement
In the alternative, respondents argue
that, despite the absence of any provision
in the general grievance procedure for the
award of money damages, such damages in
fact are available for most prisoners asserting Bivens claims. As to Bivens claims
that could have been brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),6 respondents contend that a grievance asking for
money damages can be "converted" by
prison officials to an FTCA claim for which
prison officials are authorized, under 28
CFR § 543.30 (1991), to award money damages. This "conversion" authority does
not appear in the regulations having to do
with the grievance procedure, which raises
substantial doubt that an inmate would
have sufficient notice as to how his claim
would be treated. In any event, respondents have not pointed to anything in the
record showing that prison officials have a
practice of converting a claim filed under
the general grievance procedure to a claim
that are not categorizable as FTCA claims, respondents concede that the Bureau of Prisons
has no authority to offer a monetary settlement.
Id., at 40. Instead, they contend that the Department of Justice has a general settlement
authority under the federal regulations that
might be exercised to dispose of general grievance claims. 28 CFR § 50.15(cX2) (1991).
Nothing in the record indicates that this authority has ever been exercised to recompense a
prisoner with a Bivens claim. Moreover, it is
highly unlikely that a monetary settlement
would be made in the course of an administrative proceeding, because the regulation provides
that *[a]bsent exceptional circumstances" a
monetary settlement will not be paid "before
entry of an adverse verdict, judgment, or
award." § 50.15(c)(3).
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under the FTCA procedure. We agree
with petitioner that it is implausible to
think that they do. The availability of a
money damages remedy is, at best, uncertain, and the uncertainty of the administrative agency's authority to award relief
counsels against requiring exhaustion.
See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S.
620, 626, 66 S.Ct. 445, 449, 90 L.Ed. 358
(1946); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs of Weld County, 247 U.S. 282,
287, 38 S.Ct 510, 512, 62 L.Ed. 1110 (1918),
We do not find the interests of the Bureau of Prisons to weigh heavily in favor of
exhaustion in view of the remedial scheme
and particular claim presented here. To be
sure, the Bureau has a substantial interest
in encouraging internal resolution of grievances and in preventing the undermining of
its authority by unnecessary resort by prisoners to the federal courts. But other
institutional concerns relevant to exhaustion analysis appear to weigh in hardly at
all. The Bureau's alleged failure to render
medical care implicates only tangentially its
authority to carry out the control and
management of the federal prisons. Furthermore, the Bureau does not bring to
bear any special expertise on the type of
issue presented for resolution here.
The interests of judicial economy do not
stand to be advanced substantially by the
general grievance procedure. No formal
factfindings are made. The paperwork
generated by the grievance process might
assist a court somewhat in ascertaining the
facts underlying a prisoner's claim more
quickly than if it has only a prisoner's
complaint to review. But the grievance
procedure does not create a formal factual
record of the type that can be relied on
conclusively by a court for disposition of a
prisoner's claim on the pleadings or at summary judgment without the aid of affidavits.
C
In conclusion, we are struck by the absence of supporting material in the regulations, the record, or the briefs that the

general grievance procedure here was
crafted with any thought toward the principles of exhaustion of claims for money
damages. The Attorney General's professed concern for internal dispute resolution has not translated itself into a more
effective grievance procedure that might
encourage the filing of an administrative
complaint as opposed to a court action.
Congress, of course, is free to design or
require an appropriate administrative procedure for a prisoner to exhaust his claim
for money damages. Even without further
action by Congress, we do not foreclose the
possibility that the Bureau itself may adopt
an appropriate administrative procedure
consistent with congressional intent
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.
It is so ordered,
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, with whom
Justice SCALIA and Justice THOMAS join,
concurring in the judgment
I agree with the Court's holding that a
federal prisoner need not exhaust the procedures promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. My view, however, is
based entirely on the fact that the grievance procedure at issue does not provide
for any award of monetary damages. As a
result, in cases such as this one where
prisoners seek monetary relief, the Bureau's administrative remedy furnishes no
effective remedy at all, and it is therefore
improper to impose an exhaustion requirement See McNeese v. Board of Education for Community Unit School DisL
187, 373 U.S. 668, 675, 83 S.Ct 1433, 1437,
10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Montana Bank v.
Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505, 48
S.Ct 331, 333, 72 L.Ed. 673 (1928).
Because I would base the decision on this
ground, I do not join the Court's extensive
discussion of the general principles of exhaustion, nor do I agree with the implication that those general principles apply
without modification in the context of a
Bivens claim., In particular, I disagree
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with the Court's reliance on the grievance
procedure's filing deadlines as a basis for
excusing exhaustion. As the majority observes, ante, at 1087-1088, we have previously refused to require exhaustion of administrative remedies where the administrative process subjects plaintiffs to unreasonable delay or to an indefinite timeframe
for decision. See Coit Independence Joint
Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 587, 109
S.Ct. 1361, 1376, 103 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989);
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.
14, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696, n. 14, 36 L.Ed.2d
488 (1973); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385
U.S. 196, 198, 87 S.Ct. 365, 366, 17 L.Ed.2d
294 (1966); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591-592, 46 S.Ct.
408, 410, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926). This principle rests on our belief that when a plaintiff
might have to wait seemingly forever for
an agency decision, agency procedures are
"inadequate" and therefore need not be
exhausted. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra, 489 U.S., at 587, 109
S.Ct, at 1376.
But the Court makes strange use of this
principle in holding that filing deadlines
imposed by agency procedures may provide
a basis for finding that those procedures
need not be exhausted. Ante, at 1090
1091. Whereas before we have held that
procedures without "reasonable time limit[s]" may be inadequate because they
make a plaintiff wait too long, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra,
at 587, 109 S.Ct, at 1376, today the majority concludes that strict filing deadlines
might also contribute to a finding of inadequacy because they make a plaintiff move
too quickly. But surely the second proposition does not follow from the first In fact,
short filing deadlines will almost always
promote quick decisionmaking by an agency, the very result that we have advocated
repeatedly in the cases cited above. So
long as there is an escape clause, as there
is here, and the time limit is within a zone
of reasonableness, as I believe it is here,
the length of the period should not be a

factor in deciding the adequacy of the remedy.

David DAWSON, Petitioner,
v.

DELAWARE.
No. 90-6704.
Argued Nov, 12, 1991.
Decided March 9, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in a Delaware Superior Court of first-degree murder
and sentenced to death, and he appealed.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed,
581 A.2d 1078, and certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that it was constitutional error
to admit stipulation of defendant's membership in white racist prison gang where
that evidence was not relevant to any issue
being decided at the punishment phase.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring
opinion

Justice Thomas filed a (lissen,ting opinion.
1. Constitutional Law €=»91
First Amendment protects individual's
right to join groups and associate with
others holding similar beliefs. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 1.
2. Constitutional Law «»91
First Amendment does not erect a per
se barrier to admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because his beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1.
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WARD v. VILLAGE OF MOXROEVILLE
CERTIORARI TO T H E SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

No. 71-496.

Arsued October 17, 1972—Decided November 14, 1972

Petitioner was denied a trial before a disinterested and impartial
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment where he was compelled to stand trial
for traffic offenses before the mayor, who was responsible for
village finances and whose court through fines, forfeitures, costs,
and fees provided a substantial portion of village funds. Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510. A statutory provision for the disqualification of interested or biased judges did not afford petitioner
a sufficient safeguard, and it is of no constitutional relevance that
petitioner could later be tried de novo in another court, as he
was entitled to an impartial judge in the first instance. Pp. 59-6*2.
27 Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N. E. 2d 757, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and

POWELL, J J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 62.

Bernard A. Berkman argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the brief was Niki Z. Schwartz.
Franklin D. Eckstein argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Joseph F. Dush.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1905.01 et seq.
(1968), which authorizes mayors to sit as judges in cases
of ordinance violations and certain traffic offenses, the
Mayor of Monroeville, Ohio, convicted petitioner of two
traffic offenses and fined him $50 on each. The Ohio
Court of Appeals for Huron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17,
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254 N. E. 2d 375 (1969), and the Ohio Supreme Court. 27
Ohio St. 2d 179. 271 N. E. 2d 757 (1971), three justices
dissenting, sustained the conviction, rejecting petitioner's
objection that trial before a mayor who also had responsibilities for revenue production and law enforcement
denied him a trial before a disinterested and impartial
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari.
404 U. S. 1058 (1972).
The Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers
and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is president of the village council, presides at all meetings, votes
in case of a tie, accounts annually to the council respecting
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has
general overall supervision of village affairs. A major
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court.
Thus, in 1964 this income contributed $23,589.50 of
total village revenues of $46,355.38; in 1965 it was
$18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 it was $16,085 of
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and
in 1968 it was $23,439.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue
was of such importance to the village that when legislation threatened its loss, the village retained a management consultant for advice upon the problem.1
1

Ordinance No. 59-9:
"WHEREAS, the legislation known as the County Court law
passed by the 102nd General Assembly greatly reduces the jurisdictional powers of Mayor Courts as of January 1, 1960; and
"WHEREAS, such restrictions may place such a hardship upon
law enforcement personnel in this village and surrounding areas as
to endanger the health, welfare and safety of persons residing or
being in our village; and
"WHEREAS, other such provisions of this legislation may cause
such a reduction in revenue to this village that an additional burden

WARD v. VILLAGE OF MONROEVILLE
57

59

Opinion of the Court

Conceding that u the revenue produced from a mayor's
court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's
funds," the Supreme Court of Ohio held nonetheless that
"such fact does not mean that a mayor's impartiality is
so diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinterested fashion in a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d.
at 185. 271 X. E. 2d, at 761. We disagree with that
conclusion.
The issue turns, as the Ohio court acknowledged, on
whether the Mayor can be regarded as an impartial judge
under the principles laid down by this Court in Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). There, convictions for
prohibition law violations rendered by the Mayor of
North College Hill, Ohio, were reversed when it appeared
that, in addition to his regular salary, the Mayor remay result from increased taxation and/or curtailment of services essential to the health, welfare and safety of this village; . . .
"BE IT ORDAINED BY THE VILLAGE OF [MONROEVILLE] OHIO:
"Section 1. That the services of the management consulting firm
of Midwest Consultants, Incorporated of Sandusky, Ohio, be employed to conduct a survey and study to ascertain the extent of the
effects of the County Court Law on law enforcement and loss of
revenue in and to the Village of [Monroeville], Ohio, so that said
Village can prepare for the future operations of the Village to safeguard the heath [sic], welfare and safety of its citizens . . . ."
Moreover, Monroeville's Chief of Police, appointed by the Mayor,
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 737.15 (Supp. 1971), testified that it was his
regular practice to charge suspects under a village ordinance, rather
than a state statute, whenever a choice existed. App. 9. That policy
must be viewed in light of §733.40 (1954), which provides that
fines and forfeitures collected by the Mayor in state cases shall
be paid to the county treasury, whereas fines and forfeitures collected
in ordinance and traffic cases shall be paid into the municipal treasury. Petitioner asserts that the Mayor conceded at trial that this
policy wTas carried out under the Mayor's orders. The record lends
itself to this inference. App. 10-11.
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ceived S696.35 from the fees and costs levied by him
against alleged violators. This Court held that "it
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case.' Id., at 523.
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in
the fees and costs did not define the limits of the
principle. Although "the mere union of the executive
power and the judicial power in him can not be said to
violate due process of law,'' id., at 534, the test is whether
the mayor's situation is one "which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the State and the accused . . . ." Id.,
at 532. Plainly that "possible temptation'' may also exist
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high
level of contribution from the mayor's court. This, too,
is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one
partisan and the other judicial, [and] necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." Id., at 534.
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio,
277 U. S. 61 (1928), which the Ohio Supreme Court
deemed controlling here. There the Mayor of Xenia,
Ohio, had judicial functions but only very limited executive authority. The city was governed by a commission
of five members, including the Mayor, which exercised
all legislative powers. A city manager, together with
the commission, exercised all executive powers. In those
circumstances, this Court held that the Mayor's relation-
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ship to the finances and financial policy of the city was
too remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward
conviction in prosecutions before him as judge.
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision. Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.20 (Supp. 1971). for the disqualification of interested, biased, or prejudiced judges is a
sufficient safeguard to protect petitioner's rights. This
argument is not persuasive. First, it is highly dubious
that this provision was available to raise petitioner's
broad challenge to the mayor's court of this village in
respect to all prosecutions there in which fines may be
imposed. The provision is apparently designed only
for objection to a particular mayor "in a specific case
where the circumstances in that municipality might warrant a finding of prejudice in that case!1 27 Ohio St.
2d, at 184, 271 X. E. 2d, at 760 (emphasis added;.
If this means that an accused must show special prejudice
in his particular case, the statute requires too much and
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional contention despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure.
In that circumstance, see Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423,
436 (1959), he may be heard in this Court to urge that
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree.
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair
trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal. Nor, in any event, may the
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is en-
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titled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.2 Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE,
QUIST

with whom

MR. JUSTICE R E H N -

joins, dissenting.

The Ohio mayor who judged this case had no direct
financial stake in its outcome. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S.
510 (1927), is therefore not controlling, and I would
not extend it.
To justify striking down the Ohio system on its face,
the Court must assume either that every mayor-judge
in every case will disregard his oath and administer
justice contrary to constitutional commands or that this
will happen often enough to warrant the prophylactic,
per se rule urged by petitioner. I can make neither assumption with respect to Ohio mayors nor with respect
to similar officials in 16 other States. Hence, I would
leave the due process matter to be decided on a case-bycase basis, a question which, as I understand the posture
of this case, is not now before us. I would affirm the
judgment.

2

The question presented on this record is the constitutionality of
the Mayor's participation in the adjudication and punishment of a
defendant in a litigated case where he elects to contest the charges
against him. We intimate no view that it would be unconstitutional
to permit a mayor or similar official to serve in essentially a ministerial capacity in a traffic or ordinance violation case to accept a
free and voluntary plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a forfeiture of
collateral, or the like.

